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ABSTRACT
Proper Names, Beliefs, and Definite Descriptions
September 1984
Thomas Charles Ryekman, B.A., University of Michigan at Flint
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Edmund L. Gettier, III
This dissertation investigates issues raised by these two questions:
(i) what kinds of propositions are ordinarily expressed by uses of
sentences that contain proper names; and (ii) what kinds of beliefs are
ordinarily on the minds of speakers when they use sentences that contain
proper names? It develops a new view about the connections between
beliefs, linguistic behavior, and propositional content, one that
explicitly denies that the kinds of propositions typically expressed by
uses of such sentences are the objects of the beliefs typically on the
minds of the speakers who use them.
Chapter I presents both the Mi Ilian and the the description theories
of proper names, and reviews the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Chapter II critically evaluates Dummett’s defense of the description
theory against the Modal Objection.
Chapter III introduces Kripke's puzzle about beliefs and proper
names, it shows that Kripke’s puzzle is not solved by the theory of
proper names recently presented by Devitt. It critically evaluates the
"consistency solutions" proposed by Chisholm, Harrison, Noonan, and Over.
Chapter IV continues the discussion of Kripke's puzzle. It
critically evaluates the "inconsistency solution" proposed by Marcus. It
viii
examines a con^entary on the puzzle by Lewis. Finally, it presents an
"inconsistency solution" based on views suggested by the Lewis
commentary.
Chapter V compares my view about the connections between beliefs,
linguistic behavior, and propositional content to the "naive view" and
the "Russel lean view.” It applies my view to solve two major problems
for the Millian theor-y of proper names.
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CHAPTER I
TWO THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES*
THE MILLIAN THEORY AND THE DESCRIPTION THEORY
Our uses of proper names and the sentences in which they occur give
rise to at least two philosophically significant questions. First, what
kind of proposition, singular or general, is expressed by an ordinary use
of a sentence that contains a proper name? 1 Second, what kind of belief
is ordinarily on the mind of a speaker when he uses a sentence that
contains a proper name? A theory of the meaning of proper names will
attempt to answer the first question; that is, will attempt to say what
kinds of propositions are ordinarily expressed by uses of sentences that
contain proper names. A central thesis of this dissertation is that we
have been ill-served by our failure to observe the distinction between
these two questions and misled by the assumption that when we answer the
first question we have, thereby, also answered the second question.
Section One
There are two major kinds of theories of the meaning of proper names.
A given theory is a Millian theory if it entails that ordinary uses of
name sentences express singular propositions
.
2
A given theory is a
description theory if it entails that ordinary uses of name sentences
express general, or qualitative, propositions.
^
According to the Millian theory, a proper name means what it refers
4to. Whatever it means to say that a name means what it refers to, there
is widespread agreement that it entails two significant theses. First,
1
2that a name means what it refers to, is held to entail that names which
co-refer are everywhere substituable both salva veritate and salva
liSnmcatiose. After all, if names mean what they refer to, then names
that refer to the same thing mean the same thing. Second, that a name
meanS “hat U refers to
'
ls to entail that when an apparent proper
name lacks a referent, uses of sentences in which it occurs do not
express propositions,
. lack propositional content, and do not say anything
either true or false. After all, if the meaning of a proper name is its
referent, then a name with no referent is a name with no meaning.
These two theses of the Mi Ilian theory are the source of its three
major problems. These problems have led philosophers to seek
alternatives to the Millian theory. This, in turn, led to the
development of the description theory.
The first of these problems is the problem of significant (or non-
trivial), true, identity sentences. Sentences
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus,
and
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus,
differ in cognitive significance. A speaker who is disposed to assent to
(1) need not be disposed to assent to (2). According to Gottlob Frege
(1975), (1) is not cognitively significant, whereas (2) is cognitively
significant
.
This raises a problem for the Millian. For, according to the Millian
theory, since 'Hesperus’ and 'Phosphorus' codesignate, sentences (1) and
(2) express the same proposition, have the same propositional content,
and say the same thing. In cases where the sentences involved express
3different propositions, the Million could always account for differences
in cognitive significance by means of differences in propositional
content. However, when, as in the case of (,) and (2), the sentences
involved (purportedly) express the same proposition, such an account is
unavailable. In fact, one could argue from the standard explanation-
from a divergence in cognitive significance, to a divergence in
propositional contenW-to the conclusion that (1) and (2) do not express
the same proposition, despite the fact that
-Hesperus’ and
-Phosphorus-
oodesignate. The Millian theory leaves us in need of an explanation of
how sentences like (2) can be both true and cognitively significant.
It is useful to regard the problem of significant, true, identity
sentences as a species of the more general problem of the apparent
failure of the substitute ity of codesignating proper names. This
general problem derives from evidence which is usually taken to show
that, contrary to the Millian theory of meaning, codesignating proper
names are not everywhere interchangeable both salva veritate and salva
significations. Such evidence is of two kinds, and one of the two is
parasitic on the other.
The first kind of evidence is that a speaker who is disposed to
assent to such as sentence as
(3) Hesperus is visible
may not be disposed to assent to, indeed may be disposed to dissent from,
such a sentence as
(4) Phosphorus is visible,
in spite of the fact that 'Hesperus* and 'Phosphorus' codesignate.
Arguing from the usual explanation of such phenomena, philosophers have
14
concluded that (3) and (4) do not express the „same proposition.
The second hind of evidence Is that speakers sometimes report on the
doxastlc state of others by saying such things as 'S believe that
Hesperus is visible and does not believe that Phosphorus is visible.' If
such reports are ever true, then, according to a very natural analysis of
belief ascription sentences-namely: rS believes that f is true if and
ly if the belief relation relates the designatum of 'S' to the
proposition expressed by then one and the same person may believe
the proposition expressed by (3) but not believe the proposition
expressed by (4). Again, such evidence would seem to prove that (3) and
(4) do not express the same proposition.
The second kind of evidence is parasitic on the first kind of
evidence in as much as one's evidence that such reports are true is that
speakers who are disposed to assent to sentences like (3) need not be
disposed to assent to, indeed are often disposed to dissent from,
sentences like (4).
The third major problem for the Millian theory is the problem of
apparently true, negative existential sentences. Sentence
(5) Pegasus does not exist
certainly seems true; nevertheless, if the Millian theory is true, (5)
does not express any proposition. This is because 'Pegasus' lacks a
referent and the Millian theory entails that sentences containing non-
referring names do not express propositions. Therefore, unless the
Millian is prepared to say that a sentence like (5) can be true even
though it fails to express a (true) proposition, he must hold that (5) is
not true.
5Another problem for the Hilllan theory is raise* h y sucb sentences as
(6) Pegasus has wings,
and
(7) Pegasus does not have wings.
It is reasonable to think of (7, as the denial of (6). and to maintain
that one of the two is true and the other false. According to the
Hill ian theory, however, since
-Pegasus' lacks a referent, neither (6)
nor (7) expresses a proposition; and, therefore, unless the Millian is
willing to say that sentences like (6) and (7) can have truth-values
without expressing propositions, he must concede the counter-intuitive
result that neither (6) nor (7) is either true or false.
Section Two
The description theory was developed to solve these three problems.
According to a "standard version" of the description theory, when a
speaker uses a proper name, he associates it with some definite
description. 5 According to the standard version of the description
theory of the reference of proper names, the referent, if any, of a given
use of a proper name is the object, if any, designated by its associated
definite description. 5 According to the standard version of the
description theory, the proposition, if any, expressed by a given use of
a sentence that contains a proper name is the proposition, if any, its
user would express were he to use the sentence that results from the
sentence he in fact used when the name it contains is everywhere
(therein) replaced by its associated definite description. This standard
6version of the description theory admits
problems described above.
According to the description theory,
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus
solutions to each of the three
a speaker who assents to
but not to
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus
does so because he associates
-Hesperus’ and
-Phosphorus- with different
definite descriptions. Suppose, for example that he associates the name
-Hesperus- with the definite description
-the celestial body called the
Evening Star- and the name
-Phosphorus' with the definite description
-the celestial body called the Morning Star.- Then, according to the
description theory, if he were to use (1) he would use it to express the
proposition expressed by
(1 ) The celestial body called the Evening Star is the
celestial body called the Evening Star,
and if he were to use (2) he would use it to express the proposition
expressed by
(2 ) The celestial body called the Evening Star is the
celestial body called the Morning Star.
For such a speaker, (1) and (2) do not express the same proposition.
This allows the description theorist to give the standard account of why
such a speaker assents to (1) but not to (2): he assents to (1) because
he believes the proposition he would use it to express and he does not
assent to (2) because he does not believe the proposition he would use it
to express. In this way the description theory explains the difference
in cognitive significance between (1) and (2).
7The description theory also explains apparent failures of
substitutiv ity. As in the case of (1) and (?) Q * ik ; a speaker who assents to
(3)
Hesperus is visible
but not to
(4)
Phosphorus is visible
does so, according to the description theory, because he associates
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' with different definite descriptions. Such a
speaker may use (3) to express the proposition he would express were he
to use
(3 ) The celestial body called the Evening Star is visible,
but use (4) to express the proposition he would express were he to use
(4 ) The celestial body called the Morning Star is visible.
Thus, according to the description theory, such a speaker may assent to
(3) because he believes the proposition he would express were he to use
(3), but not assent to (4) because he does not believe the proposition he
would express were he to use (4). Apparently, the description theory
explains why coreferential proper names are not interchangeable both
sal va veritate and sal va significatione
.
According to the description theory,"^ when a speaker uses sentence
(5)
Pegasus does not exist,
he associates the proper name ’Pegasus' with some definite description,
say, ’the winged horse of greek mythology,' and he thereby expresses the
proposition he would have expressed had he used
(5’) The winged horse of greek mythology does not exist.
One need then only refer to a theory of definite descriptions, such as
O
Bertrand Russell's, for an account of how sentence (5) can express a
8proposition, and a true proposition at that, even though its grammatical
subject, 'the winged horse of greek mythology,’ does not designate
anything. In this way, while it may not completely eliminate the
problems caused by negative existential name sentences, the description
theory at least subsumes them under problems we already have quite
independent of our theory of proper names.
The description theory offers a similar solution the the problems
raised by sentences which contain so-called "non-referring names."
According to the description theory, a speaker who says
(6) Pegasus has wings
associates 'Pegasus’ with some definite description, say, 'the winged
horse of greek mythology,' and thereby expresses the proposition he would
express were he to say
(6') The winged horse of greek mythology has wings.
Similarly, if such a speaker were to say
(7) Pegasus does not have wings,
he would express the proposition he would express were he to say
(7 ) The winged horse of greek mythology does not have wings.
Again, the description theorist then refers to his theory of definite
descriptions for an explanation of how (6') and (7') can express
propositions even though 'the winged horse of greek mythology' does not
designate anything.
9Section Three
The major problems confronting the description theory have been
stated in articles by Saul Kripke? and Keith Donnellan, 1° among others."
The objections involve theses common to most description theories of
proper names. First, there is the thesis that speakers who use proper
names associate them with definite descriptions. Foilowing Donnellan. we
will say that such a description backs the speaker's use of the name he
used, and I shall refer to this thesis as the "Backing Description
Thesis." Second, there is the thesis that the proposition a speaker
expresses by his use of a given name sentence is the proposition he would
express were he to use the sentence that results from substituting the
name's backing description for the name everywhere the name occurs in the
original name sentence. I will call this the "Synonymy Thesis."
The No Description Objection to the description theory is directed at
the Backing Description Thesis. Kripke, Donnellan, and David Kaplan,
among others, have claimed the speakers often use proper names without
being able to supply definite descriptions to serve as backing
descriptions. In fact, it seems possible to construct cases where the
speaker does not have enough information to be in a position to supply a
backing description. Such a case would refute the Backing Description
Thesis
.
The second major objection is the Wrong Description Objection. It
takes one of two forms. One form involves cases where a speaker
associates the name he uses with a definite description that fails to
designate anything—this despite the intuition that his use of the name
10
did refer to seething. The other for™ l„ volves oases where a speaker
associates the name he uses with a definite description that designates a
certain object-this despite the intuition that his use of the name
referred to a certain other obiect wp w-i i i ^ • .uj . We ll consider one version of each
form of the Wrong Description Objection.
Suppose that our speaker says
(8) Russell authored "On Denoting,"
and that he associates the name
-Russell' with the definite description
'the author of The Principia .' According to the description theory of
reference, the referent, if any, of his use of
-Russell- is the person,
if any, designated by the description
-the author of The Principia .'
According to the description theory of meaning, when he said (8), our
speaker meant what he would mean were he to say
(8’) The author of The Principia authored "On Denoting."
Of course, such a speaker’s backing description does not designate
anything; The Principia had two authors. Therefore, if the description
theory of reference is true, our speaker’s use of 'Russell' lacked a
referent. Kripke and Donnellan have maintained that such a speaker does
succeed in referring to something. On a standard analysis of definite
descriptions, sentence (8') is false; it asserts, among other things,
that The Pri ncipia had but one author. Therefore, if the description
theory of meaning is true, our speaker expressed a false proposition when
he used (8). Kripke and Donnellan would argue that such a speaker
expressed a true proposition when he used (8). If Kripke and Donnellan
are right, then this form of the Wrong Description Objection refutes the
description theory.
11
To consider the other form taken by the Wrong Description Objection,
we will suppose that our speaker uses (8) while associating the name
ussell with the definite description 'the author of The Tractatus
.
1
According to the description theory of reference, our speaker referred to
Wittgenstein and, according to the description theory of meaning, our
speaker meant what he would mean were he to say
(8”) The author of The Tractatus authored "On Denoting,"
and, so, spoke falsely. Kripke and Donnellan would say that each result
is counterintuitive. If they are right, this form of the Wrong
Description Objection apparently refutes the description theory.
The third objection is the Modal Objection. There are two kinds of
modal objection: alethic and epistemic. We shall consider both kinds
through a single example. Suppose that our speaker says,
(9) If Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a philosopher,
and that he associates the name 'Aristotle’ with the definite description
'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' Our intuitions inform us that
what our speaker says is both contingently true (here is the alethic
notion) and true a posteriori (here is the epistemic notion). According
to the Synonymy Thesis, however, when our speaker used (9), he expressed
the proposition he would express were he to use
(9') If the last great philosopher of antiquity existed, then
the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher.
In contrast with (9), (9') is both necessarily true and true a priori. 12
Therefore, contrary to the Synonymy Thesis, when our speaker used (9) he
did not express the proposition he would have expressed had he used (9').
The final objection is the Attitude-Context Objection. It trades on a
feature of the description theory discussed by Russell in this passage
12
from his lectures on logical atomism:
thing as anothar° person mems” by Tate" ^ ^ f"'the word 'Piccad i 1 i v » uQ . * * * l k » for example,
attach quite a different mea^i^g^to Th^w^d* f^ Piccadill ycould be attached to it by a person who had neverYeen tT^London: and, supposing that you travel to foreign parts and
entire! v^dTff”
100
^'
11111'' y° U WU1 00nvey to y°ur hearers
P 195-196)
propositions from those in your mind. 0 956,
According to Russell, unless they agreed to do so in advance, it would be
a coincidence for two speakers to associate the same backing descriptions
with the names they use. If Russell is right about this, and there is
little reason to think he is not, then, if the Synonymy Thesis is true,
it would be a coincidence for two speakers to express the same
propositions with the name sentences they use.
Now, suppose that Jones has been to London and seen Piccadilly. To
Smith, Jones says
(10) Piccadilly is very busy.
Later, recalling this incident, Smith says to a third party
(11) Jones believes that Piccadilly is very busy.
Smith has never been to London. He associates the name ’Piccadilly' with
the definite description ’the place represented by these [his] mental
images.’ The images in question were originally acquired many years
past, while watching a travelogue, and episode Smith has long since
forgotten. According to the Synonymy Thesis, when Smith said (11), he
expressed the proposition he would have expressed had he said
(11’) Jones believes that the place represented by these
[Smith's] mental images is very busy.
It would certainly be a coincidence if (IT) were true, and we may
safely assume that it is false. Still, (11) is true. Furthermore,
13
Jones-s utterance of ( 10 ) is good evidence for the claim Smith makes when
he says ( 11 ); however, Jones's utterance of ( 10 ) is not good evidence for
the claim Smith would make were he to say (IT). Such results seem
incompatible with the Synonymy Thesis.
Faced with such results, one might try to reformulate the Synonymy
Thesis. A natural refomulation is: when a speaker uses a name sentence,
he expresses the proposition he would express were he to use the sentence
that results when: (i) every name in his sentence that does not occur in
the that-c lause of an attitude ascription sentence embedded in his
sentence is replaced by the definite description he associates with it;
and (ii) every other name in his sentence is replaced by the definite
description associated with it by the subject of the immediate attitude
ascription sentence in which it occurs. According to this formulation of
the Synonymy Thesis, when Smith says
(11) Jones believes that Piccadilly is very busy,
he expresses the proposition he would express were he to say
(11 1
1
) Jones believes that the-F is very busy,
where 'the—F' is the definite description Jones associates with
Piccadilly.' Like ( 11 ), ( 11 ") will be true. This formulation of the
Synonymy Thesis might seem to avoid the Attitude-Context Objection.
However, it raises a myriad of problems.
Suppose that Smith says
(12) Plato believed that Socrates was wise.
One problem for the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is raised
by the possibility that Socrates was not called 'Socrates' by Plato or
any of their contemporaries, and that either no one was called 'Socrates'
14
or that Plato used
.Socrates' as a name for s«eo„e he yarded as rather
slow wlttedJ 3 If the secon(j formulat . on of the Syno^y ^
then in the case where no one, not even Socrates, was called 'Socrates,
Smith falls to express any proposition by his use of (12). If the
Synonymy Thesis as presently formulated Is true, then in the case where
Plato used 'Socrates' as a name for someone he had little regard for.
Smith succeeds in expressing a proposition by his use of (12); however,
the proposition he expresses is false. Either result is unacceptable.
Another problem for the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis
involves the apparent presupposition that there is a definite description
which is the definite description to be substituted for a name that
occurs in an attitude context. Suppose, for example, that Plato really
did use 'Socrates' as a name for Socrates. At various times in his life
Plato probably associated a variety of different definite descriptions
with the name
-Socrates, Furthermore, let us assume that just once in
his life Plato was misinformed about Socrates, and, as a result, just
once associated the name 'Socrates' with a definite description that does
not designate Socrates. Now, which of the many definite descriptions
that Plato associated with the name ’Socrates' is the definite
description that Plato associated with the name 'Socrates'? The answer,
of course, is that none of the many is, strictly speaking, the one.
Apparently, then, we need some way of choosing one from among the many,
and it is difficult to think of a non-arbitrar y way of making the choice.
We could decide to regard the definite description Plato associated with
'Socrates' in the majority of cases as "the right one." But maybe no
single one of the many fills the bill. Perhaps one was associated more
15
than any of the others, although not in the majority of cases. We could
regard the most associated as .'the right one..' But there could be ties
or an extremely close second or even third. Perhaps number of times
associated is too crude a measure, and we should look for the one
definite description Plato regarded as the most significant one. Of
there could still be ties, or, failing that, a close second or
third. One could resort to Searle's strategy (perhaps conceived for
other purposes) of using the disjunction of all associated definite
descriptions. 1 ^ This might work in the case of (12); however, suppose
that, rather than (12), Smith says
(13) Plato believed that Socrates was a fool,
and that the one definite description which Plato associated with
’Socrates* that did not designate Socrates designated someone who Plato
thought was a fool. In such a case, under the present proposal, Smith’s
use of (13) would express a true proposition. That seems wrong.
Finally, we might try to solve the problem with (12), and avoid the
problem with (13), by appealing to the conjunction of all associated
definite descriptions. This strategy would fail, however, if, as we are
assuming, Plato just once associated a definite description with
'Socrates' that does not designate Socrates. For then, the conjunction
of all associated definite descriptions would not designate anything.
Unless we can decide which of the many definite descriptions is "the
right one," the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis leaves us at a
loss when it comes to saying what Smith means when he uses sentence (12).
The second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis also runs into problems
with regard to the evidence a speaker has for the claims he makes when he
16
uses an attitude ascription sentence whose that-clause contains a proper
name * C°nSlder tHe ««* might have for the claim he makes when
he uses sentence (12). First, Smith could have evidence that Plato said
or otherwise produced a token of something that translates either as
'Soorates was wise- or as something that entails that Socrates was wise.
— he regarded as this kind of evidence. Second, Smith
could have evidence from a third party, for example Aristotle, that Plato
believed that Socrates is wise. We regard this as good evidence because
we assume that it is ultimately grounded in the first kind of evidence.
For our present purposes, let us assume that Plato really said or wrote
(something that translates as)
-Socrates was wise’ and that Smith has
good evidence that this is so. Now, unless Smith knows what definite
description Plato associated with
-Socrates' when Plato said
-Socrates
was wise,' and we will assume that he does not, there is no general
proposition, q, such that q is expressed by a sentence of the form
-The-F
was wise- and because Smith has good evidence that Plato said
-Socrates
was wise’ Smith has good evidence that Plato believed q. Really, given
his evidence that Plato said
-Socrates was wise," all Smith has evidence
for is the claim that there is a general proposition, q, such that q is
expressed by a sentence of the form -The-F was wise- and Plato believed
q. So, when Smith says
(12) Plato believed that Socrates was wise,
if he means what he would mean were he to say
(12') Plato believed that the-F was wise
(where ’the-F’ is the definite description, if any, that Plato associated
with the name ’Socrates'), then Smith is making a claim that he is not
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entitled to make. Nevertheless, when Smith uses 02) he is making a
claim that his evidence entitles him to make. Apparently, then, when he
uses 02), Smith does not express the proposition he would express were
he to use 02'). This shows that the second formulation of the Synonymy
Thesis does not succeed in avoiding all of the problems that the first
formulation has with attitude ascription sentences.
A final problem with the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is
generated by sentences like
(13) Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle believed that Zeno was
wise
.
Our intuitions inform us that when Smith uses sentence (13) he expresses
a true proposition, and one that attributes a common belief to Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. But, unless Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
associated the same definite description with the name 'Zeno,' the second
formulation is unable to specify the propositional content of Smith’s use
of sentence (13). It is implausible that all three philosophers
associated the same definite description with the name 'Zeno,' and we
will assume that they did not. As an alternative to reformulating the
Synonymy Thesis still another time, let us consider the strategy of
treating (13) as short for the following conjunction:
(13') Socrates believed that Zeno was wise, Plato believed that
Zeno was wise, and Aristotle believed that Zeno was wise.
If (13) is just a truncated version of (13'), then, if the second
formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is true, when Smith used sentence (13)
he meant what he would mean were he to use
( 1 3 T * ) Socrates believed that the-F was wise, Plato believed
that the-G was wise, and Aristotle believed that the-H
was wise,
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where 'the-F,' 'the-G,' and 'the-H'
descriptions Socrates, Plato, and
name ’Zeno.’
are the respective definite
Aristotle associated with the proper
This strategy carries all the burdens of the second formation of
the Synonymy Thesis and has the additional disadvantage of not preserving
our intuition that Smith’s use of (13) expresses a proposition that
attributes a shared belief to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
The preceding discussion clearly indicates that the second
formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is no better suited to handle attitude
ascription sentences than is the first formulation of the Synonymy
Thesis
.
Section Four
Each of the rival theories of proper names faces serious challenges.
The Millian theory faces the problems generated by significant, true,
identity sentences; apparent failures of the substitutivity of
codesignating names; negative existential sentences; and non-referring
proper names. The description theory is confronted by the No
Description, Wrong Description, Modal, and Attitude-Context objections.
In this dissertation neither the No Description Objection nor the
Wrong Description Objection receive the attention that is given to the
Modal Objection. (The Attitude-Context Objection is discussed in
Chapter V.) The No Description Objection purports to show that there are
cases where, contrary to our pre-theoretic intuitions, but according to
the description theory, no proposition is expressed by a speaker's use of
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a name sentence. The Wrong Description Objection purports to show that
there are cases where our intuitions info™ us that a speaker's use of a
name sentence expresses a proposition which is not about the object the
description theory says the proposition he expressed is about. There are
a variety of strategies that a detenmined description theorist might
combine in an attempt to show that these "deviant" cases-cases where the
speaker either lacks a description or has a wrong description-are very
rare, so rare as to suggest that we should consider retaining any
apparent intuition they deviate from
.
16
In this regard, the Modal Objection is quite different. It purports
to show that the description theory is always at odds with certain of our
pre-theoretio intuitions. For, according to the Modal Objection, the
description theory never correctly identifies the (kind of) propositions
we express by our ordinary uses of name sentences. This holds, according
to the Modal Objection, even when the speaker backs his use of a name by
a correct definite description.
Another reason for giving the Modal Objection more attention is that
attempts to rebut it have generated considerably more literature than the
combined literature generated by attempts to rebut either the No
Description Objection or the Wrong Description Objection. Many
philosophers explicitly endorse some form of Michael Dummett's defense
against the Modal Objection
.
16
In contrast, there is no single, widely
held, and clearly stated defense against either the No Description
Objection or the Wrong Description Objection.
In Chapter II of this dissertation, defenses of the description
theory against the Modal Objection are stated, explained, and critically
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evaluated. Considerable attention is devoted to Du^ett's’? defense
.
The conclusion is reached that none of the various defenses. Duett's
included, is acceptable.
Having considered, and rejected, an attempt to defend the description
theory against the Modal Objection. „e shift our attention to objections
to the Millian theory. The Million theory faces two Minds of problems.
One kind of problem facing the Millian theory involves the theory's
apparent mis-identification of the propositions expressed by uses of
certain sentences. This kind of trouble is generated by the problem of
significant, true, identity sentences and by the more general problem of
the apparent failure of the substitute ity of coreferential n^es. For,
according to the Millian theory of meaning, uses of sentences
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus
and
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus
express the same proposition. Many philosophers maintain that there is
overwhelming evidence that this is not so. The second kind of problem
facing the Millian theory involves the theory’s apparent inability to
specify propositions to be the propositions expressed by uses of certain
kinds of sentences. This is the trouble raised by negative existential
sentences and by sentences that contain non-referring names. For,
according to the Millian theory of meaning, uses of sentences
(5) Pegasus does not exist,
(6) Pegasus has wings,
and
(7)
Pegasus does not have wings,
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ls an
fail to express propositions. Many philosophers hold that there 1 ,
abundance of evidence to the contrary. We will concentrate on the first
kind of problem for the Millian theory.
Recently, Krlpke'8 poSed , pu22le about belief and proper
According to Kripke, a solution to his puzzle will abed light on the
general problem of the apparent failure of substitutiv ity of
coreferential names. The problem of significant, true, identity
sentences is a species of the general problem of the apparent failure of
substitutivity of coreferential names. If Kripke is right, and a
solution to his puzzle does shed light on these problems, then his puzzl<
is germane to our concerns. For, if „e discover a solution to Kripke's
puzzle, we may thereby discover a solution to one of the two major
problems confronting the Millian theory.
In Chapter III Kripke's puzzle about belief and proper names is
stated and explained. In addition, several proposed solutions to
Kripke's puzzle are presented and critically evaluated. The conclusion
is reached that none of the proposed solutions is acceptable.
In Chapter IV the outline of a solution to Kripke's puzzle is
presented. The solution is based on a view about the connection between
belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content that is suggested
by certain remarks David Lewis 1 ^ makes in his corrmentary on Kripke's
puzzle.
In Chapter V, solutions consistent with the Millian theory are
presented to the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and to
the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of
codesignating names. They are based on the view used to solve Kripke's
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puzzle. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the relative merits
of that view and its rival (from Chapter IV).
To conclude this introductory chapter, let us consider certain other
assumptions and restrictions that will guide this inquiry.
I will assume that there are basically two kinds of propositions:
singular and general. I will assume that normal assertive utterances (or
uses) of declarative sentences (of English) express propositions and are
either true or false in virtue of the truth or falsity of the
propositions they express. I will assume that belief is a 2-place
relation, one that holds between persons and propositions. I will assume
that sentences of the form
r
S believes that f are true (at possible
world w) if and only if (at w) the object (actually) designated by 'S'
stands in the belief-relation to the proposition (actually) expressed by
I will assume that there are possible worlds and that it makes
sense to talk about the truth or falsity of propositions (and,
deriv itively, of uses of sentences that express them) relative to, or at,
possible worlds. Finally, I will assume that if objects x and y are
distinct and F is a uniquely identifying set of properties such that (i)
it is possible that x exemplifies every member of F, and (ii) it is
possible that y exemplifies every member of F, then, if w is a world
wherein x exemplifies every member of F and w' is a world wherein y
exemplifies every member of F, then w and w' are distinct.
This inquiry is restricted by the following methodological principle:
accept no view that entails that there are essences and that we are
acquainted with, or express, essences when we use proper names to refer
to things. Some philosophers, Roderick Chisholm20 and Lewis, 21 come to
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™ind irrmediatel y. Have expressed stro„ g rese„ations about any suoh
1 ^ inter6Sted ln ho„ mu=h of what needs to be done In this area
can be done without resort to such entities.
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Notes
I WU1 assume that there are at least two Kinds of propositions:
general, or qualitative, propositions and singular, or particular,
propositions. I win also assunle that slngular ^ ^ ^
general propositions do not, have individual s-for example, rocks, trees,
Planets, and people-as constituents. The general/singular distinction,
as applied to propositions, is widely used and reasonably clear. I wU1
assume that it is clear enough for me to appeal to it in what follows.
2Keith Donnellan, Saul Kripke, and Ruth Baroan Marcus, among others,
favor the Millian theory of meaning.
^Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter
Strawson, John Searle, Diana Ackerman, Roderick Chisholm, Michael
Dummett, and Alvin Plantinga, among others, favor, or favored, the
description theory of meaning.
4The following characterization of the Millian theory borrows from
many other characterizations, but, most notably, from the one given in
Kripke (1979).
5Like the preceding characterization of the Millian theory of
meaning, this characterization of the description theory of meaning draws
on many sources. One of the clearest is that given in Kripke (1980).
In a departure from terminology handed down from Russell, with the
help of David Kaplan (1975), we shall speak of proper names as referring
,
of definite descriptions as denoting
,
and of both proper names and
definite descriptions as designating.
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In this respect, Frege's treatment differs from the Russel lean
treatment described here. For Frege,
'exists,' like 'believes' and
quotation marks, induces an oblique context. In this regard, Leonard
Linsky wrote:
the matter Of !
S ex Pli=itly deal with the matter [ieo negative existential name-sentences ]
’
'
:
we oan “"struct the Fregean account of negative
chanter 1 V" laneua8es which was presented in
ob 1 i qu e
„n
(mVp''m esasus
’ denotes what 13 ^iiTitP.^r..d8“
As given in Russell (191 0, 1975).
9 In Kripke (1 979, 1980).
1
0
In Donnellan (1966, 1972)
Interesting reviews of some of the basic objections to the
description theory may be found in Salmon (1981, p. 23-32) and in Devitt
(1981, p. 13-23).
12At least it is both necessarily true and true a priori on one of
two interpretations offered by a standard theory of definite
descriptions: its so-called "small scope" reading. It also has a "large
scope" reading which is neither necessarily true nor true a priori.
Michael Dummett (1973, 1981) has fashioned a defense of the description
theory that exploits this fact. That defense is considered in detail in
Chapter II.
13This is suggested by a version of the Wrong Description Objection
in Kripke (1980, p. 68-70).
14 .This is similar to the "cluster of descriptions" view presented in
Searle (1967).
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1
5
Two strategies come to mind. One, „hloh has reoeived Surprlslngly
tention, ls briefly discussed by Castaneda (1979, p. 155 ). He
tries to explain wby speakers *o do have backing descriptions tunable
to specify them on demand. Another is to rely on descriptions which
mention the name-type of the name-token used. This approach is suggested
by the theory of descriptions presented by Harrison (1982), which is
discussed in Chapter II. and again in Chapter III.
For example: Leonard Linsky (1977), Brian Loar (1981), Harold
Noonan (1981), and Steven Schiffer (1 977).
17
In Dummett (1973, 1981 ).
18 In Kripke (1979).
19 In Lewis (1981 ).
PO
In Chisholm (1981).
21 In Lewis (1981 ).
CHAPTER I I
DUMMETT 'S DEFENSE OF THE DESCRIPTION THEORY AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION
In this chapter we will consider responses to the Modal Objection to
the description theory-responses that try to preserve sane version of
the description theory of the meaning of proper names.' The greater part
of the chapter is devoted to developing and evaluating Dummett's2
response; however, four other responses are briefly considered.
Section One
Before we consider the responses to the Modal Objection, we review
both that part of the description theory it purportedly refutes and the
basic strategy behind it.
The Modal Objection purportedly refutes the description theory of
meaning. The description theory of the meaning of proper names consists
of two theses. First, there is the Backing Description Thesis: when a
speaker uses a proper name, he associates it with a definite description.
Second, there is the Synonymy Thesis: when a speaker uses a sentence
that contains a proper name, he expresses the proposition he would
express were he to use the sentence that results when the name is
replaced by its associated definite description everywhere it occurs in
his sentence. ^ By way of an illustration, suppose that our speaker
associates the proper name ’Aristotle’ with the definite description ’the
last greater philosopher of antiquity’ when he says 'Aristotle was a
philosopher.' According to the description theory, when he used
27
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'Aristotle was a philosopher,, he expressed the proposition he would have
expressed had he used 'The last great philosopher of antiquity was a
philosopher
.
'
The various versions of the Modal Objection typically involve such
modal properties as: being true at w, being false at w, being
—
SSarUy
-— ’ and^ £22iibly true (where „ is a specific possible
world). The strategy is to show, by appeal to our pre-theoretic
intuitions, that the name sentence under consideration and the
description sentence it is allegedly synonymous with do not share all of
the same modal properties. It is reasonable to hold that two sentences
are synonymous only if they share all of the same modal properties.
Thus, if the name sentence and its associated description sentence do not
share all of the same modal properties, they are not synonymous.
By way of illustration, let w, be a possible world where both
Aristotle and Plato exist; where Plato was the last great philosopher of
antiquity; and where Aristotle was not a philosopher. It is reasonable
to maintain that as we use them 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is false at
W
1
and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' is
true at w,. So it follows that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is not
synonymous with ’The last great philosopher of antiquity was a
philosopher,' even when the person using the former associates
'Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' 4
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Section Two
There are several ways to respond to the Modal Objection that do not
require the respondent to abandon the description theory of meaning.
One way is to deny that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' and 'The last
great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher' do not share all of the
same modal properties.
-Since 'The last great philosopher of antiquity
was a philosopher’ is true at w,, this response requires its proponent to
maintain that 'Aristotle was a philosopher’ is true at w,. Part of
Dummett's response to the Modal Objection includes this response.
However, Dummett does not maintain that this reply is generally
applicable. He seems to hold that it works only for certain names and
their associated definite descriptions; the balance of what he says
suggests that he regards such name-description pairs as rare exceptions.
To say that they are the rule, rather than the exception, flies in the
face of contemporary philosophical opinion and wide-spread, pre-theoretic
intuitions. Therefore, although we shall consider it in more detail when
we take up Dummett's response, until then, we will assume that this
response is unacceptable.
A second way to respond is to maintain that speakers do not associate
proper names with definite descriptions (which express properties) that
involve (the properties expressed by) the predicates of the sentences
they use when they use names. According to this response, the preceding
version of the Modal Objection rests on the faulty assumption that our
speaker associated ’Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of
antiquity' when he said 'Aristotle was a philosopher.' Necessarily,
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something is the last great philosopher of antiquity o„l y if it is a
philosopher. According to this response, when he said 'Aristotle was a
Philosopher, our speaker must have associated
'Aristotle' with s^e
other definite description. Such a definite description as 'the founder
Of the Lyceum' might fill the bill.
There are at least two major problems with this response. One is
that many people, philosophers in particular, associate
'Aristotle' with
definite descriptions that are necessarily satisfied by an object only if
the object is a philosopher. When we introduce Aristotle to our
students, we are prone to say things like 'Aristotle was a philosopher.
It is difficult to reconcile this response with our own behavior. A
second problem is that it is easy to imagine cases where the response's
restriction is almost certainly violated. We introduce Aristotle to our
students by saying 'Aristotle was the last great philosopher of
antiquity. Later that day one of them tells a friend about Aristotle,
saying 'Aristotle was a philosopher. It is difficult to imagine the
student associating
-Aristotle' with a definite description that is not
necessarily satisfied by an object only if the object is a philosopher—
especially when our student is ignorant of how careful he must be in
order to avoid the Modal Objection. We will assume that this response is
untenable
.
The three responses that remain are all (either) stated (or discussed
in the literature) in terms of the technical notion of rigid designation
.
Before we consider these responses, it will be to our advantage to see
what rigid designation comes to.
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The expression
.'rigid designator" was introduced into the
contemporary philosophical lexicon by Kripke In M •y R * Naming and Necess ity
(1980a), Kripke said:
possible world i t° design
1
atL^T^sa^^T^ if in every
^sig^ gif Uat^^ ttfcL? °P
Later
* Kripke (1980a) wrote:
Although the idea is now a familiar one I Uinbrief restatement of the idea of rip-in a • ’ , . 1 Slve a
intuition about names that underlies it. Consider:
^ ““
(D Aristotle was fond of dogs.
rs::e
f
re\;-\sTt
s
-^-
such that, as a matter of fact, (1) is true if and onlv i f h Pwas fond of dogs. The thesis of rigid designation is Jimp 1^-points aside that the same paradigm applies to the
I?
(1 > “ lk d
—ibes counterfactual
situations. That is, (1) truly describes a counterfactual
?onH
a
or°a ^ °nly if thS aforementioned man would have beend f dogs, had that situation obtained. (Forget the
counterfactu31 situations where he would not have existed.)
Kripke gives us two accounts of rigidity. The first goes as follows:
a term, 'd,' rigidly designates an object, x, if and only if (i) »d'
(actually) designates x; (ii) for any possible world, w, if x exists at
w, then *d» designates x at w; and (iii) for any possible world, w, and
object, y, if » d» designates y at w, then y is x. The second account of
rigidity goes like this: a term, fd ,» rigidly designates an object, x,
if and only if (i) f d* (actually) designates x; and (ii) for any sentence
form, '0( ),' '0(d)' is true at a possible world, w, where x exists if
and only if at w x has the property being a y such that 0(y) . Kripke
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regards these two accounts as (at least extensional 1 y) equivalent; so
shall we.
T»o thl „gs about these accounts are worth noting. First, neither
entans that a singular term is a rigid designator only if lt is a proper
name. For all these accounts say. demonstratives and indexicals might be
rigid designators. Furthermore, according to these accounts, certain
definite descriptions (provided they designate) are rigid designators.
Provided there is a number two. the definite description 'the even prime
number* is a rigid designator.
A second thing to notice about the above accounts is that, when we
talk about what a singular term designates (or the truth-value of a
sentence) at a world, we do not mean to be talking about the designatum
of the term (or the truth-value of the sentence) as it is used by that
world's inhabitants. Instead, we are talking about the designatum of the
term (or the truth-value of the sentence) as we use it to designate an
object in (or make an assertion about) that world. When we want to talk
about the designatum of a term (or the truth-value of a sentence) at a
world, as used by that world's inhabitants, we will say so explicitly.
Knpke tells us that proper names are, but that most (if not all) of
the definite descriptions their users associate with them are not, rigid
designators. 'Aristotle was a philosopher' is false at w, because, at
w 1> Arlst°tle is not a philosopher. 'The last great philosopher of
antiquity was a philosopher’ is true at w, because at w, the last great
philosopher of antiquity, namely Plato, is a philosopher. Kripke would
say that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' and 'The last great philosopher of
antiquity was a philosopher' fail to have all the same modal properties
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because the singular tern, that occurs in the former is. whereas the
Singuiar term that occurs in the Utter is not. a rlgid designator
.
e of the three remaining responses to the Modal Objection focuses
on a class of definite descriptions which-the respondent seems to
think derive their rigidity from the names they are associated with
because they make reference to. or are about, those names. This response
is the basis for a version of the description theory recently proposed by
Bernard Harrison (1982) in his article "Description and Identification."
According to Harrison, one advantage of his version of the
description theory, over rival versions of the description theory, is
that his, unlike its rivals, accommodates the intuition that proper names
are rigid designators. This, he claims, is because this theory restricts
the definite descriptions that a speaker may associate with the names the
speaker uses to a class of rigid definite descriptions. Harrison calls
members of this special class of definite descriptions "referentially-
identifying descriptions." 5 To evaluate Harrison's claim, I will
consider one such description and show that it is not a rigid
designator
.
^
According to Harrison, the following definite description, his
favorite example of a referential ly-identifying description, is a rigid
designator
:
D: [The] woman whose name S saw inscribed in the register.
Harrison sets D codesignative with the proper name 'Pamela Andrews';
'Pamela Andrews' is the name S saw inscribed in the register. Let a be
the person D designates. We will consider the following sentences:
(1) Pamela Andrews is from Bristol,
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and
<2>
frLTristol
0
.
36 "ame S Sa“ inS= ribed l " th. register is
Because 'Pamela Andrews' rigidly designates a, sentence (1) is true at a
world Where a exists Just in case, in such a world, a is from Bristol.
If D rigidly designates a, then sentence (2) is true at a world where a
exists just in case, in such a world, a is from Bristol.
In specifying possible worlds w2 , w3 , and w„ we will assume that a
realllis, but that Ackerman, Anscombe, and Marcus really are not, from
Bristol
.
W2 is a possible world like the actual world except that in w2 S
looks at a different register, one bearing the name
-Diana Ackerman' at
the place where the register S in fact looked at bears the name 'Pamela
Andrews.' In w2 , as in the actual world, the name 'Diana Ackerman’
designates Diana Ackerman. Sentence (2) is false at w2 ; sentence (1) is
true at
W
3
is a possible world like the actual world except that in w^ the
name S sees on the register is ’Elizabeth Anscombe,’ it having been
entered on the register at the place where S actually saw the name
’Pamela Andrews.’ In W3, as in the actual world, the name ’Elizabeth
Anscombe’ designates Elizabeth Anscombe. Sentence (2) is not true in w
3 ;
sentence (1) is true at W3.
w
4 a possible world like the actual world except that the
inhabitants of w^ use the name ’Pamela Andrews’ as a name for Ruth Barcan
Marcus. (The claim that proper names are rigid designators in no way
entails that the name ’Pamela Andrews' could not have been given to Ruth
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Barcan Marcus.)
w4 .
Sentence (2) is not true at w 4 ; sentence ( 1 ) i s true at
We have examples to support the contention that Harrison’s
referentially-identifying description, 0
, is not a rlgld deslgnator
. ^
the passage that foliows, Harrison explains why he takes D to be rigid:
register"
. th^t IT n"
1
element"?f direct d
lnSCribed] in the
possib le wor Icis^^The^ame^in^th^registe^eithe^h^^^^6
^
60^
or it does not: but if ii- either has a bearer
other, is the indiv idual the" < r^l££ld“ 1 - “2in all possible worlds. Of course S ' ' plcks outdifferent name in the register- hut in ^ ! seen a
simply pick out a different [person], e uaily rTg^y
0"
(Harrison, 1982, pp. 322-323)
igidl .
Harrison makes two major claims in the preceding passage. The first
claim is that D is free of elements capable of characterizing different
individuals in different possible worlds. Against this claim, I have
described three worlds where D picks out a different woman from the woman
it in fact picks out. This is possible because D is capable of the same
variations as
O': The woman who is named by the token S saw inscribed in the
register S looked at.
D ' contains no fewer than three elements capable of the sort of variation
Harrison says D is free of; they are: 'the register S looked at,-
-the
token S saw inscribed in the register S looked at,' and -the woman who is
named by the token S saw inscribed in the register S looked at.'
Harrison's first claim exhibits a simple technical misunderstanding of
definite descriptions.
The second of the two major claims made in the above passage is that
in a world where S saw a different name in the register, D would rigidly
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Pl0k ° Ut 3 diff6rent U“an
-
“3 iS »”*> «
-H, therefore, Harrison's
;
e
;;
d ° lal" °°mmitS t0
- w
3 » ^dly designates adifferent woman. namely Elizabeth Anseombe. ^ Qf ^^ ^ ^
“3 D E11Zabeth f tn., moreover, it that D u
not a rigid designator. However, the claim thaf •t m w
3 rigidly designates
Elizabeth Anseombe is both false and no help to Harrison.
The claim is no help to Harrison because, even if true, it would
establish only that D has this property: being possibly rigid, whereas
Harrison means to show that D is rigid; that is, D has this property
being rigid. The two properties are distinct and the former does not
entail the latter.
The claim U.e„ that in «
3 D rigidly designates Elizabeth Anseombe)
is false: when I specified W3, I neither said nor implied that D is
rigid in W3. I neither said nor implied that D "loses" a property it
actually has (i.e„ bei^ non-rigi d) or that it "acquires" a property it
actually lacks <i.e„ being rigid). Of course, one could specify as
possible world exactly like W
3
except that D is rigid; however, this
would merely serve to show that D is possibly rigid. Harrison's second
claim reveals a philosophical misunderstanding.
We may conclude that D is not a rigid designator. Similar reasoning
will show that none of the referentially-identifying descriptions
Harrison uses to illustrate his theory is a rigid designator.
A fourth response to Modal Objection is exhibited by the theory of
proper names proposed by Alvin Plantings (1978) in his article "The
Boethian Compromise." Therein, Plantinga proposed that we restrict the
definite descriptions speakers associate with proper names to definite
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descriptions that are rigid designators. (This view is not Harrison’s
Harrison proposes that we restrict the associated definite descriptions
to referential I y_identifying descriptions; then he claims that
referential
^-identifying descriptions are rigid designators. Plantings
proposes that we restrict the associated definite descriptions to
definite descriptions that are rigid designators.)
To see how this response is supposed to work, let us suppose that
-d-
is a definite description that rigidly designates Aristotle; and that,
when our speaker says
-Aristotle was a philosopher.' he associates
Aristotle with
-d.' According to the description theory, our speaker’s
use of
-Aristotle was a philosopher' is synonymous with
-d was a
philosopher.- Since
-d- rigidly designates Aristotle,
-d was a
philosopher’ is true at world w, if and only if at w, Aristotle is a
philosopher. Like
-Aristotle was a philosopher,’
-d was a philosopher-
is false at w,. So this response apparently avoids one version of the
Modal Objection.
Plantinga’s view is really much more elaborate than the preceding
discussion suggests. However, because we are going to rule this response
unacceptable, we will not digress to explain its added complexities. We
avoid further discussion of this response for two reasons.
First, there are strong, apparently decisive, objections to this
response. These have been stated in recent articles by Diana Ackerman 7
and David Austin
,
8
and in a talk by Kripke
.
9 These objections pose
serious difficulties to any theory similar to Plantinga’s.
Second, the claim that speakers associate proper names with definite
descriptions that are rigid designators apparently commits us to the view
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th" (there are and> We
wlth when He useproper names. Un essence is th. sort of property that would be
expressed by a rigid dpfim't-o , .s aeiinite description. Wherp viewn e x is an object and F is
a property, F is an essence of x if end on ly if necessariiy, if x exists
,then x has F: and neces^ari 1 u r, uu s ly, for any y, if v haa p fun ’ y s F
» the " y is X.) Some
phi iosophers, Chishoim- and Lewis" are exampies, have express. doub ts
about the plausibility of a theory that carries such a comment. We
are i„terested in seeing whether or not the descri Ption theory can be
way that does not commit us to the view that (there are
essences and) we are acquainted with essences when we use proper names.
We are now in a position to state the central question we are
considering in this chapter, it is:
Short of requiring that speake
they associate them with definite d
designators, is there an acceptable
Objection?
rs use proper names only when
escriptions that are rigid
response to the Modal
One response has not yet been considered. It is Dummett’s. That
response is the topic of the balance of this chapter.
Section Three
We will consider issues raised in a contemporary philosophical
dialogue. The dialogue’s major participants are Kripke and Dummett;
Leonard Linsky plays a noteworthy supporting role.
The underlying issue of the dialogue is whether or not Frege and
Russell were correct in their analyses of the meanings of ordinary proper
names. The primary focus of the dialogue is the claim that proper names
are synonymous with the definite descriptions their users associate with
39
"*
-- »
......... „„„
b>
-“* *“
— ...
...^~
61r a3S0°lated d8finlte d
—^«ons. In Frege: Phll0S0Dhv
tanSHlge (Dummett, 1973), Dummett argued that Krim, ,s pke's arguments do not
establish Krlpke's conclusion: In Names and nDescriptions (Linsky, 1976),
Linsky offered arguments strikingly similar to Dummett'sJ2 i„ hls
preface Nanung
.and N^essi^, Kripke replied to Du.ett. kecentiy, ln
~ Interpretation of Freg£s Philosophy (Dummett, 1981), Dummett replied
to Kripke's reply.
1 Will state and explain the major arguments and counter-arguments
that structure this dialogue. I win argue that Duett's defense of the
claim that proper names are synonymous with their associated definite
descriptions is unacceptable both because it fails to preserve our
intuitions about sentences that contain proper names and because it runs
into special problems with negative existential sentences, non-referring
proper names, and belief ascription sentences.
Initially, we limit the scope of our inquiry by restricting ourselves
to just those cases-real or imagined-where speakers who use the proper
name 'Aristotle' associate it with the definite description 'the last
great philosopher of antiquity.' We will consider the thesis that the
proper name 'Aristotle' is synonymous with the definite description 'the
last great philosopher of antiquity.' Our first argument against this
thesis is similar to arguments Kripke gives in Naming and Necessity
.
If 'Aristotle' is synonymous with 'the last great philosopher of
antiquity/ sentence
(3) Necessarily, if Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a
philosopher
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is synonymous with sentence
»>»r. -
a philosopher.
§ Philosopher of antiquity was
Sentence (3) seems false. After all, Aristotle could have existed and
«ied in early childhood, havin g never ta.en up philosophy. Sentence (A)
13 OPSn t0 tU° n°n-eqUlValent interpretations. It contains a definite
description, and definite descriptions induce scope-ambiguities. The two
non-equivalent interpretations of sentence (4) are formally represented
by
(V)
-
(CixGx]: Ey (y=x)—
y
[ixGx]: Px )
and
(4 n ) [ ixGx ] : MEy (y=x) — Px).
(Where ’L’ is a typographical variant of ’a,' and 'M,' which appears
later, is a typographical variant of ’«.’ ’Px’ formally represents
-x ii
a philosopher’ and ’Gx’ formally represents ’x is a last great
philosopher of antiquity.’) (4’) formally represents the narrow-scope
interpretation of (4); it is true. (4”) formally represents the wide-
scope interpretation of (4); it is false. If the Synonymy Thesis is
correct, and (3) is synonymous with (4), then (3) should be no less
ambiguous than (4). However, unlike (4), (3) is unambiguously false;
unlike (4), (3) does not have a true interpretation. Therefore, the
Synonymy Thesis is false.
Dummett and Linsky have responded to the above sort of argument.
Their responses are very similar, and we will treat them as a single
response. ^ The response has two parts. We turn now to the first part.
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Against Kripke, Dummett and Linsky maintain that, even if the
preceding argument were successfui in refu« ng the thesls^
•Aristotle, is synonyms with
-the last great philosopher of antiquity .
there are similar theses about pro^r names and their associated definite
descriptions for which similar arguments fail p. For example, Dummett and
Linsky claim that the thesis Fhat- n . .un t at Samt Anne’ is synonymous with ’the
mother of Mary' is not refuted by such an argument.
To see why Dummett and Linsky think this is so, consider
<5>
mother
arily
* ^ Salnt Anne eXisted
-
«<•" Saint Anne was a
and
(6) Necessarily, if the mother of Marv existed then the
of Mary was a mother.
Y
’ the "other
An argument similar to the one above, but designed to refute the thesis
that
-Saint Anne' is synonymous with
-the mother of Mary,' would depend
upon the claim that (5) is, but (6) is not, unambiguously false. Dummett
and Linsky agree that (6) is not unambiguously false and also that (5)
has a false interpretation. However, both maintain that (5) also has a
true interpretation. According to Dummett and Linsky, (5), like (6), has
two non-equivalent interpretations. Thus we find Dummett claiming:
there is
. . .an equally clear sense in which we might
rightly say, ’Saint Anne cannot but have been a parent ’
(Dummett, 1973, p. 113)
Similarly, Linsky writes:
Consider the statement, ’It is necessary that Saint Anne is
a mother’ (more colloquially, ’Saint Anne could not but be a
mother’). It is certainly true in one sense. (Linsky, 1977,
p. 55
)
If IXimmett and Linsky are right about this, then we are not yet entitled
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to conclude that 'Saint Anne' Is not synonymous with 'the mother
of Mary.
'
We will consider two replies to this part of the response to our
original argument. The replies are: first, to argue that, even if (5 )
is ambiguous, it Is not ambiguous In the "same way" as (6 ); and, second,
to deny that (5) has a true interpretation.
If we adopt the first reply, we need to do two things. First, we
need to explain what Is meant by saying that (5 ) is not ambiguous In the
same was as ( 6 ). Second, we need to explain how (5>'s not being
ambiguous in the same way as (6 ) affects the Issue at hand.
All parties to this dispute agree that (6 ) is ambiguous and that the
ambiguity in (6 ) Is a scope-ambiguity. The non-equivalent
interpretations of ( 6 ) are formally represented by
( 6 ') L([ixMx]: Ey (y=x) -* [ixMx]: M 1x )
and
( 6 ") [ixMx] : L(Ey (y=x) M-, ).
(Where *Mx» represents ’x is a mother of Mary’ and *M 1x » represents ’x is
a mother.') (6 '), which represents the narrow-scope interpretation of
( 6 ), is true; ( 6 "), which represents the wide-scope interpretation of
( 6 ), is false. Dummett and Linsky aver that (5), like ( 6 ), has two non-
equivalent interpretations and that the ambiguity in (5 ) is a consequence
of the (alleged) fact that proper names, like definite descriptions,
induce scope-ambiguities.
They recommend
(5') L([s]: (Ey (y=s) —Ms]: M ls )
to represent the narrow-scope interpretation of (5), and
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(5”) [s]: L(Ey (y=3 ) m
1s )
to represent the wide-scope interpretation of (5 ).
To say that (5) is not ambiguous in the same way as ( 6 , is to deny
that ( 5 .) ^ <5"> represent legltlmate> non_equlv ale„ t lnterpretatlons
of legitimate in the same way that ( 6 ', and C 6 ") are legitimate
non equivalent interpretations of ( 6 ): that is 1-0 a' n , to deny that the
ambiguity in (5) is a scope-ambiguity.
Certain passages of Naming and Necessity could be taken to suggest
npke holds that, in addition to the metaphysical, or logical,
sense of ’necessarily,* there is an epistemic sense of 'necessarily.*™
Citing this semantic ambiguity, Kripke could hold that (5 ) is true only
if the occurrence of ’necessarily* therein is taken to express an
^P ^ ^ ^ i
c
mod 3 1 it v. 3n d if* r*
v
• iy, a false if not. Kripke could then offer sentence
(5"') It is ajirlori that if Saint Anne existed, then SaintAnne was a mother ^ m
as a true interpretation of (5). He could then maintain that, when we
restrict ourselves to interpretations of (5 ) and (6 ) where 'necessarily'
expresses an alethic modality, ( 5 ) has just one interpretation, a false
one, but ( 6 ) has two non-equivalent interpretations. One could argue
from this difference in (5) and (6 ) to the denial of the thesis that
'Saint Anne' is synonymous with ’the mother of Mary.'
The argument would go as follows. When we restrict ourselves to just
the alethic sense of ’necessarily,’ sentence (5 ) is unambiguously false.
However, it is not the case that, when we restrict ourselves to just the
alethic sense of ’necessarily,’ sentence (6 ) is unambiguously false. If,
when we restrict ourselves to just the alethic sense of 'necessarily,'
sentence (5) is, but sentence (6 ) is not, unambiguously false, then
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^
ence (5) i. not synonymous with sentence (6). Flnally
, because
atnt Anne- is synonymous with
-the mother or Mary. 0n ly if sentence (5,lS Syn0ny”°US Wlth SenUnCe <6>
’ “
-o-l-e that
.saint Anne- is not
synonymous with
-the mother of Mary.'
This is the first way for Kripke to repiy to Dummett and Li„5ky. Ut
us now consider the second way.
Kripke can always reject the claim that (5) has a true
interpretation. He could maintain that, strictly speaking. (5) is
unambiguously false. He would then be free to give an argument, like our
original argument, against the thesis that
-Saint Anne' is synonymous
with ’the mother of Mary.’
An obvious problem for this reply is that it conflicts with the
sincere testimony of Duiett and Linsky that, as they understand (5). it
has a true interpretation. If Kripke were to reply i„ this way. he would
have to explain why some philosophers mistakenly claim that (5) has a
true interpretation.
Such an explanation can be given in terms of (5"’). Kripke could
maintain that philosophers who. like Dummett and Linsky. say that there
is a sense in which (5) is true, do so because they have confused it with
(5 ). If (5"’) is true, it would be quite natural for one who
confused (5) with (5'") to say that (5) is true.
We should pause to note that the two replies, though similar, are
distinct. Both involve sentence (5'"). The first reply regards (5"')
as a true interpretation of (5), the second reply does not. According to
the second reply, (5) does not have a true interpretation and those who
think it does do so because they mistake it for (5’"). The second reply
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would permit us to argue that
-Saint Anne- and nkthe mother of Mary’ are
not synonymous, in the very same wavy y that we argued that
-Aristotle- and
'the last great philosopher of antiquity- are not synonymous. The first
reply would not. It would require us to argue that when we restrict
ourselves to the alethio sense of
-necessarily,' (5), but not (6) is
unambiguously false. This, in turn, allows us to conclude that
,5, and
<6 > are not synonymous; and, therefore, that it is not the case that
’Saint Anne’ is synonymous with ’the mother of Mary.’
Dummett and Linsky anticipate that Kripke will adopt the second of
the two replies above. Let us see what they have to say against it.
Linsky writes:
If a similar account can be given of theHomer casp^ ho r-; v • - -\ . n oamt Anne and
..
’ Li.e., Kripke] will have protected his mainthesis about proper names against the threatened
counterexamples. I wish to emphasize the condition expressed in
* KST 1 * 1- 11
1
doubt
This is all Linsky has to say against the second reply. He is doubtful
that Kripke can give an adequate account of this epistemic sense of
-necessarily.' However, Linsky does nothing more than express his
doubts; he gives no argument to persuade us to share them. Let us turn
to Dummett.
Dummett attacks the second reply in the following passages:
Kripke
. . . wants to give an entirely different
explanation of the phenomena when it relates to proper names.
In this case, he acknowledges no role for the notion of scope:
and so he explains the ambiguity by saying that we are
concerned, under the two interpretations, with different modal
notions, different kinds of possibility. (Dummett, 1973,
p. 115)
... we have one and the same phenomenon occurring both
for proper names and definite descriptions. ... In the case
of definite descriptions, Kripke explains the phenomenon in
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terms of the notion of scoDe Fnr*hand, he considers the notion of L ^ names ’ 0n the othertherefore invokes a distinction^ kT* lnaPPlic*>le. andpossibility. (Dummett! 1 973' p .
b
n
W
6 )
en tW° kinds of
Dummett apparently holds that the second reply vlolate3 related
methOdOlOgl0al
"aXl" S
- THe firSt »™t. multiplying ambiguities
be y0„d necessity.15 The second raaxim ^ g ^ ^
Phenomenon receive a single kind of explanation.
The second reply does not violate the first maxim
: it does not
multiply ambiguities beyond necessity. Dummett would explain the alleged
ambiguity in (5) in terms of scope-ambiguities allegedly induced by
proper names. So, he exnlaind fh D nP s the alleged ambiguity in (5) in terms of
an ambiguity already required to explain other phen^ena. If the second
reply postulates an ambiguity, where on is not already required, then it
multiplies ambiguities. If it multiplies ambiguities to explain
something already adequately accounted for in terms of some antecedently
available device, then it multiplies ambiguities beyond necessity.
However, the second reply explains the alleged ambiguity in (5) in terms
of the already available distinction between kinds of necessity. The
second reply does not multiply ambiguities; therefore, it does not
multiply ambiguities beyond necessity. The second reply does not violate
the first maxim. Furthermore, unless we are certain that Dummett's
explanation is correct, and this is by no means obvious, we cannot be
certain that this is not a place where, if we did multiply ambiguities,
we would be multiplying them beyond necessity.
It is by no means clear that the second reply violates the second
maxim. It is by no means clear that the second reply ignores the
recommendation that a single kind of phenomenon receive a single kind of
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of phenomenon.
If (5) is amblguous. then there ls a sense ln wMoh the ambiguuies
in (5) and (6) are examples of the same kinH ud of phenomenon: both are
cases of ambiguity. But so are (6) and
(7) Jones is going to the bank.
Nevertheless, there is a clear sense in which (6) and (7) are not
examples of the same kind of phenomenon. The ambiguity in (6) is a
scope-ambiguity, a kind of "syntactic ambiguity." (7 ) i s ambiguous
because it contains a word, namely 'bank., which has more than one sense;
the ambiguity in (7) is a "semantic ambiguity." Until we are certain
that the alleged ambiguity in (5) is a syntactic ambiguity, rather than a
semantic ambiguity, we cannot say for certain that (5) and (6) are
examples of the same kind of phenomenon, in the sense of
-same kind of
phenomenon- intended in the second maxim. If Dummett assumes that (5)
and (6) are examples of the same kind of phenomenon, in the intended
sense, then he has begged the question against the second reply.
Let us summarize our findings regarding the first part of the
response Dummett and Linsky give to our original argument. They claim
that a similar argument fails to refute the thesis that ’Saint Anne’ is
synonymous with ’the mother of Mary.’ They say that this is because
(5) Necessarily, if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a
mother
is not unambiguously false. We formulated two replies to this response.
The first reply is that, although (5) has a true interpretation given by
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<5,,,)
lf Salnt *““• then Saint
when we restrict ourselves to interpretations of (5 ) where
-necessarily.
IS taken to express an alethic modality, (5) is unanimously false. The
second reply is that ( 5 ) is, strictly speaking, unambiguously false, and
that those no think it has a true interpretation do so because they
confuse it with (5-,. We considered two objections to this reply and
found neither very compelling. We are left with two rival explanations
for the alleged ambiguity in (5 ). So far, nothing has been said to
suggest that one is better than the other.
Even if this part of the response were successful, it would not
undermine the original argument against the synonymy of
-Aristotle- and
'the last great philosopher of antiquity.' It is designed to demonstrate
that such an argument cannot be generalised to show that proper names are
never synonymous with definite descriptions. Indeed, there may be a
class of proper names which are synonymous with their associated definite
descriptions. Dummett offers one in
-Saint Anne'; Linsky concurs and
offers a second in
-Homer' (and
-the author of the Iliad and the
Odjrssey'). This meager supply can be of little consolation to anyone who
claims that proper names are always synonymous with their associated
definite descriptions. Let us consider the second part of the response
to our original argument.
Recall the original argument. Sentence
(3) Necessarily, if Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a
philoso pher
is unambiguously false, sentence
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antiquit y^then great’ll o'*
phlloso Pher of
a philosopher P l] so Pher of antiquity was
is not. Therefore, contrary to the thesis that ’Aristotle •Ar istotle* is synonymous
With 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,' (3 ) and », are not
synonymous
.
Dummett and Linsky note that
(4”) [ixGx]: • L (Ey (y=x) —> px ),
which represents the wide-scope interpretation of («), is, like ( 3 ),
unambiguously false. With this in mind, they modify the original
Synonymy Thesis. The original Synonymy Thesis is that a speaker who uses
'tiWV expresses the proposition he would express were he to use
’iSCd/NV where
-d- is the definite description he associates with the
name 'N.' The modified Synonymy Thesis is that when such a speaker uses
’0(N),’ he expresses the proposition he would express were he to use
’p(d/N),’ Where ’0(d/N)' is interpreted so that 'd' does not fall within
the scope of any modal operator in ’0(d/N).’ 16 Let us see how our
original argument fares against the modified Synonymy Thesis.
Unlike the original Synonymy Thesis, the modified Synonymy Thesis
does not entail that (3) and (4) are synonymous. Instead the modified
Synonymy Thesis entails that (3) and the interpretation of (4) formally
represented by (4”) are synonymous. Our original argument depended on
the claim that (3), unlike the sentence it was said to by synonymous
with, is unambiguously false. Because (4") is unambiguously false, such
an argument will fail against the modified Synonymy Thesis.
Note that, in modifying the original thesis, Durronett and Linsky have
conceded a point to Kripke. They have conceded that the original
50
argument refutes the orlgi„al Synonymy Thesis.
.towevcr. the modlfled
Synonymy Thesis preserves much of what some fi„a attractive about the
original thesis: through the meanings of certain sentences in which they
occur, the meanings of proper names are accounts for in terms of the
meanings of their associated definite descriptions.
This concludes the first round of the dialogue between Kri pke and
Durrmett.
Section F our
Kripke initiates the second round of hi
preface to Naming and Necessity
. Therein
s dialogue with Dummett in his
Kripke writes:
It has been asserted that my own view itself rpHnnnc 4-
read with a i a v. n£1 . f
context of any sentence, should be
1 ^ 8 0Pe lncludi"g all modal operators. Thislatter idea is particularly wide of the mark* in tcrm^logic, it represents a technical error
.
*
[(8)] and KQVl
3
[stated below] are simple sentences. Neithe^ contains modal orother operators, so there is no room for any scope distinctions
int:rpr
e
et
0
a«iro
l
f°th
abOUtT ^interpr t tion o ese sentences. Yet the issue of rigid itvmakes sense as applied to both. My view is that ’Aristotle* in
r (n \ I
P1
f
1
* U the last great philosopher of antiquity’ in
m
9
! .
not * No hypothesis about scope conventions for modalcontexts expresses this view; it is a doctrine about the truth-conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (thepropositions expressed by) all sentences, including simple
sentences. ° -
the
12 )
This shows that the view that reduces rigidity to scope in
manner stated is simply in error. (Kripke, 1 980a, pp. 11-
The argument from Kripke's Preface involves the truth-values of
sentences
(8) Aristotle was fond of dogs
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and
(9) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs
relative to the possihle world, w„ partially specified as follows: at
1 * °tle and Plato exist
’ Aristotle did not go into philosophy,
Plato was antiquity's last great philosopher, Aristotle was not fond of
dogs, and Plato was fond of dogs. '7 Sentence (8) is false at w„ slnoe
Aristotle is not fond of- dogs at Sentence (9) is true at w r If the
modified Synonymy Thesis were true, then (8) would be synonymous with
(9). If (8) were synonymous with (9), then (8) and (9) would be
logically equivalent. If (8) and (9) were logically equivalent, then
there would be no possible world relative to which (8) is false and (9)
is true. But w, i 5 suc h a world. Therefore, the modified Synonymy
Thesis is false.
Dummett's response to the argument from Kripke's Preface rests on
Durrmett’s views about the connection between semantic theories for
natural language, the data such theories must preserve, and our pre-
theoretic intuitions. 1
8
In this regard, Dummett writes:
Since Frege, philosophers engaged in logical analysis have
usually proceeded, as he did, in two stages. The first stage isto transform sentences of the natural language into what Quine
calls a regimented’ form; the second is to construct a semantic
theory whose direct application is to the regimented language.
The semantic theory states how each sentence of the regimented
language is determined, in accordance with its composition, as
true or as false; it indirectly assigns truth-conditions to
sentences of natural language in virtue of the mapping of those
sentences on to the regimented ones. The entire analysis is to
be judged successful or unsuccessful by whether the truth-
conditions thus indirectly assigned to sentences of natural
language accord with our intuitive understanding of those
sentences. The regimentation cannot be judged correct or
incorrect in isolation: it has no significance on its own, but
only as supplying the syntactic forms to which we formulate the
semantic theory as applying. (Dummett, 1981, p. 574)
52
As characterized by Dummpt-i-y mett, the semanticisfs job is a two-step
Procedure. First, certain sentences of English are formally represented
^ 3 giV6n f0mal lan§UaSe ^ wel 1-formed formuli of that formal
language. Where 0 is a sentence of English and y •d* is a well-formed
formula of the formal language a franci *-•8 . translation procedure is specified It
may be th0Ught of as n^ing sentences of the form!
Vif and only If
In such as case X represents * . Second, truth-conditions are directly
assigned to the well-formed formuli of the foraal language. 4 formal
semantics is given. Where is as above, the semantics will lssue
sentences of the form:
X 1 is true if and only if
where sentence Vis a direct specification of the truth-conditions of the
formulaX
. t is then taken to be an indirect specification of the truth-
conditions of the original English sentence^. The entire project is a
success just in case, for every
<j> invol ved, our intuitions about accord
with sentences of the form:
*'<!>' is true if and only ifY' 7
.
Dummett steadfastly maintains that the only relevant intuitions-the only
intuitions the semantics must accommodate—are our pre-theoretic
intuitions. A theory which fails to preserve such intuitions must be
rejected or revised.
Dummett points out that we must consider two rival accounts of
sentences like
(8) Aristotle was found of dogs
and
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(10) Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy.
In this regard, Dummett writes:
Two strategies are possible Onp s Q +.the mechanism of scope. On .
t0 aPPea l once more to
'Deutero-Isaiah' is k5 ,l the “Passion
represented in the ’regimented ll» r °w the Pr °Phecy', to bedenotation in possible worlds „e havTa^eaSv c
6
™-?'’ Whose
regimented versions of 'Deutero-Isaiah a - a
d
/ oonslder «i- The
'The author of the croBheov h ! ,
Kd ln lnfandy ' and of
same, namely D(t)' This is not
" lnf
'
ancy ' w111 then be the
'the author of the prophecv” ^ ,Deuta>-o-ISalah' and
admit the regimentation ( t) M .
* eS not
A1 ternativ ely, we may represent 'Deutero-Isaiah' bv a
stipulated
6™
'fh
° f ^ regimented language, which isin the semantic theory to be a rigid designator,denote in every possible world the object identicalwith the actual referent of 'Deutero-Isaiah' (or of 'f) Inthis case, 'Deutero-Isaiah might have died in infancy' may beregimented as ’OD(d)'; as Kripke remarks, this sentence will
^981, p! 577)
tr nth-conditions as
' Ux.<)D( x) } ( d)'. (Dummett,
Thus, according to Dummett, (10) can be formally represented either
by
(10') D (d)
or by
(10") Ux.D(x)KiyAy).
Where 'd' is stipulated to be rigid designator and 'iyAy' is interpreted
as an incomplete symbol a _la Russell: 'iyAy' will not be a rigid
designator. (We will let 'Ax' represent 'x is an author of the
prophecy.' Dummett uses ' t' as a metalinguistic variable which takes
expressions with the semantic properties of definite descriptions as
values
.
)
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Dummett maintains that no relevant datum-no pne-thecetlc intuition
about sentence (1 0,
-supports representing (10) as do-, (whloh he
regards as Krlp.e-s analysis of (10,) rather than as (10-) (which Is his
own analysis of (10)19). Thus Dummett writes:
.
Which of the two analyses ought we to nrpfw? r •intuition will not help us here, at least in so far aslt
°
relates to the truth-conditions of sentences of naturalanguages, since both analyses ascribe exactlv i-h
conditions to such sentences. (S»e?t. 198lf Ts/lT
Along these same lines, Dummett would maintain that no relevant datum
supports representing
(8) Aristotle was fond of dogs
as
(8 ' ) F( a)
rather than as
(8'”) {Xy. D(y) }( ixGx)
.
Now, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, for a speaker who
associates 'Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of antiquity,'
English sentences of the form
r
0 (Aristotle)"1
are synonymous with the wide-scope interpretations of English sentences
of the form
0(the last great philosopher of antiquity/ Ar istotle)*1
.
The wide-scope interpretations of sentences of the form
#(the last great philosopher of antiquity/ Aristotle)1
are adequately represented in our formal language by formuli of the form
*”{Xx.0(y) }( ix Gx )"*.
Dummett maintains that no relevant datum supports representing (8) as
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<8') rather than as (8") and that- „„at no relevant datum supports
representing (,0) as (10-, rather than as <10") In' addition, he makes
the more sweeping claim that no relevant datum supports representing
sentences of the form
^(Aristotle)'1
by a formuli of the form
f$( a)"7
rather than by formuli of the form
r
Uy.^(y)}(ixGx)’\
Formuli of the form
rUy.^(y) KixGx)-1
represent^ the wide-scope interpretations of English sentences of the form
0(the last great philosopher of antiquity/Aristotle)-1
.
Therefore, If Arnett’s general claim is correct, no relevant datum will
show that the truth-conditions for English sentences of the form
^(Aristotle)"1
differ from those for the wide-scop* interpretations of English sentences
of the form
^(the last great philosopher of antiquity/ Aristotle)”1
.
So, Durrmett would maintain that no relevant datum shows either that
(8) Aristotle was fond of dogs
is not synonymous with the wide-scope reading of
(9) The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs
(which is formally represented by (8")) or that
(10) Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy
is not synonymous with the wide-scope reading of
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(11) The author of the prophecy died in infancy
(Which is formally represented by (10"),
. If Dummetfs general claim is
correct, no relevant datum will Serve as the basis for an arg-ent from a
divergence of truth-conditions to the denial of the modified Synonymy
Thesis
.
Kripke would doubtless agree with Dummett that if no relevant datum
favored representing sentences of the form
r
^( Aristotle)"1
by formuli of the form
rather than by formuli of the form
r
Uy.^(y)HixGx)"\
then his modal arguments do not refute the modified Synonymy Thesis.
Nevertheless, Kripke maintains that there is datum against representing
(8) as (8 M ) and, by default, in favor of representing (8) as (8'). For
according to Kripke, a theory of names must be adequate to the apparent
intuition that (8) is false at w-|, (8') is false at w-j, and (8 M ) is true
at w
i
.
Dummett is apparently willing to concede the point that (8') is false
at w-j and (8") is true at w-|. For he writes:
The choice between them [i.e., the two analyses] may seem
important, however. On the second analysis, the regimentation
'D(d)' of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy* is true with respect
to any possible world v such that *D(x)' is true of i with
respect to
_v. In such a world *t* will not of course denote i,
but may denote some other object
_j of which *D(x)' is not true
with respect to ^v. On the first analysis, however, the
regimentation of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy' will be
'D(t)', and this will be false with respect to _v. (Dummett,
1981, p. 578)
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The first analysis is of course Dumetfs analysis of ( 10 ), namely
CO"). The second analysis is (IC), the analysis Dummett attributes to
KriPke
- ThS P° lnt ° f «»* there is a world relative to
*ich (10.) and (10") differ in truth-value. Dummett would almost
certainly concede the same technical point about (8>) and (8"), and
acknowledge that (8') is false, whereas (8") is true, at
However, although Dummett will concede the "technical point" that
(8') and (8")~.a well as (10') and <10">-differ in their world-
relative truth-values, he would deny that it thereby follows that (8")
is an unacceptable analysis of (8) or that (10") is an unacceptable
analysis of (10). Putting the issue in terms of (10) and its rival
analyses, Dummett rejects the notion that the divergence in world-
relative truth-values in (10') and do") is evidence that one of them is
better suited to represent (10) than the other because Dummett holds that
a semantic theory need not accommodate Kripke's apparent intuitions about
the world-relative truth-value of (10) (or of (8)). In this regard,
Dunmett writes:
This argument leaves it obscure at which level it isintended to apply: at that of our intuitions concerning
sentences of natural language, or at that of our regimentations
of those sentences and the semantic theory we present asgoverning them. At the latter level, it is certainly correct.Let v be a world in which the individual who in fact composed
e prop ecy died in infancy, but in which someone else composedthe very same prophecy. Then, on the first of the two analyses
K
1S
^
S
N?
d above
’
'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy’ is representedby ’D(t) which is false with respect to v_, whereas, on the
second analysis, it is represented by a sentence 'D(d)' which is
true with respect to v . . . Kripke’s argument is irrelevant if
it is concerned only to make this point, which is indeed a
"technical" one. It has force only if it be held that, among
the linguistic intuitions to which a logical analysis is to be
held responsible, there are ones which bear, not upon the
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absolute truth or falsitv nf
falsity with respect to hypothetical 17’
bUt UP°n Us truth or
1981, p. 581) P circumstances. (Dummett,
The preceding passage identifies the basic disagreed between
Dumnett and Kripke. KripKe claims to have as an intuition
(K) (8) is false at w
1
.
Dummett denies that he has any such intuition and refuses to count (K) as
part of the data a theory of names must preserve. Against admitting «)
as datum, Dummett writes:
Isaiah might have died in infancy- as true. Truth or ?aTsit3with respect to possible worlds is a very different
tMng
trUt
a
h °r
a
alS
i
ty ° f ““"^factual conditionals. For Z?hin , sound judgement that, if Jones had attended themeetmg, he would have proposed a vote of censure on thechairman does not amount to a judgement that it would have beeni2££^ible for Jones to attend the meeting without proving
Led a vTlf th6ref0re d06S "0t dema"d Jonesproposed ote of censure' is true with respect to everypossible world with respect to which 'Jones attended themeeting is true. For another thing, we may judge a
counter factual statement to be correct without committing
ourselves to accepting the antecedent as stating a genuinepossibility. The notion of truth-value with respect to possibleworlds is a technical one, which may or may not admit a coherent
explanation, but it belongs to the semantic theory rather thanthat understanding of our own language which is datum for
such theory. (Dummett, 1981, pp. 581 -581 )
Durrmett appears to have two reasons for refusing to admit (K) as
datum. First, Dummett holds that claims about the world-relative truth-
values of sentences make reference to the theoretical entities—possible
worlds—of the theory under consideration; and, therefore, are not part
of the data the theory must preserve. Second, Dummett holds that our
beliefs about the world-relative truth-values of sentences are not
generally clear and consistent; and, therefore, are generally unreliable.
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Let us consider the force of Dummetfs spnonnett s ec d reason against admitti
(K) as datum.
ng
Each of the following states of affairs Is compatible with Lett's
clalm that our beliefs about the world-relative truth-values of sentences
are not generally clear and consistent: (i) a recognizable subset of
such beliefs both contains only beliefs which are clear and mutually
consistent and Includes (K); and (ii) an identifiable subset of native
speakers of English boUi contains only members who espouse nothing but
Clear and mutually consistent beliefs about such matters and includes
Kripke and others *o claim (K) as an intuition. So long as either of
(i) and (ii) are live options-and nothing Dummett has said suggests that
they are not-we would be rash to dismiss (K) on the basis of Dunmett's
claim that such beliefs are not generally clear and consistent. We
should not conclude from what Dunrnett actually asserts in this regard
that <K> should not be counted as datum. Let us see what can be said for
admitting (K) as datum despite its apparent reference to possible worlds.
(K) involves apparent reference to possible worlds; that Is, to the
theoretical entities of possible worlds semantics. To see what force
this has against counting (K) as datum, two things must be considered.
First, we must see whether or not it is "bad philosophy" to test a theory
against our beliefs about its theoretical entities. Second, we must
inquire whether or not (K) admits of a reformulation which avoids
apparent reference to possible worlds but which still ''argues'' against
the modified Synonymy Thesis.
It is far from obvious that it is ''bad philosophy" to test a theory
against our beliefs about its theoretical entities. If we are realists
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about our theories and their ontological comments, then, if „e find
ourselves quantifying over possible worlds, we must acknowledge that we
think such things exist. We must ackm„ledge that there are possible
worlds, even if ue Mediately try to "reduce- the™ to entities we were
already committed to. (For example, by saying that possible worlds are
really just maximal, consistent sets of propositions.)
When we discover that we are coranitted to possible worlds, it does
not seem unreasonable to consider their relations to things we were
already committed to. It does not seem unreasonable to form beliefs
about how possible worlds relate to such things as sentences, or
propositions, and truth-values. So, our philosophical curiosity ccxnpels
US to pose questions like,
-Is (B) true at w, ? - when we think we have an
answer say, that (8) is false at w-|—we would be irresponsible if we
refused to apply our answer in order gain further information about the
things the answer involves. Therefore, applying our answer in the hope
of deciding between rival analyses of (8) does not sound like "bad
philosophy." In fact, quite the reverse is true: to arrive at an answer
and then refuse to apply it sounds like a much better recipe for "bad
philosophy." In the face of these considerations, we would be hasty to
conclude, simply from the fact that (K) involves apparent reference to
possible worlds, that (K) should not be considered when we try to decide
between competing analyses of (8). Dummett, who would have us reject
(K), owes us a better explanation of why we should than the one he has
provided
.
There is a reformulation of the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to
in his Preface which avoids reference to possible worlds and which
61
FGfcsins the force nf (v\
f , .
he ”0dlfied S»«»W Thesis. One suchormulation is:
(K') Had Aristotle exisi^ri k
a Philosopher, and had PlatoTxisted °b
“d "°b bee"
and been the last great nhl l f een fond of dogs,
«e use (8), (8) would be false
P ° f antiCIUit^ ‘hen. 'as
(K') is a perfectly legitime contrary-to-fact conditional. It makes no
reference to possible worlds. Kripke would doubtless agree that he has
«•> as an intuition and would regard it as a reasonable reformation of
the apparent intuition he appeals to in his Preface.
Semantic theories, like other theories in philosophy or in the
sciences, should not restrict themselves to what is the case. They must
also be responsive to questions about what could have been the case or
could still be the case. They must answer questions of the fo™.
-How
are S and T related?. In addition, they must answer questions of the
form, 'How would S and T be related if such-and-such obtains?. Letting
'S' and
-T- take sentences and truth-values as their respective values,
<K-> is an answer to one such question; and, therefore, <K') appears to
be perfectly legitimate datum. It is not, however, datum that Dummett's
analysis preserves. For, according to Dummett's analysis, (K-) is false;
whereas (K-) is true according to the analysis Dummett attributes to
Knpke. Apparently, in «') we have admissible datum which supports
Kripke’s case against the modified Synonymy Thesis.
Assuming that Dummett would still defend the modified Synonymy
Thesis, he has just two options: (i) deny that (K») is admissible datum;
and (ii) offer a substitute formulation of (K‘) which both captures the
apparent intuition Kripke appeals to and comes out true according to
Dunmett's analysis. Let us consider the second option.
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Dumnett might propose to capture the apparent intuition Kripke
appeals to with the following:
a philosopher, anfhad Plat^txisted
“bet^r’ 7
*
f
"
7
^
and been the last great ohiln^nho
’
en fond o dogs,
would not be the case that AristotlVwas^nd^o^'do^’ “
(D) is true under both analyses. If (D) better captures the apparent
intuition that Kripke appeals to than «•), then „e can no longer be sure
that (K-) is admissible datum against the modified Synonymy Thesis.
In discussing his apparent intuition, Kripke reports:
W ^ iS 3 doctrine about the truth-conditions, with
ex%esLrbv)
U
a
n
ir
f
s
a
^
Ual Situations
*
of propositions
(Kripke!
,980^ 12 ) **'
Kripke would almost certainly deny that (D) does a better job than (K-)
of capturing the apparent intuition he appeals to in his Preface. That
intuition is about sentence (8) and the truth-value it would have had a
certain state of affairs obtained. (This is stated in the passage quoted
above on page 31.) (K 1 ) has the appropriate subject matter; (D) does
not. (D) is not about sentence (8), nor is it about a truth-value. (D)
is not a faithful rendering of the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to.
To defend the modified Synonymy Thesis, Duimiett must say that (K 1 ) is
not admissible datum. Dummett must deny that (K») is among his
intuitions and maintain that Kripke is confused or mistaken when he
claims that (K T ) is among his intuitions. Dummett could then hold that
we have reached an impasse, that Kripke’s modal arguments are, at best,
inconclusive, and that now is the time to consider the other ways in
which description theories of meaning are superior to the sort of theory
Kripke seems to favor. Dummett could remind us that descriptions
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theories, in contrast with their Millian rivals, deliver clean solutions
to the problems of negative existential sentences, non-referring names,
and significant, true, identity sentences.
In reply Kripke could hold fast to «•>. and maintain that it does
represent a genuine intuition, one which would be accepted by native
speakers of English who are not committed to certain theories about
proper names. In addition, Kripke could remind Dumnett of the problems
generated for description theories by the No Description Objection and
the Wrong Referent Objection. He could also recall problems descriptions
theories have with belief ascription sentences: namely, deciding which
descriptions—the speaker's or the alleged believer's—should be
substituted for proper names which occur in the that-clauses of such
sentences. Finally, Kripke could point out special new problems raised
for Dummett's Synonymy Thesis by negative existential sentences, non-
referring names, and belief ascription sentences. These new problems are
discussed below.
We may assume that the following sentence is true!
(12) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
So, it is reasonable to expect that the following sentence also be true:
(13) Possibly, Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
Nevertheless, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, (13) should be
formally represented by
(13') Ux.M(-Ey y=x) }( izHz)
,
where 'Hx' formally represents 'x is a Holmesizer.' Since entails the
existence of a Holmesizer, (13') is false. Apparently, then, a
description theory which incorporates the modified Synonymy Thesis does
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not handle negative existential sentences as cleanlv a,
hoped.
°ne might have
The description theory is praised for its apparent success in
Handling the Problems raised hy sentences that contain non-referring
names. Many description theorists would regard the following sentence as
true
:
m> Elther^ °r »«-look Holmes is a detective
Thus, it is reasonable to expect them to also hold that the following is
true
:
(15) Possibly, either 2+2 =« or Srerloch Holmes is a detective.
After all, (15) merely asserts the ^sslbility of a disjunctive state of
affairs one of whose disjuncts necessarily obtains. Nevertheless,
according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, (15) must be formally
represented by
0 5') {Xx.M(2+2=4 v Dx) }( iyHy)
,
where ’Dx' formally represents ’x is a detective.’ Like (13’), (15.)
entails the existence of a Holmesizer; and, therefore, like (1 3’), ( 15 «)
is false. So it appears that a description theory based on the modified
Synonymy Thesis will have its own problems with non-referring names/
Description theories have been praised for their success in
accommodating alleged truths like
(16) Smith believes that Sherlock Holmes is a detective.
(16) seems open to two non-equivalent representations:
(16') {><x.Bs, DxKiyHy)
and
20
(16'
') Bs, {Xx.Dx} ( iyHy)
,
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where 'Bn, y formally represents 'x believes that y.'
unacceptable. It entails the existence of a Holmeslzer.
theories are also often credited for their treatment of
(16’) is
Description
apparently true
sentences like
(17) Smith does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
But, like (16), (17) seems to admit two non-equivalent formalizations,
namely:
(17') Ux.Uy-Bs, x = y}(izP
1z )}( iXl H lXl )
and
(17")
-Bs, Ux.Uy. x=y}(izP
1z )}(iXl H lXl)>
where H-jX represents 'x is a Hesperizer' and 'P-|X' represents 'x is a
Phosphorizer.' However, if (1 7 ) really is true, it would be a mistake to
represent it by (17), since (17') is false. This suggests that the
modified Synonymy Thesis must be amended to require that the second place
of formuli representing belief ascription sentences-and attitude
ascription sentences in general— is occupied by closed sentences of the
representing formal language. (16") then becomes the only acceptable
rendering of (16), and (17") becomes the only acceptable rendering of
(17).
This treatment of (16) and (17) suggests that sentence
(18) Possibly, Smith believes that Sherlock Holmes is a
detective
should not be represented by
(18') {/Oc.M(Bs, Dx) }( iyHy)
,
but rather by
(18") M(Bs, {Xx.Dx} ( iyHy) )
.
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This Is well and fine, especially In lieht „r „ ,y lg of the ^ct that (18') entails
6 existence of a Holmesizer* stil i !+• j
’ ll u does present a problem. Strictly
speaking, the modified Synonymy Thesis requires that (18) h4 1 «> be represented
by For (18, represents the reading 0 f (18) (the
Holmesizer/Sherlock Holmes) where the scope of
-the Holmesize, includes
all modal operators. Of course discretion is the better part of valor
and, so, the modified Synonymy Thesis must be "remodified" to allow
(18 M ) to represent (18).
The remodified Synonymy Thesis is that a speaker who uses '*<„) and
Wh° aSS0°lateS the n“ e wlth th. definite description
'd* expresses
the proposition he would express were he to use '(S(d/N),' where 'jj(d/N>'
la interpreted so that: (i) every occurrence of 'd' in '*< d/N ,, that is
not in a that-clause of some attitude ascription sentence in '(J(d/N)' is
read with a scope that includes all modal operators In 'jS(d/N)'
: and (ii)
every other occurrence of
-d- in '(kd/N )' is read with a scope that does
not exceed, but which includes all modal operators in
,
the sentential
component of the that-clause in ,*ich is occurs. According to the
remodified Synonymy Thesis, (18) is to be represented by (18"), but by
08').
This move is independently motivated. We are operating under the
assumptions that propositions are the objects of beliefs and that the
that-clauses of belief ascription sentences name the propositions
allegedly believed (i.e., the propositions expressed by the sentential
components of such that-clauses). Traditionally, formal expressions like
'Dx' (and "English expressions" like 'that x is a detective') have been
taken to designate propositional functions, not propositions.
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Phers trade in
-
- Ply their trade in terras
0 f<>rmal langUageS tradlU °nally >»“ only the olosed sentenoes of
“e" f°mal langU3ge (reP~
---ion. of Engll sh which) deslgnate
propositions. So the representations required bv th„y e remodified Synonymy
Thesis bring Durrcnett’s project more in line with our assumptions and a
long standing tradition.
Despite its apparent advantages, even the recodified Synonymy Thesis
has Problems with belief ascription sentences. Consider this sentence:
09) Possibly, Aristotle was not a philosopher, Plato was the
^ y * and Aristotie b—
(19) is about a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle has a certain
false belief about himself. According to the recodified Synonycy Thesis,
09) is to be formally represented by:
<19,> 4 y=1ZGZ 4 BX> Ux
'-
Px l' “»1<*1)» (1«, R.,))
where 'Px' represents 'x is a philosopher' and 'Rx' represents 'x
authored The ReEublic.'ZI <1 9 ') is not an acceptable representation of
(19). For (19') is not about a counterfactual situation in which
Aristotle has a false belief about himself
. ( 1
9
») i s about a
counterfactual situation in which Aristotle has a true belief about
Plato. Therefore, like the modified Synonymy Thesis it is meant to
replace, the remodified Synonymy Thesis has special problems when it
canes to belief ascription sentences.
Where *0 (N ) f is a sentence which contains the proper name 'N' and
contains no modal operators, we generally think that 'Possibly, 0(N)'
expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility of the
proposition expressed by '0 (N ) .* We think that *0 (N )' expresses a
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proposition which attributes the property of h •P being an x such that 0(N) to
the referent of 'N » or fo r r ,, the-F (where 'the-F' is the definite
description associated with the name »). Dumett seems to thin, the
Same 3bOUt ,0<N) ’
! h—
’ ~t thin, that
.Possih ly
,
expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility of the
proposition expressed by *«).• Instead, Dummett thinks that 'Possibly
^ 6XPreSSeS 3 PrOPOSltl°" "Wch tributes the property of^
inch that £OSsibly &x/N) to the referent of
-N,' or to the-F.
Domett’s understanding of ’Possibly, |«(N)' is an essential part of
his project. For this understanding of 'Possibly, J|(N)' is „hat
guarantees that the description substituted for ’N’ gets interpreted with
a scope which includes all modal operators in ’Possibly, 0(N).’ However,
this understanding of ’Possibly, ««). is also what gives rise to the
problems presented above. Other description theories can avoid these
problems by taking advantage of the fact that 'Possibly, 0(N)' (or
'Possibly, 0(the-F/N )') admits an interpretation which does not entail
the existence of the referent of 'N,' or of the-F. On such a reading,
'Possibly, j>(N )’ expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility
of the proposition expressed by (N).' Such a reading is not available
to a description theory of meaning based on the modified Synonymy Thesis.
Indeed, the modified Synonymy Thesis entails that if 'jj(N)' entails the
existence of the referent of 'N,' or of the-F, then so does 'Possibly,
0 (N ) .
'
We now know that a description theory which includes the modified
Synonymy Thesis will have special new problems dealing with negative
existential sentences, non-referring proper names, and belief ascription
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sentences. We also know that in «) Kripke has an apparent intuition
which is inconsistent with the modified Synonymy Thesis, an intuition
which I share. Of course Dummett could reject <K')i however, „e know
that his stated reasons against admitting (K-) (or «)) as datum are
either inconclusive or open to serious objection. We have also examined
an alternative formulation of Kripke's apparent intuition-one that is
consistent with the modified Synonymy Thesis-and found that it does not
have the appropriate subject matter.
On the basis of these considerations, while acknowledging that they
might not be decisive enough to dissuade the die-hard description
theorist, I conclude that the Modal Objection gives us additional good
reasons to withhold acceptance from the description theory of meaning and
take another look at the Millian theory of meaning.
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Notes
'The basic objections to the description theory are reviewed in
Chapter I.
^Dummett's initial response to the Modal Objection appeared in Frege;
—
l03°Phy ^ (1 973). It was modified in i lght 0 f Kripke's
replies; the modified version appears in The Interpretation of Frege's
Philosophy (1981).
3We will say that, as used by such a speaker, the original name
sentence and its corresponding description sentence are synonymous; and,
for brevity, that the two sentences are synonymous.
‘'According to the description theory, speakers back their uses of
proper names with definite descriptions. On a given occasion of its use,
a name's associated definite description is its backing description. A
crude test for determining what description a speaker is using to back
his use of a name is given by the following: 'D' backs S's use of H>
(at time t) if (at t) S is disposed to respond, 'N is (was) D,' to the
question, 'Who (what) is (was) N ?'
Roughly, a definite description is a referential ly identifying
description if and only if it is about a singular term or an act of
reference.
But for a few stylistic changes, this discussion of Harrison is
taken directly from Ryckman (in press).
7
Ackerman, 1979.
^Austin, 1983.
^Kripke, 1980b.
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10See Chisholm, 1981, pp . 54,55.
^See Lewis, 1981, pp . 286-287.
12
Sev eral PhUosophers. Loar. Hoonan, and Schiffar come readUy ^
” lnd
’ rely °" DU”ett ’ S basl° Strate^ their sketchy hefen.es of the
description theory against the Modal Objection.
^Linsgys response is virtual!, Identical with that given in DuMlett
(1 973).
’We’s views about the contingent a priori are stated in fripke
0 980a, pp. 54-57 and 79). Kripke holds that a person who rigidly f lxes
the reference of a name
-N- by a definite description
-the-F' is ln a
position to know a £riori that if N exists, then N is the-F. Suppose
that Djmmett insists that, as we use it. the reference of the name
-Saint
Anne' is rigidly fixed by the definite description
-the mother of Mary.-
Kripke could then allow that we are in a position to .now a priori that
if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne was the mother of Mary. He could
then allow that we are also in a position to know a £riori that if Saint
Anne existed, then Saint Anne was a mother. Kripke could then maintain
that if (5) has a true interpretation, it is the interpretation given by
(5'”).
One finds Kri P ke endorsing this very maxim in ”SPeaker's Reference
and Semantic Reference,” (1 977, P . 267-268).
1
6
We need to insure that ’Necessarily, Aristotle was the last great
phi loso Pher of antiquity' does not come out true according to the
modified Synonymy Thesis. Let
be
EXP jthe last great Philoso Pher of antiquity (®^Aristotle ))
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'
0 ( Aristotle)
,
'
when
'^(Aristotle)' Cont-3in<! ™c ta ns no occurrences of 'the last great
philosopher of antiquity,’ and let
EXP
the last great philosopher of antlquity^Wristotle))
be the interpretation of '#( Aristotle)- that results when every
occurrence of
-the last great philosopher of antiquity’ in
'^(Aristotle)'
is read with a scope that does not exceed any modal operator In
^(Aristotle),’ when
-fl(Aristotle)- contains one or more occurrence of
'the last great philosopher of antiquity.’ The modified Synonymy Thesis
should be understood so that ’tf(Ar isfni- 1 „nwistotle)' is synonymous with the
interpretation of 'EXP*.u a ,the last great philosopher of
antiquity^ (Ari stotle))(the last great philosopher of
antiquity/Aristotle)- that results when ’the last great philosopher of
antiquity’ is read with a scope that includes every modal operator in
'EXP uthe last great philosopher of antiquity <0(Aristotle))(the last great
philosopher of antiquity/ Aristotle).'
In this way, 'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last great philosopher
of antiquity' is not supposed to be synonymous with the wide-scope
reading of 'Necessarily, the last great philosopher of antiquity was the
last great philosopher of antiquity,' which is true. Rather, according
to the modified Synonymy Thesis, 'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last
great philosopher of antiquity' is synonymous with the wide-scope reading
of 'Necessarily, there was exactly one last great philosopher of
antiquity and the last great philosopher of antiquity was it.' That is,
according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, 'Necessarily, Aristotle was
the last great philosopher of antiquity' is synonymous with the
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narrow-scope reading of
-There was exactly one last creatg philosopher of
antiquity and necessarily, it was fhpY W S t e last S^eat philosopher of
antiquity.’ This sentence is false.
was partially specified early i„ this Chapter.
18From this point on. the response we are considering is Du-ett-s.
Linsky may or may not favor Dummett's position.
19Where (10") formally represents:
Ol) The author of the prophecy died in infancy.
20
Description theories and Millian theories alike have troubles with
"names of fictional entities." The point here is that Dummett’s defense
against the Modal Objection raises special new problems for such names.
21 The rationale behind this reading is given in Note 16 above.
I I I
chapter
kripke-s PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF: consistency solutions
In a recent article, "A Puzzle About Belief (, 979)
.
Saul Kripke
presents 3 puzzle about- hoi ji- ooxc do belief and proper namp<? twi „ .v u P es. This chapter and its
successor are about Kripke's puzzle. In this chapter the puzzle is
presented and explained.- In addition, we will examine a recently
developed theory of proper names and show both that the solution it
offers to the standard versions of the problem of the apparent failure of
the substitutivity of codesignating names does not extend to Kripke's
puzzle and that this leads to additional problems for the theory. 1
Finally, four proposed solutions to the puzzle are stated and critically
evaluated
.
^
Section One
ripke states the puzzle in terms of the following example. This
example is about Pierre and Pierre's dispositions toward certain
sentences of French and English. While living in France, Pierre is a
competent, monolingual speaker of French. As a result of the testimony
of his monolingual French speaking peers, Pierre is disposed to assent to
the sentence
( 1 ) Londres est jolie.
Later, Pierre moves to an ugly section of London. There he learns
English "on the street," by observing the behavior of others, and without
the benefit of a translation manual. He is not told that 'Londres' and
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“* ~
— » »>
... «„
soon a competent speaker of English and he remains
French 4 s ,
competent speaker of. A they frequent onlv its ,, CT i Qgll6r ParU
’ hls friends havelittle regard for London. On the basis of ,f the testimony of his new
3S W0 ll a qwen as that of his senses, Pierre iss dlsPosed to assent tothe sentence
(2) London is not pretty.
For similar reasons, he is not disposed to assent to the sentence
(3) London is pretty.
In fact. Pierre is disposed to dissent from m »C i (3). He remains disposed to
assent to (1).
Kripke concentrates on the connections between Pierre's dispositions
toward sentences 0). (2). and (3, and certain natural principles about
belief, language use. translation, and truth. Certain of our interests
are better served by continuing the story of Pierre to consider his
dispositions toward sentences
(4) Londres is London,
(5) Londres is not London,
(6) London is London,
and
(7)
London is not London,
both before and after he discovers that 'Londres’ and 'London'
codesignate.
3
It is natural to expect that a reasonable person in Pierre's
situation, with Pierre's dispositions, will not be disposed to assent to
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(4). We will assume that this is so: in fact Pi* l
’
pierre is disposed to
dissent from (4). i n addition we un i
’
WS Wl11 aSSUme tha t Pierre is disposed to
assent to (5) and to (6). We wm assume that Piece is not disposed to
assent to (7). We will also assume that when Pierre learns that
'Londres' and
-London' oodesignate, he will beoonle disposed t„ assent t<>
(4>
’
WU1 "° l0"Ser ^ dlSP° Sed t0
-““t to (5), will remaln disposed tQ
assent to (6), and will remain ill-disposed to assent to (7 ).
It is important to note that there is nothing puzzling about this
example. The story of Pierre is perfectly coherent; the events described
above might will have occurred. Kripke gets a puzzle only when he
applies certain principles about belief, language use, translation, and
truth to elements of this example.
The first of the principles that Kripke employs is a disquotation
principle. Kripke presents his disquotation principle as follows:
Let us make explicit the disquotat ional principle
presupposed here, connecting sincere assent and belief. It canbe stated as follows, where V is to be replaced, inside and6 a11 quotatlon marks, by an appropriate standard English
sentence: If a normal English speaker
, on refl ection.
~~
n
248
6
249
aSSen ^ S
—
*£*' ^hen he believes that p." (1979,
To help illustrate what he means by "appropriate standard English
sentence," Kripke adds:
The sentence replacing *p» is to lack indexical or
pronominal devices or ambiguities. (1979, p. 249)
In addition to a disquotation principle in English, for sentences of
English, Kripke needs an analogous principle in French, for sentences of
French. In this regard he writes:
We have stated a disquotation principle in English, for
English sentences; an analogous principle, stated in French
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sentences. (1979* pT 25o)
Umeci t0 h° ld f°r Frenoh (German, etc.)
A third principle Kripke uses to generate his puzzle is
_
"strengthened disquotation principle'.; he presents as follows:
- a
sincere
P. 249 )
A normal speaker who is not reticent win ho a-
n assent to 'o' if ^ ^7 —
t
~
-
—
disposed to
)
—
— — il£ believes U^tX^(T97Q,
In addition to the principles above, Kripke uses
truth:'
'for\ST (French oT^T- dl =quotatl0" Principle for
"t D t i s true*, r ,
English) replacement for 'p' infer£ ue" from 'p,' and conversely. (1979, p . 277f
Finally, Kripke uses the following principle of translation:
Now,
expresses=S a trutn Un that other language). (1979, p . 250)
if the story of Pierre were a true story, Pierre's assent to
( 1 ) Londres est jolie,
in conjunction with the French version of Kripke's disquotation
principle, the French version of the Tarskian disquotation principle, the
principle of translation, and the English version of the Tarskian
disquotation principle, would entail that Pierre believes that London is
pretty. We have already said that Kripke's story of Pierre is a
perfectly coherent story. With this in mind, so that we can avoid the
sort of cumbersome subjunctive locution employed above, we will assume
that Kripke's story of Pierre is a true story. Pierre's assent to (1),
in conjunction with Kripke's principles, entails that Pierre believes
that London is pretty. Pierre's assent to
( 2 ) London is not pretty,
in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation principle, entails that Pierre
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believes that London is not pretty. Pierre's h .
assent to
lng dlSP° Sed to
(3) London is pretty,
ITT ““ «-»•• «...that Pierre does not believe t-haf ru ne that London is nrettvP y. Pierre’s not beinedisposed to assent to
(4) Londres is London,
in conjunction with Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle, entail.
that Pierre does not believe that Londres is London. Pierre's being
disposed to assent to
(5) Londres is not London,
in conjunction with Kripke's dictation principle, entails that Pierre
believes that Londres is not London. Pierre's being disposed to assent
to
(6) London is London,
in conjunction with fripke's disquotation principle, entails that Pierre
believes that London is London. Finally, Pierre's not being disposed to
assent to
(7) London is not London,
in conjunction with Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle, entails
that Pierre does not believe that London is not London.
Recall that when Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London'
codesignate, he becomes disposed to assent to (1), is no longer disposed
to assent to (5), remains disposed to assent to (6), and is still not
disposed to assent to (7). This, in conjunction with Kripke's
principles, entails that, once he learns that 'Londres' and 'London'
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believes that Undres ls not Undon
. to^^^ ^
London, and continues not to believes that to i London is not London.
We hold that belief is a two-place relationP , one that relates persons
to propositions. We hold that when we say that S he! i „ a’ b b l eves that f we are
asserting that S stands in that relation to the proposition expressed by
our use of A belief is the state of affairs of a person standing in
the belief-relation to a given proposition. The object of a given belief
is the proposition that person believes. Finally, „e hold that two
beliefs are inconsistent if and only if there is no possible world
wherein both of the beliefs objects are true (at one and the same time).
We are committed to the claim that Pierre believes both a
proposition the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty'-and also
its the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty.' Hence,
we are committed to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. But!
according to Kripke, this presents us with "insuperable difficulties"
0979, p. 257). He writes that:
We may suppose that Pierre, in spite of the unfortunate
situation in which he now finds himself, is a leadingphilosopher and logician. He would never let contradictorybeliefs pass. And surely anyone, leading logician or no, is inprinciple m a position to notice and correct contradictorybeliefs if he has them. Precisely for this reason, we regardindividuals who contradict themselves as subject to greater
censure than those who merely have false beliefs. But it is
clear that Pierre, as long as he is unaware that the cities hecalls London’ and ’Londres’ are one and the same, is in noposition to see, by logic alone, that at least one of his
beliefs must be false. He lacks information, not logical
acumen. He cannot be convicted of an inconsistency: to do so
would be incorrect. (1979, p. 257)
We may safely assume that, apart from those beliefs involved in
Pierre's dispositions toward sentences (1) through (7), Pierre does not
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have inconsistent beliefs. According to Kripke lt ,,’ ls wrong to conclude,from what he has said about Pierre that p-. Pierre has inconsistent beliefs
^ we consider Pierre's behavior. Kripke's claim seeras qui te
Plausible. Pierre seems perfectly rational. Pierre seems to draw the
sorts of conclusions any other ratinnaiy o l person would draw, were he to
find himself in Pierre’s i-nat- -isituation. A rational person who assents to
(1 ) Londres est jolie,
and
(2) London is not pretty,
would dissent from
(4) Londres is London.
It is also clear that, to the extent thai- p-: ^at Pierre can compare his beliefs,
no amount of introspective comparison will help him detect an
inconsistency among them. Furthermore. Pierre does not draw the sorts of
wild conclusions apparently available to a person v^o takes both P and -p
as premises; a person with inconsistent beliefs apparently has such
premises at his disposal. Yet, we do not find, nor would we expect to
find, Pierre running through the streets of London declaring, say, that
the moon is made from Carl Sagan's old sneakers.
Still, Pierre’s behavior and Kripke’s principles commit us to the
conclusion that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that
London is not pretty; that is, to the conclusion that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs. Together with the fact that is seems wrong to say
that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, this constitutes the first element
of Kripke’s puzzle. A solution must tell us what beliefs Pierre exhibits
by his assents to ( 1 ) and .
Inconsistent.
J"
—
- - conclusion that Plerre belleyes u
r. we are committed t0 the oMciusion pisrre ^ ^ beiieve
°" 13 PreUy
- ThUS
’ " — * >» committed to an outright
contradiction. This i <= the second element of Kripke « s puzzle. A
solution to this part of the puzzle will a , .explain why we are not really
committed to this contradiction.
We are also committed to the conclusion that before he discovered
that ’Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre did not believe that
Londres is London, did believe that Undoes is not London, did believe
that London is London, and did not believe London is not London. In
addition, we are committed to the conclusion that once he discovered that
the two names codesignate, Pierre began to believe that Londres is
London, ceased to believe that Undoes is not London, continued to
believe that London is London, and continued not to believe that London
is not London. This seems well and fine. After all, if „e were to
report on the change in Pierre's doxastic state, citing his behavior
toward sentence (4), we would say that when Pierre discovered that the
two names codesignate, he acquired a new belief.
However plausible this seems, it is unacceptable. Recall that we are
presently co.itted to the Millian theory of the meaning of proper names.
According to the Millian theory, since 'Londres' and 'London'
oodesignate, sentences (4) and (6) express the same proposition. So,
when we report that upon discovering that the two names codesignate,
Pierre acquired a new belief—the belief that Londres is London—we must
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be mistaken. For Pierre already believed that Lend • ,o on is London, and theproposition that London is London is t-h P
—
e Pro P° sition that Londres is
London
.
This is the third element of K-ipke's pu zz i e
. A solution^ say
what, if any
,
„ew beliefs Pierre acquired (or old beliefs he discarded)
when he discovered that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate; that is, „m
say what, if a„ y , new bellefs are exhlblted fey pierre, s^ ^
behavior with regard to sentences (4) and (5).
At this point, one might be tempted to say that there is nothing
puzzling about all of this; that the situation described leaves us with
nany options, each of which eliminates any pu zzli„g reSults. To see that
things are not quite this simple, we shall consider four basic options.
nfme ° Ur attentlon to the beliefs, or disbeliefs, attributed to
Pierre as a result of his dispositions toward sentences
(1 ) Londres est jolie,
(2) London is not pretty,
and
(3) London is pretty.
According to Kripke, we have four basic ways of sorting out Pierre's
doxastic state. We can maintain:
. . • that at the time we no longer respect this French
hfm
e
th
n0e °ndre
f
6St j° lie '>> thut is we no longer ascribe toi the corresponding belief; that we do not respect his English
utterance (or lack of utterance); that we respect neither; thatwe respect both. (Kripke, 1979, p. 258)
The first of Kripke's four options is to refuse to conclude, on the
basis of Pierre's assent to
(1) Londres est jolie,
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that Pierre believes that London is pretty
writes
:
Against this option, Kripke
is undeniable that- Pi
pretty—at least before he learntdT
6
.
believed that London is
he differed not at all from oounue^
8 F°r at that time,
would have exactly the same grounds to ,
hls c° un trymen, and we
them that he believes that iSLh
1 y ° f him as of any of
who is both ignorant of English and
1
^
pretty
.
: lf any Frenchman
believed that London is pretty, L°nd°"
speaks English,'“o lonLr'brilevT thV
lives in London and
unquestionably, Pierre once believed thatT n ^ -
Pretty? Wel1
’
we would be forced to sIFThat ill L°n otl 15 prett 7- So
given up his previous bel iaf r„«. u„
h3S
—
ng^ *211 mi nd
, has
Pierre is
„
has he real ly done i^T
every assertion he has eve^made
* reiterates
> with vigor,
changed his mind about anything he" h
French
;
He says he has not
Can we say that he is wr"™ thi,” ^
giV6n Uf> a" y belief
-
story of his living in London and his Engl isTut^
^ ^ the
basis of his normal command of f*. om u
h lsh terances, on the
conclude that he .tiK ^,""’“ be X2ESSJ to
1979, p. 256 )
that Undon ls pretty. (Kripke,
The second of Kripke-s four options is to refuse to conclude, on the
basis of Pierre's assent to
(2) London is not pretty,
that Pierre believes that London is not pretty; and to refuse to
conclude, on the basis of Pierre's dissent from
(3) London is pretty,
that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Against this option
Kripke writes:
His French past aside, he [i.e., Pierre] is just like hisriends in London. Anyone else, growing up in London with thesame knowledge and beliefs that he expressed in England, we
would undoubtedly judge to believe that London is not pretty.Can Pierre's French past nullify such a judgment? Can we saythat Pierre, because of his French past, does not believe that[London is not pretty]? Suppose an electric shock wiped out allis past memories of the French language, what he learned in
France, and his French past. He would then be exactly like his
neighbors in London. He would have the same knowledge, beliefs,
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and linguistic capaciti Uo il
to say that Pierre believes that^nd
esumably would be forced
his neighbors. But surely no shock th"t
“8ly if ue say 16 of
Pierre's Tories and knowledge can give P3rt ° fPierre believes that (London is not prett v , Ifbelieved it before, despite his French i
y the shock, he
0979, p. 257) o lan8 ua8e and background.
The third of Kripke's four options is to refuse to conclude, on the
basis of Pierre's assent to
(1 ) Londres est jolie,
that Pierre believes that London is pretty; to refuse to conclude, on the
basis of Pierre's assent to
(2) London is not pretty,
that Pierre believes that London is not pretty; and to refuse to
conclude, on the basis of Pierre's dissent from
(3) London is pretty,
that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Against this option,
Kripke writes:
that ,
If 7 ”°Uld dSny Plerre ’ ln his bilingual stage, his beliefLondon is pretty and his belief that London is not prettv
SU°1°1 be^f
the
,
d
t
ifficalti
-
»« both previous options. ^ would
is prettv hut ^
° JUdf that Pierre ° nce believed that LondonIS y b does no longer, in spite of Pierre's own sinceredenial that he has lost any belief. We also must worry whetherPierre would gain the belief that London is not pretty if hetotally forgot his French past. (1 979, p. 257)
Kripke's final option is to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent
to
(1) Londres est jolie,
that Pierre believes that London is pretty; and to conclude, on the basis
of Pierre's assent to
(2) London is not pretty,
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that Pierre believes that London Is not prettv <p
.
y. (Presumably, we are to
refrain from ooncluding, on the basis of Pierre's Hi „r d ssent from
(3) London is pretty,
that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.) This is the option
which Knpke says raises
"insuperable difficulties" Thl3 t .• is op ion commits
us to the view that Pierre hp*as inconsistent beliefs. As we have already
seen, Kripke thinks that this is unacceptable.
unless Kripke is mistaken in his assessment of these optlons
_^
is no "easy way" to avoid this puzzle. That
, ln faot> is Qne major
thesis of the article wherein the puzzle was presented. Therein, Kripke
wrote: ".
. . my raaln the3ls ls a slmple one; ^ ^^ ^ #
puzzle" (1979, p. 239). Once he presents the puzzle, and discusses the
four options considered above, Kripke continues, saying:
Dlain?v°fa^
SSlblllty SeemS t0 lead us t0 sa 7 something either
^
®
K
ly
. J
lse or even downright contradictory. Yet thepossibilities appear to be logically exhaustive (‘979
,
p. 258-
Since there is no easy way to avoid Kripke's puzzle, we will consider
what other philosophers have said about it and some of the issues it
raises. We shall first examine the impact of the puzzle on Michael
Devitt's recently developed theory of proper names. We argue that the
puzzle refutes Devitt’s theory. We shall then consider various
"solutions” to the puzzle. The ’’solutions” we consider in this chapter
are united by the fact that each is designed to preserve the claim that
Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. We argue that each solution
is unacceptable.
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Section Twn
th
Re=ently
’
ln hlS b°° k
’ (198,). Dev itt presented a causal
eory of the reference and waning of proper names. Devitt includes aproposal for the truth-conditions for belieft ascription sentences.
We will consider Devitt's theory to the extent „„necessary to explain
its solution to a standard version of the prohlem of the apparent failure
or the suhstitutivity of codesignating name. We will then see that this
solution does not work for Kripke's puzzle. Fi„a ii y> ue ulll exami„e a
problem raised for Devitt’s theory bv its fa -ny Dy l ilure to solve Kripke's
puzzle.
In fairness to Devitt. it should be noted that he never explicitly
discusses Kripke's puzzle. Still, as we will see. he has clear
commitments with regard to the issues it raises.
We will approach Devitt's theory through its application to the
truth-conditions for sentences. We first consider his truth-conditions
for simple sentences that contain no "intensional" verbs. We then
consider Devitt's truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences.
According to Devitt,
'Nanaf Dea^i nl 7?"!
^ 3 iS trUe if ([that token of Js x & [that token of] ’cat' App x). (1 98 1 , p. 241)
Designation (abbreviated ’Des’) is a relation that holds between a name-
token and an object when, and only when, that token's underlying d-chain
is Hounded in that object. A token’s underlying d-chain is the d-chain
that figures causally into the production of that token. A d-chain is a
special kind of causal chain running back from the production of a token,
possibly through the production of prior tokens of the same name-type, to
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the object in which the d-chain i <=n m s grounded, a a rrt .,nH,-
ceremony, initial banf •
n§ 1S 3 naming
y ’ l ptism, or dubbing. As far.
/ hh •
33
^Plication(abbreviated »Ann»'i c
lf .
^ > «— • a token or . oa, applles t0 ,
~
13 3 Cat
’
thlS 13 an overs impl ification, but it has
issues we will encounter.
earl "8 °"
Illustration, suppose that I say 'Nana is a cat •
;;
al" " ° f 'Nana ' d6Sl8nateS 3 «
-rly painless.hmg s get considerably more complex, however, when it conies to Oevitfs
truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences.
For Devitt, the canonical of a de dicto beliefSi ascription sentence is
S believes/N is F.
He states the truth-conditions for such sentences in terms of this
example sentence
(30) Tom believes/Cicero is an orator.
According to Devitt, a token of
(30) is true if and only if Ex Ev E 7 cr fhaf <. iDes x & [that token of] 'Cicero’ Soi v Ai . ° ° fJW
’orator’ Spec x * rth.f «.
j£ecy & [that token of]
(1981, p. affr
4 Cthat t0ken 0f] 'beHevesi App x and (y, ,).
Designation is as before. The fully understand Devitt-s truth-conditions
for tokens of (30) we must see what he means by specification
(abbreviated
-Spec') and how he understands the locution
-believes" App
to x and (jr, z).' We consider specification first.
Devitt's book contains a glossary of special terms. Under
'specification' one finds:
The relation that holds between an expression in aproposition attitude context and the mechanism of reference, or
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sets of mechanisms, it Ci p
context]. ( 1981
, p . 278-279)
ex Pres sion] refers to [in that
In the book's text, Devitt says
We can sum up our discus**-?
A name in an opaque context specifies^he^
10
^
-° n 3S follows:
causal network as those under 1 vine
1 d_Chains in the same
o,a,„3 )involvlng the name ^ -
Specification is a relation that holds between a term-token and its
mechanism (or, when the term is general ^i, sets of mechanisms) of
reference. A name-token's mechanism of reference is the causal network
of d-chains that contains that token's underlying d-chain. Hence, a
name-token specifies the causal network n f h „u •o d-chams which contains its
underlying d-chain.
Devitt employs his designation/specification distinction to much the
same purpose that Frege employed his reference/sense distinction. For
Devitt. the semantically significant contribution of a name, in a non-
intensional context, is its designation, the thing it designates; whereas
the semantically significant contribution of a name, in an "intensional"
context, is its specification, the thing it specifies. We will call what
a name-token specifies its "Dev itt-sense." Names specify their Devitt-
senses and (for name-tokens) Dev itt-senses are causal networks.
Names are not the only terms that specify. Indeed, Devitt holds that
a token of (3) is true only if its token of 'orator' specifies something.
Without going into what expressions other than names specify, for this
has no bearing on issues we will be considering, let us say that x is the
Devitt-sense of a given token if and only if that token specifies x.
Names specify causal networks. We will take the notion of a causal
network as primitive, subject to two requirements. First, we want to
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anew that causal network (and the d-chains they c0„ taln)> ^telev isioti networks and grapevines. expand; ^ ^ ^
networks, it might be the case that N-, is N
26 C3USdl
d-chains in a at _ t .
inN att .2 ** “here kl U earller «- t2 . Second. ue hold that
— 1 network
,, is identical with causal network »2 lf and only „
“here
.
Dl " thS S" ° f a'° halnS ^ ^ iS * of d-chains in
2. (1) every member of the union of D, and D2 is grounded in the same
obj ect; (ii, every member of the union of 0, and 0, underlies a token ofthe same type: and fi-i-n
’ 6Very me," ber of union of D, and D uas
grounded in the same naming ceremony. The reasons for • • «.
.
y insisting on these
requirements are best considered later w* ,. We turn now to the locution
'"believes" App x and (y, 2 ).'
Where a proper name HI- specifies y and a predicate 'F' specifies z
the expression
'(£, z>- designates the "Dev itt-propositio,. expressed b^y
the subject-predicate sentence * is F.' Suppose that Smith says 'Tom
believes that Cicero is an orator.' Provided his token of 'Tom’
designates Tan, what Smith said is true if and only if hls token of
'believes' applies to Ton, and the Dev itt-proposition expressed by his
token of 'Cicero is an orator.' Generally, a token of 'believes' applies
to x and (i. z) if and only if the Dev itt-proposition (*, z) is among x's
belief s.
To summarize Devitt's truth-conditions for a token of (30), „e may
say: a token of (30) is true if and only if the Dev itt-proposition
expressed by that token of 'Cicero is an orator' is among the beliefs of
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the person designated by that token of
-Tom ' We ti . urn next to Devitt's
account of belief.
Devitt would "like., to maintain that a Devin-
f . . , . ,
3
^-proposition p is amonghe beliefs of a person x if and only if x has
, ,
"i
assented to a token of
P- his simple account of belief raises some problems. Devitt
introduces one of these problems, along with his proposed solution, in
the following passage: '
The view that thoughts are attitnH^*
and so on) to sentences needs gualiOcaM
<bel
r
laVi "g ’ deslrlnS.
has pointed out that most of the
baflo tlon
- [Daniel] Dennett
New York or salt, we ler LI, ^ We believe ab°ht, say,
too obvious and boring Indeed
y
.
entertain because they are
could ever e„tertain,
g
for we haVe anTr”
0
? beUefs tha"solution is to claim that- if • infinite number. The
to sentences. Only they are reorfP"^?
^
^
S that are attitudes
in general is explained dis^aiUonal lt ^
" lnd
- Thoa«hb
all the obvious conseauencp^ n f u-
bus 3 Person believes
this qualifioatiorrZrSfo°llot
S
.
^
Later, in the course of stating the truth-conditions of or belief
ascription sentences, Devitt reminds us that they must accommodate this
never truly ’’ignored" qualification:
en
a
te
g
r
U
ta
g
in.
0f
“ have we
i . t ,
om s belief is not a "core-belief." there
£FTi0an
datte
°
d1 must mo lfy the statement of truth
core-beliefsf
"‘ ,t 1 haVe Sald [so farJ to
. , .
1/ ^0) is true but Tom does not have the required core-
sen tence fok
he Wl11 be in the appropriate relationship to other
inc^udin, r^u
S
’
S
°r? ,
includinS [tokens of] ’Cicero’ and sori^T
-
that 1 L °/ ] orator ’’ which w°ul d dispose him to be intionship to a token of 'Cicero is an orator' were he toentertain one; Cicero's being an orator is an obvious
consequence of his core-beliefs. (1981, p. 237-238)
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(Note that the statement of the truth «—cond i tions for
Dev ii-t'o
(30) glven above istt s modified statement of its truthl th-conditions.)
A *vitt-proposition p ls amMg person x , s oore_beiiefs
such that - q- expresses the same Devitt-proposition as y and x has
assented to a token of 'q.' a Devith
,
q Devitt-proposition
p is among person x'sbeliefs if and only if either fit n •(i) p is among x's core-beliefs or (ii)
there are Dev itt-propositions qi1» • • • » qn such that q-| i s among x's
core beliefs and
... and % is among x , s core.beliefs an(J p . g ^
(obvious) consequence of q, i ,
1 * * * & q n* A Person believes all the
obvious consequences of his core-beliefs. 4
The problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of
codesignating proper names is usually stated in terms of such name-pairs
as 'Hesperus, and
-Phosphorus,' and 'Cicero' and
-Tully.' Devltt ,,
theory affords him a solution to such versions of the problem; however,
it does not yield a solution to Kripke's puzzle. Let us first see how
Devitt would handle the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus.'
Let us suppose that Pierre uses both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' to
designate the planet Venus, but that he does not realize that he uses
them to codesignate. One evening we ask Pierre to consider the sentences
Hesperus is visible,
Phosphorus is not visible,
and
Phosphorus is visible.
Pierre assents to the first and second sentences. He dissents from the
third sentence. We conclude that Pierre believes that Hesperus is
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visible, that Pie-re beiieves bbat Phosphorus ls not^ ^ ^
Pierre does not believe that Phosphorus is visible.
By concluding that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and that
Pierre believes that Phosphorus is not visible, we have apparently
committed ourselves to the view that Pierre both believes a proposition
and also believes its denial-that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. By
concluding that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and that Pierre
bees not believe that Phosphorus is visible, we have apparently committed
ourselves to a contradiction.
According to Devitt, when we say that Pierre believes that Hesperus
is visible, what we say is true if and only if Pierre believes the
Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of 'Hesperus is visible.'
Also, according to Devitt, when we say that Pierre does not believe that
Phosphorus is visible, what we say is true if and only if it is not the
case that Pierre believes the Devitt-proposition expressed by our token
of 'Phosphorus is visible.'
We have seen that, according to Devitt, the Devitt-proposition
expressed by our token of 'Hesperus is visible' is identical with the
Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus is visible' only
if the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Hesperus' is identical
with the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus.' According
to Devitt, the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Hesperus' is
identical with the Devitt-sense expressed by our token of 'Phosphorus'
only if our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are codesignating,
cogrounded tokens of the same name-type. They are codesignating, but it
is unlikely that they are cogrounded, and it is certain that they are not
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of the same type. I„ this way, Devitt's thee.
of th6f11
60ry P6mlts hi " ^ deny each
fo 1 1 owi that own tokens of 'Hesperus' and
-Phosphor have
Dev itt-sense
; that our tokens of 'Hesperus is visible' and
'Phosphorus is visibie'
.press the same Dev itt-propositio„
; and that in
saying that Pierre believe uieves that Hesperus is visible and that Pierre does
not believe that Phosphorus is visible, we are committed to a
contradiction. By a similar line of reasoning, Devitt can reject the
claim that in saying that Pierre believes that Hesperus is visible and
the Pierre believes that Phosphorus is not visible, we are com itted to
the view that Pierre has inconsistent, or contradictory beliefs.
Devitt has a solution to the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and
-Phosphorus.’
Whether or not his solution is acceptable depends in part on the merits
of his theory. We will not consider the merits of the theory. Rather, we
w that Devitt cannot give a similar solution to Kripke's puzzle.
At bottom, Devitt's solution to the puzzle of 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus' rests on his claim that because our tokens of 'Hesperus' and
Phosphorus' are not codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type,
our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' do not have the same Devitt-
sense. An analogous treatment of Kripke's puzzle must rest on the
analogous claim about tokens of 'Londres' and
-London.' That is, to give
a solution to Kripke's puzzle, Devitt must maintain that because tokens
of 'Londres' and 'London' are not codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the
same type, tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' do not have the same Devitt-
sense.
Devitt actually has a view about he Dev itt-sense of 'Londres' and
'London.' Along with other important parts of his theory, it is
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presented in the following passage:
I talk of d-chains as being Dart- nr m-u
network." Is anything more required for tn f" 6 °aUSalconcern the same name and same object" ^e d!,
" that they
there is: they must be linked int-n nif ,
iscussion suggests
same grounding (including same namine
W°rkS arising from the
substitute). And this seems intuTt,®
°eremm * or suitable
there are two distinct communities which
oorreot here
- Suppose
each other, but both communities by chaLeTiTindTh"
10^6 Wlth
to an object. Could an opaque belief g
ivi g the same name
name token arising form one nami i
taternent
» including a
exoression nr • * ° ng ’ be confirmed by an
another? The situation ^s^so”
8 3 t0k6n arising from
pretheoreticai
cT
"°
'It*
that the
a
..
.^he case of the two communities raises the matter of
Names thatTtr^ ^
ellefs to those who speak another language
streLrto
h
a
e
i
S
r
e
t
n
r
e ‘ Nevertheless
* this liberality cannot
rivH:;:r^For if we allow that they could, how could we deny that (W) -i *true if Tom assents to
-Tully is an orator' but di^ents fromCicero is an orator'? (Devitt, 1981, p. 239-240)
In the above passage, Devitt tells us that two name-tokens specify
the same causal network (i.e., have the same Dev itt-sense) exactly when
they are codesignating tokens of the same type whose underlying d-chains
are grounded in the same naming ceremony. This is the source of our
earlier account of the identity conditions for causal networks. This is
the point of Devitt's 'Everest' example. Two communities, X and Y, use
tokens of 'Everest' to designate one and the same mountain. Prior to
time t there was no (significant) causal connection between the two
communities. At time t a member, x, of community X overhears a member,
y, of community Y say 'Everest is tall.' y has used 'Everest' to refer
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to the very mountain x and other members of community X use 'Everest' torefer to. Nevertheless, according to Devitt, x would be
~ ,
saying something
he were to return to his community and issue the following
’y believes that Everest is tall. This is because, according
to Devitt. the Devitt-sense x would thereby express by his use of
•Everest' would not be identical with the *vitt-sense y expresses by his
uses of 'Everest, Since, the two
_ities have never causally
interacted, the causal network specified by y's tokens of 'Everest'
cannot be the causal network specified by x's token of
-Everest,
also makes it clear that one speaker's token of a name
sentence can express the same Devitt-proposition as another speaker's
token of the same name sentence type. So we can speak of the proposition
typically expressed by tokens of a sentence type. This is why I insisted
that causal networks (and the d-chains they contain) be allowed to grow
over time.
Finally, the preceding passage contains Devitt’s view about the
Devitt-sense of 'Londres' and 'London, Devitt holds that typical tokens
of 'Londres' and 'London' are codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the
name type. They specify the same causal network; and, therefore,
they have the same Devitt-sense. This means that Devitt cannot give a
solution to Kripke's puzzle analogous to his solution to the puzzle of
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus, Such a solution would depend on the claim
that because tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' are not codesignating,
cogrounded tokens of the same type, tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' do
not express the same Devitt-sense. Devitt explicitly rejects this claim.
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Let us consider a consequence of Devitt's viPU KU itt s ew about the Devitt-sense
of Londres' and 'London.' Pierre expressed the same Dev itt-proposition
by his use of
(1) Londres est jolie
that we would express by our use of
(3) London is pretty,
were we to say, ' Plerre believes that London is pretty.’ By Devitt’s own
admission, the Dev itt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of (1) is
identical with the Dev itt-proposition typically expressed by tokens of
(3). Among Pierre's core-beliefs are the Dev itt-proposition typically
expressed by tokens of (,) (i.e., the Dev itt-proposition typically
expressed by tokens of (3)) and the Devit-f •J " d u n itt-proposition typically
expressed by tokens of
(2) London is not pretty;
Pierre has assented to (1) and (2). These are contradictory Devitt-
propositions; and, therefore, unless there is a Dev itt-proposition, p,
such that p is not an obvious consequence
, for Pierre, of the Devitt-
propositions expressed by typical tokens of (2) and (3), according to
Devitt's own theory, it follows that Pierre believes every Devitt-
proposition.
Of course, Pierre does not believe everything. He is certainly not
disposed to assent to every sentence he understands. Devitt's theory
fails to solve Kripke's puzzle, and its failure to do so raises a problem
for Devitt's views about belief.
We will consider an objection to the preceding discussion. One
sympathetic with Devitt might object that Devitt was simply mistaken—too
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and avoid the conclusion that Pierre belie
either 'L „ ,
-erything by denying that
ondres. and
.London, are cogrounded or that
.Londre, and
'London' are of the same name-type.
We should not be swayed by this objection. In the first place, even
and London" are not in fact codesignating, cogrounded
tokens of the same type, they could have been. We could concoct an
example like the one about Pierre and his dispositions, but which
involves codesignating, cogrounded tokens of the same type. In which
case, Kripke-s puzzle would still arise. (As a matter of fact, Kripke
states a version of his puzzle which does involve codesignating,
cogrounded tokens of the same type.5) In the seoond place> , f ^
speculate about Levitt's motivation for allowing that 'Londres' and
'London' express the same Dev itt-sense, the most reasonable answer is
that he did so because he wanted to allow that a typical Frenchman who
s to (1) and a typical Englishman who assents to (3) exhibit a
common belief. Fregean theories make it unlikely that this is so, and,
in this regard, if Devitt were to succeed, his theory would better accord
with our ordinary intuitions. However, if Devitt were to maintain that
'Londres' and
-London' do not express the same Devitt-sense, he would
have to deny that a typical Frenchman who assents to (1) and a typical
Englishman who assents to (3) exhibit a common belief.
To close, let us summarize the basic moves Devitt must make to avoid
the problems raised by Kripke's puzzle. One is to modify ''his" account
of what it is for two tokens to have the same Devitt-sense. Another is
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to modify his solution to the objection
original account of belief. A third mov
Dennett raised against his
e is to give a plausible account
o obvious consequence'" one that pemits a solution to Dennett's
Problem but which also explains why we neither find, „or expect to find
Pierre racing through the streets of London proclaiming that the moon is
made of Carl Sagan's old sneakers.
Section Three
In a recent article. "Names and Belief" (1981), Harold Noonan
presented a version of the description theory of proper names and
proposed a solution to Kripke's puzzle. Noonan maintains that it is a
mistake to conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to
(1) Londres est jolie,
that Pierre believes that London is pretty. He says we are right to
conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to
(2) London is not pretty,
that Pierre believes that Uindon is not pretty. If Noonan is right about
this, then we are not committed to the view that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs, nor are we committed to the contradictory conclusion that Pierre
both does and does not believe that London is pretty.
According to Noonan, the critical step in Kripke's move from Pierre's
assent to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is
pretty is the step from
(C) 'Pierre crois que Londres est jolie' is a truth of French,
to
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(D)
^Ur:h
.
belleves that LOnd™ Pretty, is a truth of
Noonan correctly notes fhaf fu D „t t the ,o,e from (c) to (D) rests on KripKe's
translation principle together with the assumption that
(E) Pierre believes that London is pretty
translates
(B) Pierre crois que Londres est jolie.
AS far as Noonan is concerned the guilty part is the assumption that (E)
translates (B); he never questions the translation principle. So we find
him claiming:
... the assumption that (E) translates rm in *u .
vnuTvr pierre sr
To summarize: According to Noonan, we cannot generate a puzzle
because the move from (C) to (D) is illicit; the move from (C) to (D) is
illicit because it depends on the false assumption the (E) translates
(B). We need to see why Noonan thinks that (E) does not translate (B).
Noonan avers that (E) does not translate (B) because,
. . . (B) and (E) differ in subject matter, the formercontains a reference to the French work
-Londres’ where the
098^ p. fosj)
3 ref6renCe to the E"glish word
-London.-
Noonan holds that for an English sentence S to (strictly) translate a
French sentence S-, S and S- must have the same subject matter; they must
be about all the same things. This seems reasonable. In addition he
holds that (E) and (B) differ in subject matter. So, Noonan's attempt to
solve Kripke-s puzzle rests on his claim that (E) and (B) have different
subject matter.
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This seems wrong. (E) and (B)
things- »•
311 an<J onl * <*• somemngs. Pierre, the belief-relati ™
pretty C t
’ “ thS Propositio
" that Undon isP . on rary to what Noonan says in the above
So much for a strict and literal reading of Noonan's case against
ranslating (B) as <E, Perhaps Noonan's ^sition can be reformulated so
as to appear less implausible.
Noonan never reallv savs u-y y so, but his case asain^i-g inst the assumption that
<E) tranSlaUS <B) mlght tu™ O" tM, truth-conditions for belief
ascription sentences. Noonan holds that, where S is a speaker, S's use
Of
if eitherf
beUeV6S that^ *»«»»«- Catiline' may be true
(1)
a°nd Rarph%; i;«e3
y
;h
e
a
X
t
Pr
[ a
:
’ren^un^d'camin^
101601
or
(11>
a^d oTA ; .'Tull y' expresses <r in S's idiolect
(Noonan^ 1 98 1 ^ pX® 99^
hat C® denou"oed Catiline],
Where 'a ' designates a sense expressed by sane definite description,
'the-F', and '[ex denounced Cat! line] • designates the proposition that
the-F denounced Catiline. This suggests the following treatment of
Kripke's claim that Pierre believes that London is pretty:
true Neither?
6 ° f 'Pierre believes that London 1= Pretty' is
(i) For some cc
, 'London' expresses a in Pierre'sidiolect and Pierre believes that [a is pretty]
or
(ii) For some a
,
'London' expresses of in Kripke's
idiolect and Pierre believes that [cc- is pretty].
101
Let us tentatively assume that Noonan , s truth_oondit . ons
a
set of truth-conditions could be given for Kripke's use of
'Pierre crols ,ue Londres est Jolie’; however, unlike the account of
Kripke’s use of (E), the account of Kripke’s use of (B) would make
reference to the word 'Londres * Tn i-v-ii®. I this way, Noonan’s account of the
truth-conditions of (B) is ahonf „I b ut the word 'Londres'; whereas his account
of the truth-conditions for (E) is about the word ’London.’ This is
beginning to sound familiar. All Noonan needs now is the not-
unreasonable claim that (E) (strictly) translates (B) only if <E ) and (B)
have the same truth-conditions (or intertranslatable truth-conditions).
Interpreted in this way, Noonan's case seems more plausible.
This discussion indicates that Noonan’s solution to Kripke’s puzzle
depends on Noonan’s truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences.
This is unfortunate for Noonan because his truth-conditions are provably
fal se
.
Suppose that Brown associates •London' with 'the most famous dog';
for Brown the sense of 'London' is the sense of 'the most famous dog.'
Applying Noonan's truth conditions for belief ascription sentences, we
discover that if Pierre believes that the most famous dog is pretty, then
Brown's use of (E) is true, regardless of what other beliefs Pierre might
have. This seems incorrect.
Suppose that Pierre associates 'London' with 'the most famous dog';
for Pierre the sense of 'London' is the sense of 'the most famous dog.'
Applying Noonan's truth-conditions for belief ascription sentences, we
discover that if Pierre believes that the most famous dog is pretty, then
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Brown's use of (El i <?
have This t
'
Pe8a " ^ bellefs Pi—
-l«ht
. , oo, seems incorrect.
On the basis of this discussion,
„e conclude that hoa Noonan has failed
to explain why (E) does not translate (B1 «•i ). Since his proposal for
solving Kripke's puzzle depends on fho i •r uc u the claim thai-nat (E) does not translate
<B>. we have no reason for accepting his proposal. Noonan has not solved
Kripke's puzzle.
Section Four
D. E. Over proposes a solution to Kripke's puzzle in "On Kripke's
Puzzle" (, 983 ). over tries to show that Pierre's linguistic behavior and
Kripke's principles do not conn.it us to the conclusion that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs. Toward this end, Over maintains that although
Pierre's assent to
( 2 ) London is not pretty
(in conjunction with Kripke's principles) commits us to the conclusion
that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, Pierre's assent to
(1) Londres est jolie
(even in conjunction with Kripke's principles) does not commit us to the
conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty.
According to Over, Kripke's inference from Pierre's assent to ( 1 ) to
the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty is defective
because
. . . Kripke misuses the translation principle
1983, p. 253) * (Ov er
,
In the
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passage that follows. Over exolain* k ,.p s how he would handle Pierre's
uses of ’Londres':
Suppose
.
. . that Pierre ,.n .Paris. He returns to London on aVrJ •
3 Sh° rt time in
tunnel.
... He boards the trai i„
the new ch^"el
sophisticated train (very fasti ,
" P ris
’ • • . The
5.“.' ivrrs, rr-London as soon as possible. around—I must go to
principles^"
8
“? ^^tion and translationciples
.
.
. [ we ] infer:
Pierre believes that this is London.
occasion,
3
^fl* Werre thlsthat this is not L.ndo^Ud^eleMe^lrtLVthisTs6These are the beliefs whinh OV nio' .• cnat thls ls Londres.
tempted to say that he has iT^SIStent beliefs" ’ But wenot be able to pyniain u,- c K u • u i t . would
that he had inconsistent beliefs^ f w^foll”
0
"^^
376 t0 h° ld
translated Pierre's use of Me a’ ,
f
?
llowed Krlpl<e and
p. 253-254) ondres as London.' (Over, 1983,
In Over's example, Pierre assents to 'This is Londres.' Let us assume
that Pierre also assents to 'This is not London.' Over records that
we conclude, on the basis of Pierre's assent to 'This is Londres, that
Pierre believes that this is Londres, but not that Pierre believes that
this is London. (This is easier to understand if „e assume ourselves to
be present when Pierre arrives in London.) Over would have us conclude,
on the basis of Pierre's assent to 'This is not London, that Pierre
believes that this is not London, but presumably not that Pierre believes
that this is not Londres.
Over’s treatment of his own example suggests his treatment of
Kr lpke's puzzle. Over recommends that on the basis of Pierre’s assent to
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(D, we conclude that Pierre believes that To a3 Londres ^ pretty, but not
that Pierre believes that London is pretty 0vPr. O e recommends that on the
basis of Pierre's assent-sent to (2), we conclude that Pierre believes that
London Is not pretty, but not that Pierre believes that , a-n Londres is not
pretty.
Let us summarize Over's response to Kripke's puzzle. Over wants to
avoid the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. So he tries
to block the inference to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London
is pretty; he has nothing to say against the conclusion that Pierre
believes that London is not pretty. He claims that the inference to the
conclusion that Pierre bpi i ovoc a_ i_
_
r ,el e es that London is pretty depends on the
false assumption that Pierre's uses of 'Londres' must be translated as
'London.' Finally, in place of the belief that London is pretty. Over
recommends the belief that Undres is pretty as the belief exhibited by
Pierre's assent to (1 ).
There are at least two major problems with Over's treatment of
Kripke s puzzle. First, the move from Pierre’s assent to (1) to the
conclusion that Pierre believes that U>ndon is pretty has nothing to do
with translating Pierre's uses of 'Londres' as 'London.' So, Over's
attempt to block the move fails. Second, if we follow Over's
recommendation and conclude that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty
and that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, we are still
corrmitted to the conclusion that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs; in
fact, we are saying that Pierre believes what Kripke's original
inferences led us to say he believes. Let us attend to the point about
translation.
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The only step in the move from Pierre's assent to (,) to the
conclusion that Pierre believes that •nev Ix>ndon is pretty that involves a
translation of ’Londres' as ’London’ is the steo viap, the principle of
translation, from
•Pierre orois que Undres eat jolle' is a truth of French
to
'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a truth of English.
At this point in the derivation one is translating one sentence_as used
by Kripke, or us, or the person per^ormiag the derivation..to another
sentence. Pierre's use of 'Londrea' is not involved; we are not
translating Pierre's use of 'Londres.' Nothing about Lake's derivation
requires that Pierre ever used or assented to either of the sentences
involved in the translation. Over has simply misunderstood Kripke's
inference to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty.
We now turn to the point about inconsistent beliefs.
Nowhere in the article where Over proposes his solution to Kripke's
puzzle does Over even so much as hint that he intends to employ a special
interpretation either of proper names or of belief ascription sentences.
As a matter of fact, he gives every indication of intending that this
solution is compatible with a Millian theory of the meaning of names; for
he writes that his examples and his proposed solution,
... do not establish that ’Londres' and ’London' have
regean senses and are not rigid designators. (1 983, p. 255)
This is all quite puzzling, because, according to the Millian theory and
our standard interpretation of belief ascription sentences, when we say
that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty we are saying exactly what we
are saying when we say that Pierre believes that London is pretty. If
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the belief that London is prettv t-ncr 4-uP y, together with Pierre's other beliefs
shows that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs th
.
UefS
' en s° *>es the belief thatLondres is pretty. Pierre's beliefs are every bity l as inconsistent, when
characterized by Over as uh.n •y u , w e "derived" by Kripke.
We conclude that Over has fa-M^afailed on two scores. First, he has failed
fchs inf'0F0npp +-
^
the conclusion that Pierre believes that Londonis pretty. Second, he ‘has fail pHed to recommend, as the belief exhibited
by Pierre's assent to (1) a belipf on nany less troublesome than the one we
already have.
Section Five
In The First Person 0 981) Roderick Chisholm claims that he can
accommodate the conclusions that Pierre believes that London is pretty
and that Pierre believes that London is not pretty, and avoid the
conclusion that Pierre thus stands convicted of harboring inconsistent or
contradictory beliefs. In his attempt to solve Kripke's puzzle, Chisholm
invokes his own views about proper names, his analysis of belief, and his
account of belief ascription sentences.
We have assumed that propositions are the objects of beliefs and that
when say that S believes that p we are, thereby, asserting that the
belief-relation a two-place relation that relates people and
propositions relates S to the proposition that p; that is, relates S to
the proposition expressed by 'p.' Chisholm rejects this account as it
applies to our beliefs about particulars, or as it applies to the beliefs
we express by means of referring singular terms. To understand
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Chisholm's solution to Kripke's puzzle, we must first „understand certain
features of the view Chisholm adopts in place of the •K xii i t view we have
assumed
.
Chisholm holds that a person x can directly refer to, or have a
belief directly about, no one but x. He holds that whenever a person x
refers to somethin, other than x, x does so only indirectly, and then
_
only m virtue of having referred directly to x. Chisholm holds that
whenever a person x has a belief about a y distinct form x. the belief is
merely indirectly about * and directly about x. According to Chisholm
our beliefs about things other than ourselves are mediated through 0„
beliefs about ourselves.
Chisholm's theory is stated in terms of the following primitive
doxastic locution:
it to
T
y!
PrOPerty ° f belng £ iS SUOh that i directly attributes
Chisholm holds that a person x can directly attribute a property to y
only if y is x. For Chisholm, our beliefs directly about ourselves are
our direct attributions of properties to ourselves. For example, my
belief that I am alive is my direct attribution of the property of being
alive to myself (provided it is one of my beliefs directly about myself).
If a person x attributes a property to jr, and y is diverse from x, then
that attribution is indirect rather than direct; moreover, x succeeds in
attributing a property to such a y only if x thereby attributes a
property to x. Chisholm tells us that x indirectly attributes a property
F to y if and only if there is a relation R such that x bears R uniquely
to y and x directly attributes to x (i.e., x self-attributes) this
property: tz [Eu (zRu & Vu' ( zRu 1 u* = u) & Fu) ]. For Chisholm,
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beliefs indirectly about things are indirect attribuf
to them P
butions of properties
or example, Jones’s belief that <?
, n .. ,
Smith ^ tall just is Jones’s
t bbtnibution of the property of being tall to s
indirectly attributed being tall t
^^^— 0 S” lth
- anith is the person
standing directly in front of Jones, by directlv alt ky a y attributing this
property to himself: Xx [Ev ( v
~
y (y is the person standing in front of x & yis tall)]. . - ^
When Chisholm states his theorv'ays primitive doxastic locution, he
adds:
predicative^xpression ^ may be replaced by any
P. 28 )
^P^ io having a property as its sense. (1931,
This comment is significant because it involves one of Chisholm's
principle theses: namely, that an account of reference and
intentionality can be given in terms of a purified theory of properties.
WHat 3 PUrifl6d the0
- " “ties
- -haps best be understood by
contrasting it with a "non-purified" theory of properties. A non-
puri fied theory of properties entails that every well-formed predicative
expression expresses a property. According to such a theory,
-is a dog'
expresses the property of hpincr o »•P l being a dog, < as a unicorn’ expresses the
property of being a unicon,, ' ls identical with London' expresses the
property of being identical with London, and 'is a round square'
expresses the property of beigg a round sauare. According to Chisholm's
purified theory, the first two expressions, 'is a dog’ and 'is a
unicorn,' express properties, but the last two expressions, 'is identical
with London,' and 'is a round square,' do not. Chisholm maintains that a
predicative expression succeeds in expressing a property only if it can
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be paraphrased so as to eliminate any reference to a particular
Accordingly. u„ le ss
-Is Identical with London- can he paraphrased so as
to eliminate reference to London,
-is Identical with London- does not
express a property. (Oiisholm „ould llkely malntaln ^ ^
with London- does not admit of suoh a paraphrase, Chisholm also holds
that although properties need not be exemplified, properties are
exemplifiable. Since it is impossible for seething to be both round and
square, the
it expresses
According ly,
expression
-is a round square’ expresses a property onl;
an impossible (i.e., unexemplifiable) property.
'is a round square’ does not express a property.?
if
Chisholm's views about properties are important for us for two
reasons. First, when we evaluate Chisholm's treatment of Kripke’s puzzle
(and modifications of Chishoim-s explicit statement of his treatment), „e
will want to verify that they are acceptable to Chisholm. Second, if -is
identical with London- expresses a property, that property will be an
essence of London; and we want to at least try to solve Kripke-s puzzle
in a way that does not comnit us to the view that (there are essences
and) we are acquainted with essences when we use proper names. It may be
that a solution to Kripke's puzzle coumits us to essences; however, until
we have good reasons for thinking that we need essences to solve the
puzzle, we will reject any solution that resorts to essences.
We are not in a position to consider Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's
puzzle. Recall that Pierre’s behavior toward
(1) Londres est jolie,
in conjunction with Kripke's principles, forces us to conclude that
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Pierre believes that London is prettv and i
toward
8130 P1— S b^-lor
(2) London is not pretty,
in conjunction with Kripke’s principles, forces us to ,conclude thatierre believes that London is not prettv nP y. On our reading Q f belief
ascriptions, we must conclude that- uat Pierre has inconsistent beliefs: he
-Ueves both a proposition and its denial. Chisholm sa ys that Pierre
does not have contradictory or inconsistent beliefs. According to
Chisholm, Pierre does not believe both a proposition and its denial-
rather, according to Chisholm the conclusions that Pierre believes that
London is pretty and that Pierre believes that r a •D il London is not pretty, when
properly understood, are about Pierre's self-attributions of non-
contradictory (or consistent) properties. Thus Chisholm writes:
If we interpret the two sentences- ip-,-^ u t .
pretty' £ ESSjJ ^ ^
is true in virtue ofI \ flnd the 3“°"d sentence
property of being such that “th iw-
h® attributes to himself the
to designate is pretty.^ (1981, p
1
."^)
6 USUally uses '-"don'
Chisholm holds that we can truly say that Pierre believes that London is
pretty because Pierre self-attributes property F, : Xx [Ey (* nornlally
uses 'Londres' to designate y and y is pretty)]. In addition, Chisholm
holds that we can truly say that Pierre believes that London is not
pretty because Pierre self-attributes property F2 : /x [Ey (x nontally
uses 'London' to designate y and 1 is not pretty)]. Pierre could
exemplify both F, and F2 at one and the same time: his self-attribution
F
1
and F2 is neither contradictory nor inconsistent. F-| and F2
Ill
are ( aPP,ently) purlfled properties; nelther
_ ^^
to any P-rtioul.r. However, Chishoim's treatment of these ascriptions is
unacceptable. This is because the ascriptions could be false even if
Pierre self-attributes both F, and F, Thls can be illustrated by an
example involving F-j.
Suppose that Pierre things he uses
-Londres. to designate southing
pretty, when in fact he either never uses 'Londres' or uses 'Londres' to
designate the neighbor’s nrpi-f v nop Tn p etty cat. In this case Pierre self-attributes
F,! nevertheless
- Pierre might not believe that London is pretty.
This example shows that F, is not such that if Pierre self-attributes
it, then it is plausible to say that he believes that London is pretty.
The problem with F, seems fn hP d-
1 to be that Pierre can self-attribute F-, even
though he either never uses 'Londres,' but thinks he does, or does use
'Londres' to designate something (pretty), but something other than
London
.
Perhaps there is another property such that if Pierre self-attributes
it, then we may say that Pierre believes that London is pretty. One
property that might work is F3: X x [Ey (x normally uses ’Londres’ to
designate y and y is pretty and in x’s culture ’Londres’ is normally used
to designate y)L Perhaps with F
3 Chisholm could exploit the fact that
Pierre lives in a culture where ’Londres’ is used to designate London.
However, another example will show that F^ will not do.
Suppose that Pierre wakes up one morning, and sees, left over from
the preceding evening's word game, the word 'Londres.' He is still a
very sleepy fellow. He says to himself, 'Surely "Londres" is a name.'
He pronounces it a couple of times, being pleased by the sound, and says,
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'I
-St be in the habit of using "Londres" to deslsnate
pretty.' He continues to say the name. untii he finally concludes,
•Indeed, like others in my culture, I must be in the habit of using
"Londres" to designate something pretty.' In this case Pierre self-
attributes F3 ; nevertheless, Pierre might not believe that London is
pretty.
The problem with i, -^u
3 s much the same as that with F
q
: Pierre can
self-attribute F3 even though he never uses 'Londres' (as a name for
London). What we need is a property the self-attribution of which links
Pierre with 'Londres' and London, and
-Londres' with London in some
appropriate way. Suppose we try F,
: [Ey ( , normally
to designate y and y is pretty and in x's culture 'Londres' is normally
used to designate London)]. The proposal we are considering is that we
may truly say that Pierre believes that London is pretty because Pierre
self-attributes F„. With regard to the belief that Pierre exhibits by
his assent to (2), this proposal's counterpart is: „e may truly say that
Pierre believes that London is not pretty because Pierre self-attributes
property F5 : Xx [Ey (x normally uses 'Londres' to designate y and y is
not pretty and in x's culture 'Londres' is normally used to designate
London)]. Is it reasonable to say that Pierre's belief that London is
pretty comes to nothing more or less than his self-attribution F, and
that Pierre's belief that London is not pretty cones to nothing more or
less than his self-attributing F
? ? Surely it is not.
There are two good reasons to reject this version of Chisholm's
treatment of Kripke's puzzle. First, F
^
and F5 are not purified
properties. Each involves reference to London. Therefore, this proposal
113
;;
unaooeptabie to chish° im ~
..ns t0
second
,15 reaS° nable ^ th3t
— "0^ self-attribute both F
,
andF5 ‘ ^ Pl™“, he would ^assenting to <,, and (2)
. Thls ubecause be would be worried that bis assents to („ and (2) uere
misleading his auditors into thinking that he bad contradictory or
inconsistent belief's Rnf d-,- iefs. But Pierre has no such worries. So he does not
self-attribute both F„ and r5. The concl usions-that Pierre believes
both that London is pretty and also that London is not pretty-are not
supported by Pierre's self-attributions of F„ and Fc 9
„ ...
two versions of Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's puzzle. Each is
unsatisfactory. No doubt other versions can be concocted. However,
rather than considering them here, we conclude our discussion of
Chisholm's work on Kripke's puzzle with a summary of what a "Chisholmian"
solution to Kripke's puzzle must do. Such a solution must specify two
properties F and G such that; (i) it is reasonable to say that Pierre
self-attributes F; (ii) it is reasonable to say that Pierre self-
attributes G; (Hi) it is reasonable to say that if Pierre self-
attributes F, then he believes that London is pretty; (iv) it is
reasonable to say that if Pierre self-attributes G, then he believes that
G; (v) both F and G are purified properties; and (vi) Pierre would not be
inconsistent to self-attribute both F and G. This is a tall order.
Until it is filled, we may conclude that Chisholm has failed to solve
Kripke's puzzle.
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Section Six
a recent article,
''boscription and Identlfloatiorfl^^
arrxson presents a version of the description theory of proper naaes andproposes a soiution to Krip.e's pu 22 le. We „m state, explain, a„d
critically evaluate Harrison's proposed solution.
Harrison claims that,
believes T^Z ""T* : ' ' ls ' ' ' that Pierre
'Londres' that it names some othe^Jt^or
'
’otT °l
the na” e
matter of fact, is nrpi-i-v , .
or ot ^er which, as a
objects, in no way contrad ict^onp
0
^u^
3
’ hav ing different
y e another. (1982, p. 338)
Harrison clearly intends to avoid the conclusion that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs. According to Harrison, when Pierre assents to
(1 ) Londres est jolie,
Pierre exhibits the belief that 'Londres' names a pretty city.’O Also>
according to Harrison, when Pierre assents to
(2) London is not pretty,
Pierre exhibits the belief that London is not pretty. These two beliefs
are neither contradictory nor inconsistent; and, therefore, if Harrison
right, Pierres linguistic behavior does not convict him of an
inconsistency.
To understand how Harrison would avoid the conclusion that Pierre
believes that London is pretty, we need to see how Harrison uses the
words 'object' and 'content.' As Harrison uses the word 'object,' the
object of a belief is the thing the proposition believed attributes a
property to. As Harrison uses the word 'content,' the content of a
belief is the property the proposition believed thus attributes. For
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example, suppose that Jones believes that •
.
^ 15 tall; Jones believes
proposition that Smith is tall Thai-n. at proposition attributes the
^^ » »•
..
....
0 “ ”” ' ™ aas aj.its content.
Harrison rejects the conciusion that Pierre believes that ionhon is
pretty. Kripke derived that conclusion from Pierre's assent to (,) and
certain principles. Harrison, who recommends that we dismiss that
conclusion, must say where Kripke's derivation breaks do™. He tries to
do just that in this passage:
parado"
e
is
We
thn,
PO
tH
nt ? the argument Whloh Spates Kripke's
that "it fans to dist
l
i
S
„«ufs
a
h
tl
h
°';
Pri "°lple
'
a"d what la wrong is
about an Wi.to Tf, ? dlrect and lndlrect beliefs
not the object of a belief. 0982,^^7^) ^ °° ntent ’ bUt
Remember that Harrison favors the description theory of names. He
holds that unless a speaker has "actual epistemic contact"" with a given
thing he cannot have a belief directly about that thing; that is, he
cannot have a belief whose object is that thing. For Prison, a belief
is directly about a given thing if and only if that thing is that
belief's object. If Jones believes that Smith is tall, Jones has a
belief whose object is Smith; Jones’s belief is directly about Smith.
But suppose that Jones only believes that the man next door is tall, and
not that Smith is tall, where Smith is the man next door (to Jones).
Then Jones does not have a belief whose object is Smith; he does not have
a belief directly about Smith. Rather Jones's belief is indirectly about
Smith and directly about the house next door.
Now, suppose that Jones has had no actual epistemic contact with
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’
bUt ttat JO"eS SayS ,a" lth iS «Wle associating the nane
-it, wit, the definite description
-the man next door, KripXCs
disquotation principle infoms us that dones helieves that Smith is tan
But, according to Harrison, this is wrong He , •. explains why he takes this
position in the following passage:
Bg 1 if* f' • .
about an indi^ idua^doLTeq^^ belief
the individual in question Tf T ,
1 epistemic contact with
mountain called 'cZbo raZ which iTtaTl Y but’‘^^ 3mountain it is then t am ^ • tal , not which
belief about the actual rasfof
n
sto„
P
e°
Sit
rn t0 e"tertai " a"*
’Chimborazo’ but onlv a hai • r k
anb veg e tation called
(1982, p. 337)
le about the word ’Chimborazo.'
So, according to Harrison, a necessary condition for a person x to have a
belief directly about an object y_a belief whose object is y-is that x
have actual epistemic contact with y.'3 Disquotation, when it involves a
name sentence, correctly informs us of both the object and the content of
a belief only if the believer has actual epistemic contact with the
name's referent. Otherwise it does not give us the correct object, but
only the correct content.
If Jones says,
-Smith is tali' but has never had actual epistemic
contact with Smith, then, according to Harrison, the most we can infer is
that Jones believes that the man next door is tall. The object of that
belief is the house next door; its content is the property of being
(inhabited by a man who is) tall. Disquotation, however, informs us that
Jones believes that Smith is tall. That belief's object would be Smith;
its content would be the property of being tall
. Again, according to
Harrison, without actual epistemic contact, disquotation yields the wrong
object but the ''right'' content. 14 We can now return to Kripke's puzzle.
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While in Franca, when he assented to (1), Plerre laoked aotual
epistemic contact with London. Dlsquotation tells us that Pierre
believes that London Is pretty. But, by Harrison's lights, this Is
wrong, since Pierre lacKs actual epistemic contact with London, he
cannot have a belief whose object is London. Harrison reports that the
belief Pierre in fact exhibits by his assent to (1) is the belief that
'Londres- names a pretty city. The content of this belief, given by
dlsquotation, is the property of being (the name of) a £retty city. The
object of this belief, not given by dlsquotation but by Harrison's tacit
assumption that Pierre associates 'Londres' with the French translation
of 'the city named "Londres",' is the word 'Londres.' Once in London,
Pierre has actual epistemic contact with London. So, when Pierre
assented to (2), he exhibited his belief that London is not pretty. In
the case of Pierre's assent to (2), dlsquotation yields both the correct
content and the correct object of the exhibited belief.
We have seen how Harrison would block the move from Pierre’s assent
to (1) to the conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty. We
have also seen what belief Harrison recommends as the belief behind
Pierre’s assent to (1). We will now consider two objections to
Harrison’s proposed solution. I will suggest a way for Harrison to
respond to the first of these two objections. I regard the second
objection as conclusive evidence that Harrison's proposal is
unacceptable.
The first objection goes as follows. Once Pierre is in London he has
actual epistemic contact with London. For if not, dlsquotation errs when
it tells us that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. Pierre
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continues to assent to (1) Thi „ r «.T l s fact, together with Kripke's otherprinciples and the fact that Pierre
.
W 3 actual epistemic contact with
n on, yields the conclusion that Pierre believes that I a
T , „ London is prettvherefore. Harrison is committed to the view that Pierre has
contradictory beliefs.
1 f° rmUlate thS f0ll °Wi "S
, When, subsequent to
hlS ™°Ve tC L°nd0n
’ Pl3rre 333e"tS f «>. »e does so on the basis of
dispositions he formed when he was in France. Those dispositions were
acquired before Pierre had actual epistemic contact with London and they
survive the Journey to Undo, Therefore, the belief Pierre exhibits by
his assent to 0), once he is in London, is the sane belief he exhibited
by his assent to <„ before he arrived in Undo, Tha t belief did not
have London as an object; and, therefore, the belief exhibited by
Pierre's current assents to (1) does nnt- r ja ot have London as an object. So,
Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.
This reply would force Harrison to modify his views about
disquotation and actual epistemic contact. Let us assume that the
details of such a view could be worked out; moreover, let us assume that
Harrison can give a reasonable account of actual epistemic contact
.
Despite our generosity, Harrison's solution is unacceptable. This is
because we would still be able to show that any acceptable version of
Harrison's view will protect the conclusion that Pierre believes that
London is not pretty if and only if it issues the conclusion that Pierre
believes that Undon is pretty. This can be illustrated by considering
the following simple modification of Kripke's original story about
Pierre.
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The modified story is ni«, v • , ,
that Pier
°rl8lnal ^ the time
.
^ mOV6d t0 thS U§ly SeCti ° n ° f U)ndon
‘ W Offers from the
sto
:
in that in tha— •*-
— -
.
French
e
8 S60tl0n ° f^ Hls“
-th Ulndon before hls move 15
dlrect and intimate as his contact with London after the
move. Therefore, Pierre hs-? tactual epistemic contact with London after
115 ”OVS " and °nly " " »“ “‘“1
-Pi-t-ic contact with London
before his move. Hence, Pierre’s assent to <2 > exhibits his belief that
London is not Pretty if and onl y if his assent to <„ exhibits his belief
that London is prett y .
How might Harrison respond to this objection? Recall that Harrison
" 3 deS°ripti°n He might maintain that we are right: if
Pierre has actual epistemic contact with london *en he assents to (2)
then Pierre has actual epistyle contact with London when he assents to
(1)i a"d
’ theref° re> lf P1
— “‘“l epistemic contact with London,
He believes that London is pretty if and only if he believes that London
is not pretty. Harrison might go on to say that since this would convict
who we know has consistent beliefs-of having inconsistent
beliefs, it follows that Pierre does not have actual epistemic contact
with London, either before or after he moves.
Of course, if Harrison were to adopt this position he would lose the
conclusion that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. This is
because, according to Harrison, Pierre cannot believe that London is not
pretty unless he has actual epistemic contact with London. This conforms
to my original claim. I claimed that any acceptable version of
Harrison’s modified view protects the conclusion that Pierre believes
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that London is not pretty just in case it •
.
also lssues the conclusion that
Pierre believes that London is prettv Pprha uP y* Pe ps Harrison would reply that
Pierre’s beliefs are not really direct! v a hl y about London tut are, instead,
directly about areas, parts, portions, or sections of h, u London. If he were
to .aKe this move
* he would sacrifice the conclusion that Pierre believes
that london is not pretty; Harrison says that Pierre does believe that
London ls not pretty. Furthermore, it is by no means olear th>t the
sacrifice would be worth the train cgain. For a version of Kripke's puzzle
could always be generated for an area, part, portion, or section of
London. After all, London is nothing m0re than an area, part, portion,
or section of Greater Metropolitan London.
Looking back over this chapter, it is clear that the philosophers
whose views we have discussed have a considerable stake in the claim that
Pierre has consistent beliefs. Kripke says that it is a mistake to say
that Pierre is guilty of an inconsistency. Devitt's theory of the
meaning and reference of proper names flounders on the discovery that it
is comitted to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Finally,
the various philosophers whose proposed solutions we have considered all
mean to avoid the conclusion that Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent.
Kripke's contention that it is a mistake to convict Pierre of having
inconsistent beliefs is based on two related considerations. First, no
matter how much Pierre compares his various beliefs, so long as he is
unaware that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre will not be able
to detect any inconsistency. Second, Pierre will not draw the sorts of
conclusions readily available to one who has premises p and -p at his
disposal even if we tell him that every proposition is entailed by an
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inconsistent set of propositions.
It would be a mistake t0 exclude, from the fanure of
Proposed solutions based on the claim that Pierre's beliefs are not
inconsistent, that Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent. Nevertheless. the
ailure of such solutions should give us DaU se- up us : perhaps Pierre's beliefs
are inconsistent. In the chapter that foilP l ows
> we abandon our tacit
assumption that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs.
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Notes
1
2
e th60ry refUted 13 °ne Presen ted by Michael Devitt (, 981).
The solutions are given by Poderick Chisholm
Harrison (1982), Harold Noonan (1981) and D F nv a . E. Over (1983)
will assume that (4, and (5, are sentences of English.
interesting to note that this account of belief leaves Devitt
MltH the Pr0ble" °f Sayl "g Hhat “
- a person to cease believing
something. Such an explanation is not given in Devitt (1981).
6
S the Paderew3k1 ’ example given by Kripke ( 1979
, p. 265-266).
I have taken 'consequence of' to mean n™-; ilogical consequence of.'
This may not be Devitt-s intended meaning. He may be using
.consequence
of to mean
.dispositional, or causal, consequence of. If so, he owes
us an account of what it is for one Devitt-proposition to be a
dispositional consequence of another Devitt-proposition, or set of
Devitt-propositions. As the story of Pierre is presented, we do not
expect every Devitt-proposition to be a dispositional consequence of the
set of all Devitt-propositions that Pierre believes. But had we
concluded that Pierre believes that london is pretty on the basis of an
assent to sentence (3), rather than sentence (1), we would expect every
Devitt-proposition to be a dispositional consequence of the set of all
Devitt-propositions that Pierre believes. Yet, in the two cases all and
only the same Devitt-propositions are believed by Pierre. This suggests
that something is amiss with the notion of one Devitt-proposition being a
dispositional consequence of another Devitt-proposition, or set of
Devitt-propositions
.
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^Chisholm sets forth his purified theory of
Tho _. „
y properties in his book
—
First Person (1981, p . 5.9).
’
8The principle Chisholm is referring to is:
If it can be correctly said nr *he believes that a isF' (where 'a' „,
PerSO
"
-
ln ^listi that
proper name and 'F' the place of =~ .
ouples the place of a
S has a belief whi'ch could be expressed
ex Pr «sion), then
a way that its English translation 00uid he
la"gUage in such
F,’ wherein the name replacing
-a° is the r f
araPhrased as
-a is
certain proper name in S's language. (,» “(,7* of a
- can say that Pierre believes that London is pretty^ not violate
this principle.
9 t looks like F
4 and F5 can be used to generate a puzzle like
Kripke's original puzzle. Putting the question to Pierre in Fre„ch-by
using a French predicative expression-Pierre will say he self-attributes
FV But. if we put the question to him in E„glish_by using an English
predicative expression-Pierre will deny that he self-attributes F„. At
this point, if, easy to imagine Kripke asking,
-Does Pierre, or does he
not, self-attributed F^?'
1°u rn son holds that when a speaker, S, uses a proper name, 'N,' S
associates U» with a definite description which wither makes reference
to <*' or makes reference to an act of reference to the referent of 'N.'
This is why, m the examples we consider, we find Harrison using definite
descriptions which contain proper names as the definite descriptions
backing uses of proper names.
"Harrison neglects to explain what he means by 'actual epistemic
contact.' His notion of actual epistemic contact is similar to Russell's
notion of direct acquaintance. However, Harrison's notion of actual
epistemic contact is not identical with Russell's notion of direct
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acquaintance. Harrison allows that Pierre has actual epistyle contact
with London but Russell would not have allowed that Pierre has direct
acquaintance with London. Let us say that Pierre has actual epistemic
contact with London provided he either sees, touches, hears, tastes, or
smells (a part of) London.
12
It is because Harrison typically uses definite descriptions that
contain the proper names they back that he says that the belief's object
is a proper name.
1
3
Harr ison needs to explain what happens to Pierre’s belief that
London is not pretty if Pierre leaves London for the weekend and ceases
to have actual epistemic contact with London. If Pierre’s beliefs
directly about London are not lost, then Harrison’s views about the
connection between actual epistemic contact and direct belief are
violated. Yet, it seems odd to say that Pierre loses all his beliefs
(and hence his knowledge) directly about London as a consequence of going
for a drive through the English countryside, and (as we may reasonably
assume his must) that he regains such beliefs (and knowledge) upon his
return
.
This is obviously false. Strictly speaking, when disquotation
fails to correctly identify the object of a given belief, it is likely to
fail to correctly identify that belief’s content. When it fails to
correctly identify a given belief’s object, disquotation really just
"helps" us determine that belief's content.
CHAPTER I V
KRIPKE'S PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF: INCONSISTENCY SOLUTIONS
preceding chapter, several atte.pt. to solve Kripke’s puzzle
Were °rltl0ally 6ValUated
- E~h preserved the consistency of
Pierre’s beliefs. So, there is a significant sense in which the chapter
was dominated by the assumption that Pierre’s beliefs are not
inconsistent. That assumption is now dropped. I„ deed, I win maintain
that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not
pretty; and therefore, that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.
Kripke gave two related reasons for rejecting the view that Pierre
has inconsistent beliefs.' first, Pierre is apparently unable to infer
all that such beliefs would entail. For example, if Pierre believes both
that t°ndon is pretty and that Undon is not pretty, then he believes two
propositions which jointly entail, say, that New York is pretty;
nevertheless, we do not expect Pierre to be able to infer that New York
is pretty. Second, Pierre is apparently unable to detect any
inconsistency among his beliefs. No matter how much introspective
comparison occurs and no matter how carefully Pierre thinks about his
beliefs, he will not come to see that his beliefs are inconsistent.
Because I hold that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, I must deal with
Kripke's assertion that such a view is mistaken. In this chapter, two
articles on Kripke's puzzle, and related issues, by Ruth Barcan Marcus
are considered
.
2
An explanation of why there is nothing wrong with
saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs is constructed on the basis
of things Marcus says in the two articles. It is argued that such an
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explanation is unacceDtahi ^ ao p ble. A co^entary on Kripke's puzzle by David
ewis is then considered.3 The general outline of a so, r-t lution to Kripke's
puzzle, developed from nertaincertain things suggested by what Lewis says, Is
presented. My solution comes complete with an explanation f ho w y there
is nothing wrong with the view that Pierre has in™ • «.inconsistent beliefs.
Section One
"A
and
Ruth Barcan Marcus discusses
Proposed Solution to a Puzzle
Kripke's puzzle in two recent articles:
about Belief" (1981) and "Rationality
Believing the Impossible" (1983).
On the basis of Pierre’s assents to
(1)
Londres est jolie
and
(2) London is not pretty,
Marcus concludes that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that
Pierre believes that London is not pretty. She acknowledges that this
commits her to the view that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Marcus
argues that it is a mistake to conclude, from Pierre's withheld assent to
(3) London is pretty,
that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. She modifies
Kripke's disquotation principle so that Pierre's assent to
(5) Londres is not London
does not yield the conclusion that, before he learns that 'Londres' and
'London' codesignate, Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with
London. (Her modified disquotation principle allows her to retain the
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conclusion that Pierre believes that London is pretty and th
that Pi u
P e conclusion
Pierre believes that London is not pretty.) Finallv „y J f y, Marcus would
prohibit inferring from Pierre's refusal to assent to
(4) Londres is London,
that before he learns that the two names codesignate Pierre does not
believe that Londres is London.
Knpke gave two related reasons for holding that Pierre should not be
convicted of harboring inconsistent beliefs. Pirst, to the extent that
Pierre can compare his various beliefs, no matter how good a logician he
is, no amount of introspective comparison will help Pierre detect any
inconsistency among his beliefs. Second, no matter how good a logician
Pierre is, he will „0t draw-in fact it would be a surprise if he did
draw-the kinds of conclusions available to someone who possessed
inconsistent premises, even if he is told flat out that any proposition
is entailed by an inconsistent set of propositions. A proposed solution
which entails that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs but which fails to
ease our worries-worries shared by Chisholm, Devitt, Harrison, Kripke,
Noonan, and Over—about saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs is at
best only half complete.* It is one thing-™ easy thing at that-to
assert that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. It is quite another thing-
a far more difficult thing-to explain why there is nothing wrong with
saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.
Marcus denies that Pierre believes everything. There are certain
propositions that Marcus says Pierre does not believe. She is aware of
Knpke's claim that Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs. She does
not say why she thinks it is worth pointing out that Pierre does not
128
believe the propositions she says he does not believe Soneve. , we cannot be
certain that she denies that Pierre hpiio ,r believes what she denies that he
believes in response to Kripke's claim that Pierre does not have
inconsistent beliefs. Nevertheless, it is in our interest to see if a
response to Kripke can be crafted from her remarks.
Among other things. Marcus contends that despite the fact that Pierre
is disposed to assent to both
(5) Londres is not London
and
(8) Londres is pretty and London is not pretty,
Pierre believes neither that Londres is not identical with London nor
that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty. Of course. Pierre's
assents to (5) and (8), in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation
principle, entail that Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with
London and that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty and London is not
pretty.^ Marcus tries to avoid these, and similar, results by replacing
Kripke's disquotation principle with one of her own.
Recall that Kripke presented his disquotation principle as follows:
Let us make explicit the disquotational principlepresupposed here, connecting sincere assent and belief. It canbe stated as follows, where 'p' is to be replaced, inside and
outside all quotation marks, by any appropriate standard English
entence: If a normal English speaker
, on ref lection,
s incerely assents U)
_|p,' then he believes that p." (1979. d.248-249 ) — ’
In place of Kripke's disquotation principle, Marcus recommends:
Again assuming that assent is sincere and reflective, if(i) a normal speaker assents to 'p' and (ii) 'p» is a sentence
of English and (iii) p is possible, then he believes that P(1981, p. 505)
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Since (5) and (8) exnrp« ., ,mpossible propositions,
„e cannot go via
Marcus's disquotation principle from Pierre's assents to (5) and (8) tothe conclusions that Pierre believes that lo aL ndres is not identical withLondon and that Pierre believes th,t . athat U>ndres Pretty and London is notpretty. Marcus recommends her disauotai- i
™
a quotat on principle over Kripke’s
because hers, unlike his, accords with the foil nunl owing principle (which she
calls "Principle C"): '
x believes that p, then p is possible. (1981, p . 505)
Principle C is true, then It is quite easy to explain why Pierre does
not believe every proposition:
'According to Principle C there are
constraints on what one can believe. One cannot believe an impossible
proposition. Therefore, despite the fact that certain impossible
propositions are entailed bv the <?er nr n*. .-tea oy set of propositions Pierre believes,
they are not propositions he believes. So, it should come as no surprise
that Pierre does not believe everything. Given that he believes both
that London is pretty and that Undon is not pretty, since he does not
believe that Londres is not identical with London, it should cone as no
surprise, and we should not worry about saying, that Pierre does not
believe, say, that New York is pretty.’
This explanation has at least three major problems. First, Principle
C is the basis for this explanation and Marcus has failed to give us good
reasons for thinking that Principle C is true. Second, Principle C
yields some counter-intuitive results. Third, it is by no means clear
that this explanation succeeds in mollifying our legitimate fears about
attributing inconsistent beliefs to Pierre. We turn first to the problem
of warrant.
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We want to know why there is nm-M«
.
8 WPOng with saying that Pierrehas inconsistent beliefs tv, 0o i i s. The account before us i s ho ^
Mo
1S based °n Principle Carcus makes her case for Principle C in ihi m the passage below:
Suppose that someone were to claim fwHesperus is not identical with Phosnhn
that he believes that
identical with Cicero, or that
^ ^ Tul^ is not
London where in those contexts of usp
n0t ldentlcal withm question do
.
. . re f er to thi
the names of the "Pairs"
post-hoc, intuition tLt on di.cove^^^
1
?; “ is <»»nhold, and consequently that ~th7~^~^ • ^
at those
^entities
same thing, I would not say that I ZT^ "T Pairs name ^acquired a new belieTto real
1
"
ad changed my belief or
mistaken in claiming that I Lh
°
ld
’
bUt that 1 was
After all, if x hadbe^ to bei^ with.
Cicero, I would have been believing that
1S nob ldentlca l with
same as itself and I surelv din ^ K ,
somethlng is not the
impossibility, so I was misfa,
bf leve that, a blatant
(1981, p. 505 )
60 10 cl aiming to have the belief.
The preceding passage falls short of giving us eoodha g reasons for
thinking that Principle c is true
. We oa „ easUy aooept ^^
actually assents in the passage-that she neven believed any one of three
propositions and still consistently hold: ( 1 ) that Marcus believed, or
believes, other impossible propositions; tii) that we, or others,
believed, or believe, the three impossible propositions that Marcus
mentions; and (iii) that we, or others, believed, or believe, still other
impossible propositions.
Marcus claims to have an intuition about how she would react in
certain situations. It is by no means clear that there is a sound
argument from this reported intuition to the conclusion that Marcus never
believed any of the three impossible propositions she mentions, let alone
to Principle C. Perhaps an argument with Marcus's reported intuition as
a premise and with the claim that Marcus never believed, say, that
Londres is not identical with U>ndon as a conclusion can be fashioned.
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?lrta£3 we could use that argument as a blueprint
,m constructing an
argument with Principle C i f oPi its conclusion. But, this is sheer
speculation. Marcus has not provided such ,P arguments; moreover, she hasgiven us very little ify , If anything, that will help us to h 0 1j- p develop such
arguments
.
Not only does the preceding passage fail to •give us good reasons for
thinking that Principle C is true it
’ also raises serious problems for
Marcus's own position on Pierre's beliefs. For it is reasonable to
suppose that a person who would deny that he ever believed that Londres
is not Identical with London, upon discovering that
.Londres. and
'London- codesignate, would also deny that he believed boU, that London
is pretty a nd that London is not- nrotfpretty, upon discovering that 'Londres'
and 'London, codesignate. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a
Plausible, non-question begging response to the claim that the first
denial is no better evidence of non-belief than the second denial.
Therefore, if Marcus does have evidence, based on her reported intuition,
that Pierre does not believe that Londres is not identical with London,
then we have equally good evidence that Pierre does not believe both that
London is pretty and that London is not pretty.
We have reached two conclusions about the evidence Marcus presents
for Principle C. First, we have concluded that there is no clear
connection between that evidence and Principle C. Second, we have
concluded that if the evidence Marcus presents for Principle C undermines
claim that Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with London,
then it jeopardizes the claim that Pierre believes both that London is
pretty and that London is not pretty. From the question of evidence for
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Principle C, we turn to problems raised by Principle C.
Marcus never discusses the intended modal status of Principle C;
however, in order for PrinciDle r ^ henncip C to have any interesting application to
Kripke's puzzle it must be such that if lt ls true
,
the„ u ^
necessarily true, for if Principle C is a mere contingent truth, it has
the status of an accidental generalization. It would lack any of the
explanatory power Marcus might hope to attribute to it and Marcus would
have to concede that although Pierre (supposedly) does not believe that
Londres is not identical with London, in a possible situation similar to
the one Pierre is in. save for the fact that Principle C is false, Pierre
would believe that Londres is not identical with London. This is one
reason for thinking that Principle C’s intended modal status is one of
necessary truth.
Marcus seems committed to the view that Principle C is a necessary
truth. She likens possibility as a constraint on the objects of belief
on a par with truth as a constraint on the objects of knowledge. This
much is clear from the following passages:
It is generally held that if someone knows that p, then ascontrasted with belief, p is the case in that epistemological
subject s world, p obtains, p is actual, or, if we use "true"for propositional contents as well as sentences, p is true. Aasis for that claim is the widely shared intuition that if
someone claimed to know that p, he would say, on discovering
that p did not obtain, was not actual in his world, was not, ifyou like, true, that he was mistaken in claiming to know that p.His clinging to his knowledge claim on the known falsity of p(on the knowledge that the state of affairs does not obtain)
would be seen as a conceptual or linguistic confusion.
The analogy between this intuition about belief claims
[i.e., the one Marcus reports she has in the passage quoted on
page 130 above] and the more universally accepted ones about
knowledge is close. Just as a condition for knowing that p is
that p obtains, so a condition for believing is
'33
505)
C
‘ If * belle
'' es p, then possible p. ( 1981> p . 5M _
It is necessarily true that if a proposing
..
.
b osition p 1S an object of knowledgethen Pls true. By an analogy that Marcus encourages it 1Hcoura , would seem tobe the case that if Princi D ]p c i « 4-‘i -uu-ipie t is true, thpn if ,• „
if a
.
e it is necessarily true that
» *• •• «•« •<
"* *“•
"
“•
-
— «... .. ....
......
....
Principle C is true oni v s r i+- •ia necessarily true. This raises a seriesOf related problems.
If Principle c is true, it is necessarily true. If Principle C is
necessarily true. then, since it is possible that Londres is not
identical with London, it is impossible that Pierre believes that Londres
is not identical with London. Therefore, no one. not even Pierre, ever
believed, or ever could believe that Pi k t
’ erre believed that Londres is not
identical with London. Furthers, if Principle C is true, no one ever
believes that someone could believe an impossible state of affairs. I„
fact, if Principle c is true, it is impossible to believe that s«eo„e
can believe an impossibility.
These results are counter-intuitive, to say the least. This is
especially so in light of something Marcus acknowledges: namely, that it
is firima facie true that we do sometimes believe the impossible. Marcus
concedes this much in the following passage:
. . -all evidence seems to support the claim that thenecessary falsehood of V does not preclude believing that pMathematical conjecture, it is argued, are. if false P ‘
necessarily so; yet some mathematical conjectures, purportedlyelieved by competent mathematicians who do not suffer fromconceptual confusion have subsequently been demonstrated to be
. one accepts (as I do) the principle that logically
flanking the id^^t
Sentenoes (i
-
e
-
sentences where the namesdentity sign are proper names) are, if true,
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necessarily so, then there are ha^in
support the claim that we can believe
n° n~complex examples that
prefer to put it, that we can enter i„t n !hT SSible ’ or ’ as 1with an impossible state of affairs F bellef elationfalse identity sentence is an imposs'ibn n ^ 15 described b y aspeaking. (1933, p# 322-323) ibl 1 lb y> metaphysically
Thus, if Principle C is trupe, the proposition that we sometimes believe
impossible propositions is prima faoip ^c e true, and perhaps even known by usto be prima facie true, even though It Is never in fact h ,t believed. This
13 3130 qUU<!
"arcus owes us an emanation of how a
proposition could be known to be prima facie true and
.till not be a
possible object of belief.
It looks like we can use what we know about Principe C to lead Marcus
into a trap. Suppose Pierre behaves just like Marcus says she would
behave had she discovered that
-Londres. and
.London, codesignate, having
earlier claimed to believe that Londres is not identical with London.
Suppose, that is, that Pierre says he was mistaken to have claimed to
believe that Londres is not identical with London. But, when Pierre says
he was mistaken when he claimed to believe that Londres is not identical
with London, it would seem to follow that he is right only if he
mistakenly believed that he believed that londres is not identical with
London. Yet, if Principle C is true, Pierre never believed that he
believed that londres is not identical with London; and, so, Pierre never
mistakenly believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with
London. Apparently, then, Pierre would be mistaken to report that he
mistakenly believed that he believed that Londres is not identical with
London. (Just as Marcus would be mistaken were she to report that she
mistakenly believed that she believed that Londres is not identical with
London
.
)
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Marcus can counter as follows* *t 4.m not c°«itted to the view thatPierre mistakenly believed that he believed that , a
with a „
"dreS 13 not identical
on on. Rather, I am committed to the view that p-on Pierre mistakenly
c aimed that he believed that Undres is not identical with London. This
<oes not entail that Pierre stood in the belief-relation to the
proposition that he believed that iondres is not identical with London
instead, it entails that Pierre stood in some oth^ ^itive eplstemlo
relation say thinkinR or nnrpeim’vm ,& ££Il£e2LV31ng toward the proposition that he
believed that Londres is not identical with London; that is, that Pierre
mistakenly thought or conceived that he believed that Londres is not
identical with London. That i <3 Uhv is why he claimed to believe that Londres is
not identical with London. Indeed, we often err and use ..bellevers„ when
it would be more accurate to use either "thinks" or "conceives." You can
think or conceive an impossibility, but you cannot believe one.'
This response has two problems. First, it is obvious to one who has
been present when Marcus has plied this response that it is counter-
intuitlve has received nothing even remotely like universal consent;
in fact, the opposite is true. With this response we have reached a
point where Marcus is defending Principle C by an appeal to a distinction
where there is no genuine difference. Second, a puzzle just like
Kripke's original puzzle can be generated about thinking and conceiving.
For Marcus's defense of Principle C to work, she must explain how Pierre
can think that London is pretty and think that London is not pretty
without also coming to think that New York is pretty. Therefore, for
Marcus's defense of Principle C to succeed, she must explain a phenomenon
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strikingly similar to the one Principle C was originally supposed to help
explain
.
We pay a heavy price for Principle C. It saddles us with counter-
intuitive results and its defense leads to pUZZ les similar to Kripke’s
original pUZZ le. Now that we know something about the cost of Principle
C, let us see what we get for the price we oav iP y- Let us consider the
strength of the proposal that it supports.
Kripke says that it is a mistake to convict Pierre of an
inconsistency. Marcus, who says that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs,
must explain why Pierre will not infer what his beliefs entail. If
Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, then he has at his disposal premises
which, when taken together, entail every proposition. But Pierre will
not assent to every sentence; for example, Pierre will not assent to
(7) London is not London,
and Marcus explicitly denies that he believes that London is not
identical with London.
Principle C is supposed to help us explain why Pierre does not
believe that London is not identical with London. Our explanation runs
as follows: ’According to Principle C, there are constraints on what one
can believe. Pierre cannot believe an impossible proposition.
Therefore, despite the fact that Pierre believes both that London is
pretty and that London is not pretty he does not believe that London is
not identical with London. So, contrary to Kripke, it should come as no
surprise that Pierre will not come to believe everything.'
We already know that there are many sentences which Pierre will
assent to but which, if Principle C were true, would not express objects
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or his beliefs. This undines Principle c
. the principle upon whloh
preceding explanation is built; however, beyond that it does not
undermine the explanation. I„ Principle C Marcus has a • •principle she
could appeal to in order to explain why Pierre does not believe
everything. However, the preceding explanation is unsatisfactory. for
there are many sentences Pierre will not assent to but which express
propositions Pierre would be free tno t o believe even if Principle C were
true
.
Suppose that Pierre is told that if london is pretty, then New York
is pretty. As a result he acquires the disposition to assent to
(9) If London is pretty, then New York is pretty.
This, in conjunction with Marcus's disquotation principle, entails that
Pierre believes that if london is pretty, then New York is pretty.
Putting this new belief together with his old belief that London is
pretty. Pierre ''should" be able to infer that New York is pretty. But
Pierre may not believe that New York is pretty. Certainly, we would not
expect him to assent to
(10) New York is pretty.
Pierre may have no beliefs about New York, save his belief that if London
is pretty, then New York is pretty and what he is prepared to infer from
it and his other beliefs.
Neither Principle C nor anything Marcus says in support of Principle
C explains why Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty. The
proposition that New York is pretty is a contingent proposition, and it
is entailed by a pair of propositions that Marcus would agree that Pierre
believes. In addition, the proposition that New York is pretty is a
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consequence of two Propositions that Marcus asserts that Pierre believes-
namely, the Proposition that Uindon is pretty and the proposition that
onhon is not pretty. Therefore. although Principie C might help explain
why Pierre does not believe i-hai- ^t t London ls not lde„tioal wlth London__
despite his willi ngneSs to assent to a sentence that expresses it and
despite the fact that it is entailed hy his heliefs-we still laok an
explanation for Pierre*s inahi i it,, +. • «re bil y to infer that New York is pretty.
Putting aside problems for Principle C. we will consider an attempt
to repair the preceding explanation. In pi ace of the original
explanation, we shall consider the following:
'Although a person can
cone by reason to believe any logical consequence of each of his beliefs
taken individually, it is not he case that a person can come by reason to
believe any logical consequence
that he believes. For example,
of every subset of the set of all things
a person might believe a proposition, p,
and also its denial,
-p, and still be unable to infer all that he could
infer if he believed their conjunction, p and -p. If this were correct,
then Pierre could believe both that London is pretty and that London is
not pretty but be unable to infer all that their conjunction entails. Of
course, if Pierre did believe their conjunction—if he did believe that
London is pretty and London is not pretty-then he could infer all that
it entails. It entails that New York is pretty. Here is where Principle
C comes into play. For, if Principle C were true, Pierre would not
believe that London is pretty and London is not pretty, despite the fact
that he will assent to a sentence that expresses it. This is because the
proposition that London is pretty and London is not pretty is impossible.
Therefore, we should not be surprised that Pierre is unable to infer that
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New York Is pretty. Pierre does not believe any Dr„™p oposition that entails
that New York is pretty.'
One problem for the preceding explanation is its dependence on
Principle C. still, troubles with Principle C aside, the explanation is
unacceptable. It is not unacceptable so much for what it says as for
what it fails to say. The explanation does not explain the phenomenon we
find puzzling; it codifies it. We know that Pierre is unable to infer
that New York is pretty. We want to know why Pierre is unable to infer
York is pretty. We want to know why
, despite the fact that it
is entailed by things he believes. Pierre is unable to infer that New
York is pretty. The explanation is really nothing more than a
generalization drawn from cases like Pierre’s. In this way it is (at
best) analogous to a scientific law. We want something analogous to a
scientific theory-we want something that explains such generalizations. 6
A solution to Kripke’s puzzle which ascribes inconsistent beliefs to
Pierre must exp lain why Pierre is unable to infer that New York is pretty
(and why Pierre is unable to detect any inconsistency among his beliefs).
We have tried, and failed, to develop an acceptable explanation based on
what Marcus says about Kripke's puzzle. It appears that Marcus does not
have an acceptable explanation. We may conclude that she has not solved
Kripke's puzzle.
Section Two
David Lewis considers Kripke's puzzle in ''What Puzzling Pierre does
not Believe" (1981). Lewis discusses Kripke's puzzle in terms of the
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following sentences:
(LI
)
(L2)
0-3)
Lewis writes:
Pierre believes that London
Pierre believes that London
Ci.e„ Pierre] cannot beto do so would be incorrect
is pretty
is not pretty
convicted of an in co ns i stency j
and [(L3)
S
] are “mpatme.^O 981* p? 284)
h°" [<L,)]
'
father than trying to solve Kripke's puzzle
, Lewls
major claims. These ni aim o •cl s involve sentences <L„, (L2)> and
,
addition, they Invol ve the fol lowing sen tenoes:
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-dinary proper
Pierre a belief whose obJ^t7, “thV
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’ scribes to
expressed by 'F(A)'
J he Pro Position (actually)
(L5) This proposition M p 4-u q
'F(A)'] holds at exactly thos^ 31- 0" ^pressed by
thing which is (actually) denoi
P
°H
SS
K
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\
e worlds where the
which is (actually) expressed by
haS the propert y
(L6) Beliefs are jointly inconsistent if f u
world where the positional objects £1/ true ^eth/r
We will consider Lewis's two claim. However, before we do, it is
important that we take a closer look at (LV n •3). Owing to the occurrence of
the phrase ’convicted of' therein n ^ ..
* 3) admits of two significantly
different interpretations. They are
(L3') It is a mistake to conclude i-hai- Pl- Q„
beliefs,
t t Pierre has inconsistent
and
<L3 " > Ik 1S a '"istate to conclude that because Pierre hasinconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxasticany^
5
Suppose that Kripke's puzzle involves a situation where Pierre's beliefs
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are inconsistent, tut where Pierre's failure to spot the inconsistency
is, in sene reasonable sense, beyond his control-is southing Pierre
should not be held responsible for. In suoh a oase (L3I) woul(J be falge
but <L3") would be true. Indeed, I shall maintain that Pierre is in
such a situation. Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, but he is in no way
blameworthy. In addition, I will maintain that (LI) and <L2). as well as
<M), as), and (L6> art tru«. .3 we are about to see
,
this puts me at
odds with Lewis.
The first claim that Lewis tries to establish is that
The case of Pierre refutes this analysis [i.e. the setconsisting of sentences (L4), (L5), and (L6)]. (1981, p. 284)
By this, Lewis apparently means that the set consisting of (LI) through
(L6) is inconsistent. According to Lewis, (LI), (L2), and (L3) are all
true. He intends to demonstrate that at least one of (L4), (L5), or (L6)
is false.
Let us consider the line of reasoning behind Lewis’s first claim.
Lewis holds that (LI), (L2), and (L3) are true. If (LI) is true, then if
(L 4) 1S true
*
Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by the
sentence ’London is pretty.' Similarly, if (L2) is true, then if (L4) is
true, Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed by the sentence
’London is not pretty.’ Now, if (L3) is true, if (L6) is true, and if
Pierre believes the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty' as well
as the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty,' then there is a
possible world where both the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty'
and the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty' are true. If
there is such a world, then if (L5) is true,^ there is a world where
London both is and is not pretty. Of course, there is no such world,
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since the properties of being prettv and h •
be) m„r , ,
8 n0t Pretty are (assumed to
’ tU3lly eX° 1U3lVe:
ab Lewis holds, a „. <L 2,and (L3) are true, then one of (LH). (L5), or (L6) i s fal„
It i. important to realize that Lewis's argument is valid onXy if
0-3) is interpreted as (L3>). and invalid if (L 3 ) tt i) is interpreted as
If <L3) is interpreted as (L 3 "), rather than as CL3'), then we
re believes both the proposition expressed by 'London is pretty'
and the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty,' then there is a
possible world where both propositions are true.
Uwis, who claims that Kripke's puzzle refutes the analysis given by
(i.e.. the set consisting of) (Lit), (L5), and (L6), reads (L 3 ) as (L3-).
I shall maintain a position opposed to Lewis in this regard. I shall
maintain that Lewis's argument is unsound either because (L 3 ) is fal se-
as when it is interpreted as (L3 ')_or because the argument is invalid-
as when ( L 3 ) is interpreted as n u„,,. ra Uo ). However, Lewis is certainly right
about this much: if (Li) (L2) and n onv ^ (L3 > are true, then one of (L4),
(L5), or (L 6) is false.
The second claim that Lewis makes is that ''the refuted analysis"-the
set consisting of CLK), (L5). and (L6)-fails to account for the truth of
(LI). In this regard, Lewis writes:
the refuted
t0 th6 0336 ° f Plerre
'
and “"aider whether
analysis accounts even for the truth of [(LI)] I
(L
y
2)])
d0
p-e
n
r
0
re d
(U falla t0 the truth ofLC J ) Pi oes not have as an object of his belief theproposition (actually) expressed by 'London is pretty'. Forthere is a possible world which fits Pierre's beliefsperfectly it is one of his 'belief-worlds'—at which thatproposition is false.
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heard about was not London but Bristol I
1 Clty Plerre
like ours until very recently Cpyo t- l
maSme a world just
differ to fit Pierre’s mis™/ . . ept to the extent that it must
any). Then the T “rller hlst°^- «the same time it was renamed in hnn °r oWas undertaken . and at
French called this beautifni ?. u
Slr °gdred Londer
-
its beauty, and aU d 1’
-
rre
at "• srss’
While Bristol was beautiful, London fell into decay The
,
partd uer
,f
dem°lished copies were sometimes built inBristol, alias Londer'—and only the slums remained London
happened^there
r
°
Th^ ?
d th™gh
- “*>. “thing of c^sequenSe
,
-he French had little occasion to speak of the
Pierrp'T
^ ^ name
’ ^ ind ®ed ^ never Was mentioned in
Pierre was*" mad"/
V
T t0 fchiS plaCe that the unfortunatee^ s e to go. Again, what happened at the end of
the^ea"! XTd"^ 3 jUSt like What haPPened at
This world fits Pierre’s beliefs perfectly. For all he
elieves, it might every well be the world he lives in. Tellhim and show him all about it, claiming that it is the real
world; he will never be at all surprised; unless it surpriseshim to find that he has been right in all his beliefs without
exception. Nothing he believes—no propositional object of hisbelief— is false at this world.
However, the proposition (actually) expressed by 'London is
pretty' according to [(L5)] ... is false at this world.
’London’ denotes London and 'is pretty' expresses the property
of being pretty, and this is a world where London ... is
present and is not at all pretty. (1981, p. 286)
I hold with Lewis that (LI) is true. (So is (L2).) Now, if (L4) is
true, then, since (LI) is true, at the actual world, w
p , Pierre believes
the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty.' According to
Lewis, at wb , the Bristol-is-beautiful-world Lewis describes, Pierre
believes everything he believes at w
r
. If this is so, then at w^ Pierre
believes the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty.' Also,
according to Lewis, everything Pierre believes at w^ is true at w^. If
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SO, and if at Wu Piprro k»i •b lieves the proposition actually
.Inn , • expressed byLo don i, pretty,, then the proposition actual
l
v
prettv- is f
ly expressed by
.London isy true at wL Rni- -i r j.i_
b* But, if the proposition actually ov
IT . expressed bvLondon is pretty, is true at wh , then if „ ^ .
where la- > is true, w b is a WOrldv/n6P0 London is nrpt'i-v op
Lewis maintains that one of (L4) or (L5) is false.
Lewis notes that (L6) plays no rol p in we his argument and says that hehas no quarrel with (L6). 8 At bott™. t • •om, Lewis is trying to show that one
of (L 4 ) or (L 5 ) is false.
This conflicts with the view I intend to defend. ! am
, therefore,
obliged either to point to a flaw in Lewis's reasoning or to dispute one
of Lewis's premises. The reasoning is flawless. I agree with Lewis that
(LD is true. I also agree with Lewis that everything that Pierre
believes in wb is true at wb . I reject lewis's claim that Pierre
believes everything in wb that he believes in w
r
. Pierre does believe
every general, or qualitative, proposition in wb that he believes in w
but he does not believe every proposition in wb that he believes in
I shall maintain that Pierre believes certain singular propositions-for
example, the singular proposition that London is pretty_i„ w
r
that he
does not believe in w
b*
So the preceding derivation depends on two claims; the two claims
jointly entail that everything that Pierre believes in w
r is true at wb .
The first claim is that Pierre believes everything in „b that he believes
in w
r . The second claim is that everything Pierre believes in wb is true
at w
b .
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In support of the claim that Pierre believes everything in wb that he
believes in „
r , Leuis wrltes of Pierre , s experle„oes ^ ^
What happened at his end was iust l i iro u
real world. (1981, p. 286) happened at the
And of Pierre’s experiences in London at wb ,
, nnJgain ’ what happened at Pierre's end of his encounters with
p 286)
WaS JUSt llke What haPPened at the real world. (1981,
The claim that Pierre believes everything in w, that he believes in
w
r
is supported by the fact that Pierre’s experiences in wb are-at least
from Pierre’s perspectiv e-qua 1 itativ ely indistinguishable from his
experiences in w
r
. For if his experiences are thus indistinguishable, it
is hard to see what could give rise to divergent beliefs. Anyone who
disputes the claim that wb is one of Pierre's belief worlds, but who
accepts the claim that everything Pierre believes in wb is true at wb ,
must explain how, despite the qualitative indistinguishabil ity of
Pierre's experiences in the two worlds, Pierre's beliefs in wb can differ
from his beliefs in w
r
.
I hold that Lewis is correct with regard to Pierre's qualitative
beliefs: wb is one of Pierre's qualitative belief worlds. Pierre
believes every qualitative proposition in wb that he believes in wp .
This is because his experiences in wb are qualitatively indistinguishable
from his experiences in w
r .
Still, in both w
r
and wb , Pierre has certain
kinds of non—qual itative beliefs. I will need to explain why qualitative
indistinguishability of experience does not guarantee that Pierre has all
and only the same non-qual itative beliefs in wb that he has in wp .
10
In support of the claim that everything Pierre believes in wb is true
at wb , Lewis writes:
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This world fits Pierrp'^ hoi
he believes, it might very welAe 7^' F°r a11 thathim and show him all about it h W°rld he lives in - Tell
world; he will never be at al’i
Claiming that it is the real
him to find that he has turned out"^ be"
’ “ SUrprises
eliefs without exception. Nothing he belilves
1 " 311 hlS
propositional object of his h^iiof ieves—no
(1981, p. 286)
" f~ ls false at this world.
Let Pierre wander through w . .
b- Let him discover all there Is to know
about „b . At no time will Pierre see m to dlsoard Qf ^
Apparently, everything Pierre believes at w, is true at w
fe
.
Once he has presented his alleged counterexample, Lewis entertains
several objections to his line of reasoning. One of these objections
together with Lewis's reply are of special interest to us. That
objection and Lewis's reply are contained in the passage that follows:
fits ffi7F?f
1
belIefs
00U
?
ter
p
Xa'nPle W° rld 15 n0t a world that
prettv where, , ^
or Plerre believes bbat London is
not nrettv r 1
counterexample world is one where London isp y. I reply by posing a dilemma. When we charactersthe content of belief by assigning propositional (or other)
s^ate of
" 0hara=terizing an inner, narrowly psychologicalt the believer? Are beliefs in the head? Or are wecharacterizing partly the believer's inner state, partly the
latter
0
"?),,
bhat
.
state to the outer world? If it is the
,
e objection may succeed; however, Kripke's puzzlevanishes. For if the assignment of propositional object
characterizes more than the believer’s inner state, then there
would
rSaSOn
,
t0
,
SUppose that a fading philosopher and logician
never let contradictory beliefs pass, or that anyone is inprincipie in a position to notice and correct contradictory
noh>p
S
^
6 has
.
them * Anyone is in Principle in a position totice and correct a state of the head which can be
characterized by assigning contradictory propositional objects,
u w y s ould philosophical and logical acumen help him if thetrouble lies partly outside? As soon as we accept the
consistency of Pierre's beliefs as datum—as I did, on Kripke'sinvitation—we are committed to the narrowly psychological
conception of belief and its objects. (I would like to thinkhat this is what Kripke intended in instructing us to consider
elief dj? jjcto .) But on the narrowly psychological conception,
ohe counterexample world does fit Pierre's beliefs, as witness
the fact that it would not at all surprise him to be persuaded
that the world was just that way. (1981, p. 288-299)
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The objection is „uite simple: wb ls one of Pierre , s beUef^0 " eVerytMng Pier
-—^ l"
-r I- tn. at w„
: however. since „
w
r
Pierre believes that London is prettv andP y the proposition that London
is pretty is false at w
b- "b 1S not one of Pierre's belief worlds As
noted above, the claim that wb is one of Pierre's belief worlds is
ailed by the claims that Pierre believes everything in wb thathe believes in w
r and that everything Pierre believes in wb is true atV By his reply, Lewis suggests that he takes the objection as a threat
to the former claim, not to the latter claim. Lewis says nothing „e„~
nothing he has not already said-about the claim that everything Pierre
believes in wb is true at wb . Henceforth, we will assume that Lewis is
concerned with the claim that Pierre believes everything i„ „b that he
believes in w
r
.
Lewis responds to the above objection by asking us to reflect on
"what we are doing when we characterize the content of belief by
assigning propositional objects" (1981, p. 288). He suggests that there
are two basic alternatives. The first alternative is that when we
characterize belief by assigning propositional objects, we are
"characterizing an inner, narrowly psychological state of the believer"
0 981, p. 288). The second alternative is that when we characterize
belief by assigning propositional objects, "we are characterizing partly
the believer's inner state, and partly the relations of that inner state
to the outer world" (1981, p. 288). Uwis then traces the implications
of each alternative.
According to Lewis, if the first alternative is correct, then "the
counterexample world does fit Pierre's beliefs" (1981, p. 288); if the
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first alternative is corr^oi- . •rect, the objection fails Aeain o^S , according to
Lewi s, if the second altprnafiwo •e t ve 13 correct, then "the objection may
succeed; however, KrinU-p’-?ipkes puzzle vanishes" ( 1 981, p. 288).
reached the crucial point in Lewis’s commentary on Kripke’s
puzzle. Before we continue, a word of caution is in order. We will soon
see why Lewis maintains both that if the first alternative is correct, „
is one of Pierre's belief worlds and that if the second alternative is
correct, then, although the objection may succeed, Kripke's puzzle
vanishes. It is, however, important to realize that I am not so much
interested in interpreting and developing Lewis's position as I am in
solving Kripke's puzzle. Lewis is neither committed to nor responsible
for anything I say when I develop a position based on what is suggested
by what he says. Bearing this in mind, let us see what Lewis says.
Lewis maintains that to solve Kripke's puzzle one must show that the
following are compatible:
(LI) Pierre believes that London is pretty,
(L 2 ) Pierre believes that London is not pretty,
and
(L3) He [i.e., Pierre] cannot be convicted of an
to do so would be incorrect.
inconsistency;
Lewis says that when we characterize the contents of beliefs by assigning
them propositional objects, we are doing one of two things—what I have
been calling the first alternative and the second alternative. He claims
that if the first alternative is correct, then w5 is one of Pierre’s
belief worlds; and, therefore, that one of the following is false:
(L4) ’Pierre believes that F(A)\ where A is an ordinary proper
name and F is an easily understood predicate, ascribes to
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Pierre a belief whose object is t-h«
expressed by 'F(A)', Proposition (actually)
(L5) This proposition Tip «-u Q
by 'F(A)'] h0ld3 at ;xactly tho°r
Slti0n <actuall y> expressed
thing which is (actual ly) denoted 'S’v^A h
“°rlds Where the
which is (actually) expressed by f! *
® propert >'
Uwis allows that 1, the second alternative is correct, the objection to
hie argument by (alleged) counterexample may succeed. Flnally
,
he olalms
-at 1, the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puttie vanishes;
that is, there ls no longer any need to show that (LI), <L2), and (L3)
are compatib le-since one of them, namely (L 3 >, may be regarded as false.
What are these two al ternatives? They are rival views about what
*tnds of propositions we believe and what kinds of beliefs we attribute
when we use belief ascription sentences whose that-clauses have n»e
sentences for sentential components. To explicate the two alternatives,
I will make use of the distinction between general, or qualitative,
propositions and singular, or individual, propositions. The first
alternative is the view that the objects of belief are qualitative
propositions and that we use belief ascription sentences whose that-
clauses have name sentences for sentential components to attribute
beliefs whose objects are qualitative propositions. The second
alternative is the view that the objects of beliefs may be either
qualitative propositions or singular propositions and that (typically) „e
use such sentences to attribute beliefs whose objects are singular
propositions
.
Lewis apparently favors the first alternative. He does, after all,
claim that one of (LD) or (L5) is false. He holds both that if the first
alternative is correct, then w
fc
is one of Pierre's belief worlds and that
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if Wb is one of Pierre's belief worlds, then, if (LI) is true (and he
says it is), one of (L4) or (L5) is false.
I shall hold that the second alternative is correct. Lewis alio,
that if the second alternative is correct, then the objection to his
claim that wb is one of Pierre's belief worlds (and, therefore, to his
attempt to demonstrate that one of <L«) or <L5> is false) may succeed.
Lewis claims that if the second alternative is correct, then Kripke's
puzzle vanishes—presumably because we no longer need to hold that (LI),
(L2), and (L3) are compatible.
It is clear by now that our interests will be served if we consider
these three statements from Lewis’s reply: (i) if the first alternative
is correct, then wb is one of Pierre's belief worlds (and, therefore,
since (LI) is true, one of (L4) or (L5) is false); ( i i) if the second
alternative is correct, then the objection may succeed; and (iii) if the
second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle vanishes.
We begin with the claim that if the first alternative is correct,
then wb is one of Pierre’s belief worlds (and, therefore, since (LI) is
true, one of (L4) or ( L 5 ) is false). I hold with Lewis that (LI) is true
(at w
r
). If the first alternative is correct, then (LI) is true at w f in
virtue of one of Pierre's qualitative beliefs. Pierre believes every
qualitative proposition in wb that he believes in w p . This appears to
follow from the qualitative ind istinguishabil ity of Pierre's experiences
in the two worlds. If the objects of belief are qualitative
propositions, then Pierre believes everything in wb that he believes in
wp . So it appears that if the objects of belief are qualitative
propositions, then everything Pierre believes at w
p is true at wb ; that
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1S
’ Wb 1S one of Pierre's belief worlds If w ,
.
*
b ls one of Pierre's belief
worlds
’ then (if 0.1) were true at w ) „ n
of ..
b ’ U°Uld be true at wb i„ vlrtueQUalitatlVe bSlief
— it true at w, if both (w)
and (L5) were true and if (LI) „ere true at w fhb> then w^ would be a world
wherein London is pretty. But London is not pretty at „b ; and.
therefore, if the first aiternative is oorreet. w, t . one 8f Plerre , sbelief worlds and. sino** a in •_ ,ce (LI) is true, one of 0.4) or (L5) is false
We have verified the first of the three statements in Lewis's reply
Let us consider the second stat^ent: if the second alternative is
correct, then the objection to Lewis's argument by (alleged)
counterexample may succeed.
To say that if the second alternative is correct, then the objection
may succeed is tantamount to saying that if the second alternative is
correct, then wb may not be one of Pierre's belief worlds. (I shall
regard the modal expression in this claim as one expressing epistemic,
rather than metaphysical, possibility.)
I shall maintain that if some of Pierre's beliefs are non-qualitative
beliefs of a particular sort, then the qualitative indistinguishability
of Pierre's experiences in the two worlds is no guarantee that he has all
the same beliefs in the two worlds.” He may have qualitatively
indistinguishable experiences and yet not believe exactly the same
singular propositions. If so, and if the second alternative is correct,
then w
b ma y not be a world wherein Pierre believes everything he believes
in w
r ,
despite the qualitative indistinguishability of his experiences.
Therefore, if the second alternative is correct, even though everything
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Pierre believes at wu is trupb e at wb , wb may not be one of Pierre's belief
worlds.
We have censored one way of defending the second of these
statements In Uwis's reply. Let us consider the third statement: if
the second alternative is correct, then Kripke’s puzzle vanishes.
Recall that, according to Lewis, to solve Kripke's puzzle one must
show that <L„, <L 2 >, and 0 . 3 ) are compatihle. We have a puzzle just so
long as we seem committed to the view that (LI), (L2), and (L3) are true
and also to the view that they are inconsistent Toin-' c ‘•‘consis . Lewis seems to favor
one kind of solution: interDret (LI") ana n a ulue p i I i; d (L2) in such a way that (LI),
(L2), and (L3> are not inconsistent. (This leads him to reject the
conjunction of (L4) and 0.5).) He favors the first alternative and
prefers that (LI) and (L2) be understood so that their truth does not
entail that Pierre believes both a proposition and its denial. I favor
the second alternative and I wish to retain both (L4) and (L5). This
means that I cannot pursue the sort of solution that Lewis prefers. I
favor a second kind of solution. I will maintain: that (LI), (L2), and
0-3) are incompatible—when (L3) is interpreted as
(L3 ') It ls a mistake to conclude that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs
;
that (LI), (L2), and (L3) are not incompatible—when (L3) is interpreted
as
(L 3”) !t is a mistake to conclude that because Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically
culpable
;
and that although (L3 M ) is true, (L 3*) is false. If we are in a
position to reject the claim that (L3) is both true and inconsistent with
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<L1> and 0.2,
. then we no longer have a puzzle- it „n , „
..
n
P e
’
x Wl11 have vanished,
dissolved, or been solved.
1 will interpret the claim that if fv, athe second alternative is correct
then Kripke's puzzle vanishes so that it hdepends on the claim that if the
second alternative is corroot- <-urect, then we no longer have reason to think
that (L
3
f
) is true.
*en Lewi s claims that Kripke's puzzle vanishes under the second
alternative, he adds the following by way of an explanation:
For is the assignment of proDositi nnai *.
characterizes more than the believer’s inner state
S
then this no reason to suDDose i-hat- a i Q ^ . » ere
would never let contradictory beUef^asV T/that^ l0gician
^
n°tiCe
-^ect^a=y1S "
notice and correct a state o^th^head^hic^can'be
3 P° Siti ° n t0
phu::o^c:^d
ai:srntra"itory objects ’ but why sh° uid
partly 098^ ts")
^
Le^s holds that if the second alternative is correct, then we no longer
have reason to believe that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. This
suggests that he would agree that if the first alternative is correct,
then we have reason to believe that Pierre does not have inconsistent
beliefs
.
I shall maintain that when we reason from our beliefs, we reason only
from either our qualitative beliefs or our own personal beliefs ; and that
when we reason via propositions, the propositions that we reason from are
either qualitative propositions or our own personal propositions
. A
belief is qualitative when its object is a qualitative proposition. A
proposition, p, is personal to x, or is one of x’s personal propositions,
if and only if p is a singular proposition, x is an individual
constituent of p, and nothing else is an individual constituent of p.
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belief is persona! to *. or is one or ,s persona! be!iefs. provided
ltS 0bJ60t U °" e ° f X ' S propositions.^ The singu!ar
proposition that Ronald Reagan is wise is one of Reagan's personal
propositions Reagan is its uni que individual constituent, it is not one
of George Bush's personal pro^sitions-it does not have Bush as a
constituent. Although the singular proposition that Reagan is older than
Bush has Reagan as a constituent, it is not one of Reagan's personal
propositions because it also has Bush as a constituent. For similar
reasons, it is not one of Bush's personal propositions. The proposition
that all men are mortal is no one's personal proposition because it is
not a singular proposition.
When we reason from our beliefs, we reason only from either our
qua 1 itative beliefs or our own personal beliefs; we do not reason from
our non-qua 1 itativ e, non-personal beliefs. If the set of beliefs we
reason from is inconsistent, we are, at least in principle, in a position
to detect the inconsistency.^ However, if the set of beliefs we reason
from is consistent, then, even if the set of ^11 of our beliefs is
inconsistent, we are not, even in principle, in a position to detect the
inconsistency.
As noted above, Lewis seems to hold that if the first alternative is
correct, then we have reason to believe that (L3 1 ) is true. If the first
alternative were correct, and if Pierre had inconsistent beliefs, then,
since we reason from our qualitative beliefs, Pierre would be in a
position to detect the inconsistency. This is because, if the first
alternative were correct, the inconsistency would be among Pierre's
qualitative beliefs. But, as Kripke says, Pierre cannot detect any
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inconsistency. Therefore, if the first ail-alternative were correct, and if
" reason from our *»liU„v.^ the, sinoe ^^ ^detect a„ y inconsistency, we would need to concede that Pierre does not
h3,e ln°0nSlStent bellefS
' " «“ alternative were correct, the„
Pierre's inability to detect any inconsistency among his beliefs, would
be reason to conclude that he does not have inconsistent beliefs.
If, however, the second alternative is correct- fl-rect, it would be a mistake
to conclude, from Pierre's inahii-it-v . .re ab l ty to detect any inconsistency, that
Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs This is ku neis. i because, if the
second alternative is corr pnt- j-i-ect, the inconsistency could be among Pierre's
non-qualitative, non-personal beliefs; it could be among those of his
beliefs he does not reason from. The singular proposition that London is
pretty and its denial, the proposition that London is not pretty, are
contradictory. If, as we think they are, they are the objects of
Pierre's inconsistent beliefs, then the inconsistency is not one that
Pierre is, even in principle, in a position to detect. The second
alternative admits them as possible objects of beliefs. But they are not
among the beliefs that Pierre can reason from, for they are not among
Pierre's qualitative or personal beliefs.
If the second alternative is correct and if I am right about the
propositions we reason with, then Pierre can have undetectable,
inconsistent beliefs. If Pierre can have undetectable, inconsistent
beliefs, then the fact that he is not in a position to spot any
inconsistency, is not a reason to think that (L3') is true. Therefore,
if the second alternative is correct and if I am right about the
propositions that we reason with, then, since there is no longer any
156
reason to thin, that each of CL„, (L 2 ), and (L31) ls true> Kripke , s
puzzle has vanished.
We have examined one way of defending the third atatement from
twin's reply. In so doing, „e have discovered a solution to at least
one of the three parts of Kripke's puzzle. Prior to concentrating
exclusively on Kripke's puzzle, let us return to the two major claims
that Uwis makes in his commentary. The first of Lewis's two major
claims is that Kripke's puzzle refutes the analysis given by (Lk), (L5),
and (L6). The second major claim is that (L 4 ) and (L5) fail to account
for the truth of (LI ).
When Lewis asserts that (L4) anH a c;')
^ ) d (L5) do not account for the truth of
(LD, he sets out to prove that if (LI) is true, then one of (Lk) or (L5)
is false. Let us simply take Uwis's second claim to be the claim he
attempts to prove: if (LI) is true, then one of (Lk) or (L5) is false.
The discussion above clearly indicates where, according to my view,
Uwis's attempt to prove this claim goes astray. I hold that despite the
fact that everything Pierre believes at wb is true at wb „e need not
conclude that wb is one of Pierre's belief worlds. For we need not agree
that Pierre believe everything in wb that he believes in wr even though
his experiences in the two worlds are qualitatively indistinguishable.
My view allows me to retain both (Lk) and (L5), even though I agree with
Lewis about the truth of (LI).
(Let us agree that) I believe that Socrates is wise. The object of my
belief is the non-personal, singular proposition that Socrates is wise.
Given the mediacy of my connections with Socrates, it should be clear
that there is a possible world which is, at least from my perspective,
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qualitatively indistinguishable from the actual world but where Soorates
" W1Se ’’ ^ r6tain 311 ° f
-^ qualitative and personal beliefs
“ makeS
.
1Utle Se" Se t0 “» «"*
- -> a world X believ e tbe singular
proposition that Socrates is wise* in faot i-h, c , there is little reason to
thsfc sue hi 3 nrom An •p positio a proposition partly constituted by
Soerates-even exists at such a world. If the inhabitants of such a world
uae the name
-Socrates' to designate someone, then, at such a world, the
belief exhibited by my disposition to assent to
-Socrates is wise- is a
belief whose object is some singular proposition I may not actually
believe. For these reasons, I deny that qualitative indistinguishability
of experiences guarantees identity of non-qualitative, non-personal
beliefs
.
When Lewis says that Kripke's puzzle refutes the analysis offered by
a-O, (L5), and (L6), he proceeds by arguing that if (LI), (L2), and (L3)
are true, then one of (L4), (L5), or (L6) is false. Let us simply take
Lewi s s first claim to be the conjunctive claim that (LI), (L2), and (L3)
are true and if (LI), (L2), and (L 3 ) are true, then one of (L4), (L5),
or (L6) is false.
I wish to retain (L4), (L5), and (L6). As previously noted, (L3)
admits two distinct interpretations:
(L3’) It is a mistake to conclude that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs,
and
(L 3 *
'
)
It is a mistake to conclude that because Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically
culpable
.
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According to my view, although it is true that if 0.1), (L2), and
' A1S° a0 °0rdlng "
- —* - is true that «,, 0.2),
and 0-3”) are true, it is not true that if ( L l) (,,,II ui), L2), and (L3**) are
true, then 0*. and <L6> i s false
. My v iew al lous rae t0
reject the conclusion that one of (H>, <L5). or (L6) is false
UWlS ^ 1 rea°h dlfferent
-Elusions about issues raised by
Kripke's puttie. This is because we hold opposing views about what kinds
of beliefs people have and the function of belief ascription sentences
whose that-clauses have name sentences for their senf^nf in tential components.
We do, however, seem to agree aboni- i-ho : 1 •out the implications of the two views.
Section Three
Let us consider, one part at a time, each of the three parts of
Kripke-s puttie. I shall explain how my view can be applied to each part.
The first part of Kripke's puttie involves Pierre's dispositions
toward sentences
(1) Londres est jolie
and
(2) London is not pretty.
Pierre assents to each sentence and, so, we conclude that he believes
both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. He has
inconsistent beliefs. He believes both the singular proposition that
London is pretty and its denial, the proposition that London is not
pretty. Kripke cited two related reasons when he said it is a mistake to
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convict Pierre of any inconsistency. First, Pierre is not in principle
In a position to spot any inconsistency. Second, Pierre will not infer
all that is entailed by the conjunction of the two inconsistent
propositions (I say) he believes. Since I hold that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs, I must explain why there is nothing wrong with
saying that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.
I hold that when we- reason from our beliefs, we reason from those of
our beliefs that are either qualitative beliefs or our own personal
beliefs. The set of beliefs that Pierre reasons from is not
inconsistent. The inconsistency lies among Pierre's non-qual itativ e,
non-personal beliefs, and that is why he is unable to spot the
inconsistency. It is a mistake to think that he is unable to spot any
inconsistency because there is none.
This also explains why Pierre will not infer all that is entailed by
the pair of contradictory propositions I say he believes. They are
neither qualitative nor personal to Pierre. Hence, according to my view,
they are not among the premises Pierre reasons from. Little wonder,
then, that he will not infer all that they jointly entail.
Kripke s claim that it is a mistake to convict Pierre of any
inconsistency may be understood in at least two ways. Understood one
way, Kripke is right: Pierre has done nothing doxastically blameworthy;
he has neither reasoned incorrectly nor neglected to keep a tidy
inventory of what he believes and what his beliefs entail—he has done
the best he can do. Understood another way, Kripke is mistaken: Pierre
does have inconsistent beliefs.
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The second part of Kripke':
toward sentences
(1) Londres est jolie
puzzle involves Pierre’s dispositions
and
(3) London is pretty.
Pierre assents to (1) but he events from (3 ). His assent to („ leads
us to conclude that he believes that London is pretty. His dissent from
(3) leads us to conclude that he does not believe that London is pretty.
It cannot be the case that Pierre both does and does not believe that
London is pretty. Since I accept the conclusion that Pierre believes
that London is pretty. I must explain why, in spite of his dissent from
(3). it is a mistake to conclude that Pierre does not believe that London
is pretty.
If Pierre's decision to dissent from (3) were based on his having
considered and deemed false the singular proposition that (3) expresses,
then it would be unreasonable not to conclude, from his dissent, that he
does not believes that London is pretty. However, he did not decide to
dissent from (3) as a result of such reasoning. The proposition that
London is pretty is not a qualitative proposition, and it is not one of
Pierre's personal propositions. As such, it does not enter into Pierre's
deliberations. It cannot be a part of Pierre's reasons either for
assenting to (1) or for dissenting from (3). To explain why Pierre has
the dispositions he has toward (1) and (3), we must make reference to
propositions that Pierre can reason with.
Pierre has the personal belief that the city his friends call
Londres* is pretty. That personal belief leads him to conclude that (1)
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15 "" ^ "““ta t0 *> Edition to Ms personal beUef
that the city Ms friends can 'Londres' Is pretty, Pierre has the
Persona! teller that the city his friends call
-London. Is not pretty
That personal teller leads M™ to conclude that (3, Is false and, so, he
dissents fro™ (3). His decision to dissent from (3) did not ste™ fro™
his having considered and rejected the singular proposition it expresses.
My view allows ™e to reject the conclusion that Pierre does not
believe that London is pretty, despite Pierre's dissent fro™ ( 3 ). I„
this way It avoids the contradiction that Pierre's behavior se^ed to
commit us to.
Because I deny that Pierre's dissent for™ ( 3 ) co™™its us to the
conclusion that he does not believe that London is pretty, I a™ coated
to rejecting Kripke's strengthened disquotation principle. Kripke
presented that principle as follows:
A normal speaker who is not reticent will be disDosed tolinpce 333^ to X if and onl*irteHSvsTthM^ (T979,
I must explain why I do not accept this principle.
Kripke calls this principle a strengthened biconditional version of
his disquotation principle. I have no doubts that we need something like
the weaker disquotation principle: a principle to license the move from
dispositions to assent to attributions of belief. But it is a mistake to
think we need the "other hair* of the strengthened principle: the half
implying that belief (held by a speaker who understands the relevant
sentence) will manifest itself in assent.
If our dispositions to assent to sentences were always based on
reasoning about the propositions they express, then some principle moving
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l£om belief to assent would be called foroxx a t . However, our dispositions
me sentences are usually not based on reasoning about the
propositions they express. Rather, our dispositions toward name
sentences are based on reasoning that involves either qualitative
propositions or our own personal propositions. Therefore, when we are
considering name sentences and the propositions they express, although we
may allow both that withheld assent is evidence of a lack of belief and
that dissent is evidence of a disbelief, it would be a mistake to allow
either that withheld assent is a guarantee of a lack of belief or that
dissent is a guarantee of a disbelief.
The third part of Kripke’s puzzle involves Pierre's dispositions
toward the following sentences, both before and after he learns that
Londres' and 'London' codesignate:
(1) Londres est jolie,
(2) London is not pretty,
(3) London is pretty,
(4) Londres is London,
(5) Londres is not London,
(6) London is London,
(7) London is not London,
and
(8)
Londres is pretty and London is not pretty.
Before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre
assents to (1), (2), (5), (6), and (8), and he dissents from (3), (4),
and (7). Using Kripke's principles, we infer from Pierre's assents that
before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre
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believes: that London Is pretty; that London Is not pretty; that London
is not Identical with Undon; that Undon is identical with London; and
that London is pretty and London is not pretty. Using Kripke's
principles, we infer from Pierre's dissents that before he learns that
'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, Pierre does not believe: that London
is pretty; that London is identical with London; and that London is not
identical with London. •
When Pierre learns that
-Londres- and
-London- codesignate, his
assent/dissent dispositions will be modified. He will reconsider his
dispositions toward (1), (2), and (3). He will acquire a disposition to
assent to (4). He will acquire a disposition to dissent from (5). He
will continue to assent to (6) and to dissent from (7). Finally, he will
acquire a disposition to dissent from (8). A solution to Kripke-s puzzle
must say what, if any, new beliefs Pierre acquires, or old beliefs he
discards, once he discovers that
-Londres- and
-London- codesignate.
According to my view, before Pierre learns that
-Londres' and
'London' codesignate, he believes each of the singular propositions
expressed by (1), (2), (5), (6), and (8). He has inconsistent beliefs.
Despite Pierre's dissents from (3), (4), and (7), before he learns that
'Londres' and
-London' codesignate, Pierre believes each of the singular
propositions expressed by (3), (4), and (7). Each of (3), (4), and (7)
expresses a singular proposition expressed by some sentence Pierre
assents to. (3), for example, expresses the same singular proposition as
(1), and Pierre believes the singular proposition expressed by (1).
-But,' one might object, 'Pierre dissents from (3), (4), and (7). He
has reasons for doing so. Finally, he does not believe that he believes
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the propositions that they express.'
This is all quite correct. Pierre has. what seem to him to be, good
reasons for dissenting from (3 ), (4 ) and m’ (7)
’ and he does not believe
-t he believes the positions that they express - Pierre dissents
from (3) because he believes that the city his friends call 'London' is
not pretty. Given his belief thai- •<. , .at the city his friends call 'London' is
not pretty, he certainly has good reasons to believe that (3) expresses a
false proposition, and (so far as we know) he has no reason to believe
that he believes false position that it might express. Pierre
dissents from (4) because he believes both that the city his friends call
'Londres' is pretty and that the city his friends call 'London' is not
pretty. He has reasons for believing that (4) expresses a false
proposition, and he has no reason to think that he believes any false
proposition if might express. Finally, Pierre dissents from (7) because
he believes, say, that 'London' and 'London' "codesignate." He has
reason to think that (7) exDres^p^ a _ .p ses a false proposition, and no reason to
think that he believes any false proposition it might express.
We have considered Pierre's doxastic state before he learns that
'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. Let us now consider what happens
once he discovers that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate.
When Pierre learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate, he will:
reconsider his dispositions toward (1), ( 2 ), and (3): withdraw his assent
from (5) and (8); continue to assent to (6); acquire a disposition to
assent to (4); and continue to dissent from (7).
Pierre will reconsider (1), (2), and (3) because he believes: that
'Londres' and 'London' codesignate; that if ’Londres' and 'London'
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codesignate, then ( 1 ) is equivalent to (3); and that if .Lo„dres' and
'London, codesignate, then <2> is equivalent to the denial of (,). „e
also has reason to believe that if he believes both the proposition
expressed by ( 1 ) and the proposition expressed by ( 2 ), then he has
inconsistent beliefs. Since he does not want to have inconsistent
beliefs, he will set about deciding whether or not London is pretty (or
whether or not there is- a sense in which one and the same city can be
both pretty and non-pretty).
Pierre with withdraw his assent from (5) (alternatively, from (8))
because he now believes both that ’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate and
that if ’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate, then the proposition
expressed by (5) (alternatively, by (8)) is false.
Pierre will remain disposed to assent to (6) because he has been
given no reason to believe that it expresses a false proposition (and he
still has reason to believe it expresses a true proposition). He will
acquire a disposition to assent to (4) because he now believes both that
’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate
_and that if ’Londres’ and ’London’
codesignate, then (4) is equivalent to (6).
Finally, Pierre will remain disposed to dissent form (7) because he
has been given no reason to believe that it expresses a true proposition
(and he still has reason to believe that it expresses a false
proposition)
.
Before he learns that ’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate, Pierre
believes the singular propositions expressed by (1), (2), (5), (6), and
(8); he has inconsistent beliefs. Subsequent to his discovery that
’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate, Pierre will withhold his assent to
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(1> and (2 ). until he straightens things out it , „
„„
^ 0U
' l uould be premature toaa, that he believes the singular position that London is pretty or
that he believes the singular position that London is not prett. He
«lll be disposed to dissent from (5) and win .) ll not otherwise behave as if
ondres is not identical with London; and, therefore, based on what we
*now about Pierre, we conclude that he stops believing the singular
Proposition that Londres is not identical with London. He continues to
believe the singular proposition that London is London. Finally, since
Pierre is no longer disposed to behave as if Londres is pretty and London
- not pretty, and no longer assents to (8), we conclude that he no
longer believes the singular proposition that Londres is pretty and
London is not pretty.
In Chapter IV, I said that a solution to Kripke's puzzle must explain
what, if any, new beliefs Pierre acquires (or old beliefs he discards)
when he discovers that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. I have now
done just that.
I have said that (before he learns that 'Londres' and 'London'
oodesignate) Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London
ia not pretty; and, therefore, that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. I
have explained why, if the second alternative is correct, and if we
reason only from either our qualitative or our personal beliefs, there is
nothing wrong with holding that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. I have
explained how we can avoid the contradiction entailed by Pierre's
dispositions toward (1) and (3) together with Kripke's principles.
Finally, I have explained what happens to Pierre's doxastic state when he
learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate. In doing these things, I
have given the general outline of a solution to Kripke's puzzle.
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Notes
' In frlPke <1979
’ P ' 257-258,
‘ In P^vate conversation Kripke
inconsistent beliefs.
3
In Marcus (1 981, 1 983).
In Lewi s (1981 ). •
“These views were discussed in the preceding chapter.
^
are aSSUmlng th3t <5) count as sentences of English.
There is another problem for this explanation. Had we reasoned to
the conclusions that Pierre believes that London is pretty and that
Pierre believes that if London is pretty, then New York is pretty via
Pierre's assents to English sentences, we would expect him to be able to
Now York is DPoifv D.,fpr ett y . But, we reasoned to the conclusion that
Pierre believes that London is pretty via his assent to a French
sentence, and do not expect him to be able to infer that New York is
pretty. The explanation at hand offers nothing to account for this
difference in expectations. But, in light of the fact that Pierre's
beliefs are the same in both cases, an acceptable explanation must
account for such a difference.
70f course, this does not follow from (L5)i it follows when the
semantics Lewis has in mind are extended, in the usual way, to handle
negations
.
8 In Lewis (1981, p. 286).
9 It should be clear from these two passages that Lewis has Pierre in
wb . Of course, Lewis's own "official view" is that Pierre in not in wb ,
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rather one of Pierre's counterparts is i n w •f b . Lewis is careful to
present his case so that- it- a
, 0
^ * d°eS "0t de >e"d on his own official view.
This is taken up on page 156.
"The sort of no„-qualitative beliefs I have in mind are beliefs
whose object are singular propositions which are not personal to the
believer. This is discussed in detail starting on page 153. The claim
itself is considered on' pages 156.
12
«e might want to allow that a proposition, p, is personal to a
Person, x, (at his current time, t, and in his current location, 1), jUst
in case (i) p is a singular position and (ii) either (a) x is the sole
individual constituent of p or (b) either x and t, or x and 1, or x, t,
and 1 are the sole individual constituents of p.
^Suppose that Pierre says, 'I am wise,' and that he sees a man, dubs
him 'Peter,' judges him unwise, and says, 'Peter is not wise,' when,
unbeknownst to Pierre, he is the man he is seeing. Apparently, Pierre
believes both that he is wise and that he is not wise. As I have
characterized personal beliefs, Pierre seems to have inconsistent
personal beliefs; nevertheless, Pierre is in no position to spot the
inconsistency.
Such an example points out a defect in my characterization of a
personal belief. A belief can be non-personal even though its object is
one of the believer's own personal propositions, but only the believer's
personal propositions can be objects of his personal beliefs. In
addition to having one of the believer's own personal propositions for
its object, a personal belief is a belief such that its believer is
disposed to use sentence ’0(1),' where >0(1)' is a sentence that contains
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st least one occurrenop nr <-u~ „of the personal pronoun
'I,' contains no other
non-descriptional singular terms that de3ignate the° i believer, and is such
that if used by the believer, it would express thpP e personal proposition
which is the belief’s object.
By this definition, one of Pierre's two beliefs, namely his belief
that he is not wise, is not a personal belief. Pierre is not disused to
assent to 'I am not wise. As such an ex^ple does not enter into the
issues we are discussing, I will continue to use the original definition
in the main body of the text.
'“That is, for example, Pierre does not believe this: that he
believes the proposition that (3) expresses Ti- i ^ *.. it is not to say that
Pierre does not believe this* K n •at he believes the proposition that
London is pretty.
Vchapter
belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content
in this chapter three views about the connection between belief,
linguistic behavior, and positional content are compared: what I call
"the naive view,.' what I call »the Russellean view,. and my oun vlew
. ,
show how the view I hold can be applied to the problem, of significant,
true, identity sentences and to the problem of the apparent failure of
the substitutivity of codesignating names. Finally, I explain why I
prefer my view, and the solution it affords to Kripke-s puzzle, to the
sort of view, and solution, that Lewis apparently favors.
Section One
Each of the three views about the connection between belief,
linguistic behavior, and propositional content consists of two theses.
According to the naive view, when a speaker uses a name sentence, and
thereby succeeds in expressing a proposition, the proposition he
expresses is a singular proposition partly constituted by the object(s)
designated by the name(s) contained in the sentence he uses. Also
according to the naive view, such a speaker says what he says because he
believes the singular proposition he thereby expresses; that very
proposition was directly involved in the deliberations that led him to
use the sentence he used.
According to the Russellean view, when such a speaker uses a name
sentence, he thereby expresses seme qualitative proposition, not a
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singular proposition,
speaker says what he
Also according to the Russe
says because he believes the
he thereby expresses.
Hean picture, such a
Qualitative proposition
I hold that when such a speaker nses a name sentenoe, he thereby
expresses a singular proposition partly constituted by the objects
designated by the name(s) contained In the sentence he uses. I„
addition, I hold that such a speaker says what he says because of his
qualitative and personal beliefs* and nnfIS
* ot because he believes the
singular proposition he thereby expresses th* « •y P * T e singular proposition he
®^P*"®sses played no role in tho , .the deliberations, reasonings, or thought
processes that led him to use the sentence he used.
The naive view and the Russellean view are at odds over both the
propositions speakers express by their uses of name sentences and the
propositions on the mind of speakers when they use name sentences. I
agree with the naive picture about the propositions speakers express by
their uses of name sentences, and I agree with the Russellean picture
about the beliefs on the minds of speakers when they use name sentences
.
2
Note that, despite their disagreement over both the propositions
speakers express by their uses of name sentences and the propositions on
the mind of speakers who use name sentences, the naive view and the
Russellean view agree about this: when a speaker uses a name sentence he
does so because he believes the proposition he thereby expresses.
Against the naive view and the Russellean view, I hold that it is
generally not the case that when a speaker uses a name sentence, he does
so because he believes the proposition he thereby expresses.
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Kecan that, in Chapter I. I said that our uses of nane sentenoes
generate two distinct questions: First, what hind of proposition,
singular or qualitative, is expressed by an ordinary use of a sentence
that contains a proper name? Second, what hind of belief is ordinarily
on the mind of a speaher when he uses a sentence that contains a proper
name? Each of the three views offers its own answer to each of these
questions. Recall that I also maintained that we have been ill-served by
our failure to observe the distinction between the two questions and
misled by the assumption that when we answer the first question we have,
thereby, also answered the second question. That distinction is
carefully preserved under the view I favor, and I have explicitly denied
that when we answer the first question we have, thereby, answered the
second question.
Our tendency to conflate the two questions is what gives force to at
least two of the major problems for the Millian theory of names. These
are the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and the problem
of the apparent failure of the substitutiv ity of codesignating names.
Section Two
The problem of significant, true, identity sentences is of interest
to us for two reasons. First, it is one of the major problems
confronting the Millian theory of names. Second, when Kripke raised his
puzzle about belief, he explicitly linked the puzzle to the general
problem of the apparent failure of substitutiv ity of codesignating
names—which problem may be regarded as the genus of which the problem of
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significant, true. Identity sentences is a species.3 A solution to
Kripke's puzzle might, therefore, be expected to have application to
these problems.
Suppose that Smith is our speaker, and that Smith assents to
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus
but dissents from, or withholds assent to,
(2) Hesperus
-is Phosphorus.
According to the Millian theory, since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
codesignate, (1) and (2) express the same proposition. Still, (1) and
(2) seem to differ in cognitive significance. (1) is (nearly)
cognitively insignificant, or trivial, whereas (2) is cognitively
significant, or non-trivial. Even one so sympathetic to the Millian
theory as Kripke concedes as much, when he writes:
My view [is] that the English sentence 'Hesperus is
Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue
while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not. (1 980a, p. 20)
The problem confronting the Millian is this: to explain how two
sentences which express the same proposition can differ in cognitive
significance.
This problem is especially acute when the Millian theory is teamed
with the naive picture of the connection between belief, linguistic
behavior, and propositional content. According to the explanation most
naturally recommended by the naive picture, when Smith assents to (1), he
does so because he believes the singular proposition that (1) expresses;
and, also according to the naive picture, when Smith dissents from, or
withholds his assents to (2), he does so because he does not believe the
singular proposition that (2) expresses. This sort of explanation seems
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adequate when the sentences involved express diff «.a erent propositions;
however, it collapses when as in 4-hot' u , the case of (1) and to\ 4-uthe sentences
ln qUeStl°" 6XPreSS the
The HiHian needs a better
explanation.
A better explanation is offered by my view. According to my view
two sentences can express the sMe singular proposition. Qr _ ^ _
propositional content,
-even the reasons sufficient for a speaker to
ent to the one are not sufficient for the same speaker to assent to
the other. Smith need only acquire the nearly trivial qualitative belief
that the celestial body called 'Hesperus' is the celestial body called
'Hesperus* to be ready to assent to (1 ). But he wil l nniv DU1: n l ot assent to (2)
until he acquires such a qualitative belief as the belief that the
celestial body called
-Hesperus- is identical with the celestial body
called
-Phosphorus.' This second qualitative belief is far more
significant than the first one. When we understand that we assent to
sentences which express singular propositions only because of our
qualitative (or personal) beliefs, we can see our way toward being
Mil 1 ians while at the same time acknowledging that sentences like (1) and
(2) differ in cognitive significance. The cognitive significance of
sentences that express singular propositions is to be understood in terms
of the qualitative (or personal) beliefs required for sincere, reflective
assent. The qualitative (or personal) beliefs required for sincere,
reflective assent to (1) are far less significant than the qualitative
(or personal) beliefs required for sincere, reflective assent to (2).
My view suggests a promising approach to the problem of significant,
true, identity sentences. Let us now see how it applies to the general
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problem of the apparent faUuce of subsUtutivity of codes lg„a tlng „Me,
Sxnce the problem of significant, true, identity sentences is a
special case of the problem of the apparent failure of substitute ity, it
is reasonable to expect: (i) that the phenomena involved in the two
hinds of cases is similar; (ii) that the explanation offered by the naive
pioture fails for similar reasons; and (Hi) that the explanation given
in terms of my view is similar to the one already given in the case of
significant, true, identity sentences.
Let us suppose that Smith is our speaker and that Smith is disposed
to assent to
(3) Hesperus is visible,
but disposed to dissent from, or withhold assent to,
(4) Phosphorus is visible.
According to the Millian theory, since 'Hesperus* and 'Phosphorus* name
the same thing, (3) and (4) express the same proposition. The problem
facing the Millian is this: to explain how two sentences which express
the same proposition could be such that a speaker who is disposed to
assent to the one is not disposed to assent to the other. Clearly, this
problem is similar to the problem posed by significant, true, identity
sentences
.
The explanation most naturally suggested by the naive picture goes as
follows. Smith is disposed to assent to (3) because he believes the
singular proposition that (3) expresses. He is not disposed to assent to
(4) because he does not yet believe the singular proposition it
expresses. As in the case of significant, true, identity sentences, this
explanation gets by when the sentences involved express distinct singular
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propositions. But. as in +-k~3 l the °ase of si6nifleant, true, Identity
sentences, the explanation collapses when as in the’ case of (3) and (4),
the sentences involved exnrassp e the same proposition. Again, the Millian
is in the market for a better explanation.
Such an explanation is provided by my view. According to my view, a
person's reasons for assenting to (3) may differ from his reasons for
assenting to (4), despite the fact that (3) and (4) express the same
proposition. Once Smith acquires the qualitative belief that the
celestial body called
-Hesperus' is visible, he will be ready to assent
to (3); still, he need not be ready to assent to (4). Smith will
withhold his assent to (4) until he acquires such a qualitative belief as
the belief that the celestial body called 'Phosphorus' is visible.
Certainly, a person could cone to believe that the celestial body called
’Hesperus' is visible without thereby coming to believe that the
celestial body called 'Phosphorus' is visible. The view adopted here
allows us to explain apparent failures of substitutivity without
forsaking the Millian theory. Such apparent failures are merely
a pparent
,
and not genuine
,
failures of the substitutivity of
codesignating proper names.
The view I hold points the way toward solutions of the problems
raised by significant, true, identity sentences and by apparent failures
of substitutivity. My view suggests that certain well-known puzzles
involving belief and proper names result from our failure to realize that
we use belief ascription sentences to perform two distinct, though
related, functions. First we use belief ascription sentences to
characterize the mental state of the (alleged) believer, to name the
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propositions he has before hilus mind, the propositions he reasons with.
This is the normal function of belief ascription sentences whose that-
c lauses name qualitative proposition, Second, we use belief ascription
sentences to say something about the way in which the (alleged)
believer's mental state connects with, hooks into, or matches up to
objects in the world. This is the normal function of belief ascription
sentences whose that-clauses name singular propositions.
We have shown a tendency to let our thinking about beliefs whose
objects are qualitative (or personal) propositions influence our thinking
about beliefs whose objects are singular (non-personal) propositions.
For example, we think that a person who has inconsistent qualitative (or
personal) beliefs is, at least in principle, in a position to detect the
inconsistency. This influences our thinking about beliefs whose objects
are singular (non-personal) propositions. Hence, when a speaker affirms
both that Hesperus is visible and that Phosphorus is not visible and we
think he is not, even in principle, in a position to see that he has
inconsistent beliefs, we conclude that he does not have inconsistent
beliefs. This, in turn, leads us to conclude that, contrary to the
Mill ian theory of the meaning of proper names, (3) and (4) express
different propositions. If, however, my view is correct, we need not
accept either conclusion. For, according to my view, when a speaker
performs a speech act using a sentence that expresses a singular
proposition, he does so because of his qualitative (or personal) beliefs.
If the position developed here is correct, then some of what has been
taken for data that decisively refutes the Millian theory can be regarded
as data that must be taken into account in reforming our views about the
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connection between belief l i ncm-i „ K~u
, inguistic behavior, and propositional
content. We must not take it for granted that when speakers use
sentences that contain proper names, they do so because they believe the
Singular propositions they thereby express. The belief on the mind of a
speaker when he uses a sentence that contains a proper name is rarely, if
ever, a belief whose object is the singular proposition he thereby
expresses.
Section Three
In Chapter IV, we considered two radically opposed views about what
kinds of propositions people believe and the function of belief
ascription sentences whose that-clauses contain proper names. According
to the view (apparently) favored by Lewis, the objects of beliefs are
qualitative propositions and such belief ascription sentences are
ordinarily used to attribute qualitative beliefs. In my view, we believe
both personal and non-personal singular propositions, in addition to
qualitative propositions, and such belief ascription sentences are
ordinarily used to attribute non-qualitative (non-personal) beliefs. In
this section, I will explain why I prefer my view to its rival.
I have the following intuition : that there are two possible worlds
W
1
and w 2 » and a person, x, such that: x inhabits both w-, and w 2 ; for x,
wi and w2 are qualitatively indistinguishable; everything x believes at
W
1
is true at w-j ; but not everything x believes at w2 is true at w2 . I
prefer my view over its rival in part because my view does, whereas its
rival does not, preserve this intuition.
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Because w, and w2 are qualitatively Indistinguishable for x, x has
all and only the same qualitative beliefs in w
,
and ^ slnoe ^ ^
are qualitatively indistinguishable for x, and every qualitative
proposition x believes at w • ,
i
is true at wi (recalli ^ that everything x
believes at w, is true at w,>. every qualitative proposi^TT^Tieves
at w2 is true at w2 . If the view Lewis prefers were correct, then, since
x could believe only qualitative propitious, and every qualitative
proposition x believes at w2 ls true at w2 , everything x believes at w2
is t ru 6 st
In this way the view Lewis prefers is hostile to my reported
intuition. My view is not. It allows that x believes both personal and
non-personal singular propositions. Therefore, while all of x's
qualitative believes are true at w2 it does not follow that everything x
believes at W2 is true at W2 .
I also have an intuition about the role played by singular
propositions in our understanding and evaluation of uses of belief
ascription sentences whose that-clauses contain proper names. Suppose
that Jones uses this sentence:
(5) Smith believes that Hesperus is visible,
to issue a report on Smith’s doxastic state. I have the following
.intuition about Jones’s use of (5): when Jones used (5), what he said is
true if and only if Smith has as an object of one of his beliefs a
proposition which is true if and only if the singular proposition that
Hesperus is visible is true. My intuition assigns the singular
proposition that Hesperus is visible a central role in our understanding
and evaluation of Jones’s use of (5).
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This is not to deny that when so understood such reports may be
either
-Heading or Incomplete. They may be misleading in that they
give rise to false expectations. They may be inc^plete in that they
leave out some significant information.
For example, suppose that Jones is speaking to Brown when Jones uses
(5). In my view. Jones thereby attributes to Smith a belief whose object
is the singular proposition that Hesperus is visible. If Brown
understands and accepts what Jones had said. Brown will attribute the
same belief to Smith. Suppose that Smith does not believe that
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' codesignate, and that he is disposed to
assent to
(3) Hesperus is visible
but not to
(4) Phosphorus is visible.
Brown knows that the two names codesignate; however, he does not know
that Smith does not believe that they codesignate. He expects Smith to
be disposed to assent to (3) and to (4).
In this way, Jones's report has given rise to a false expectation.
There is a sense in which the report is misleading. If Jones is aware
that Smith does not believe that the two names codesignate and also
believes that Brown is not, then Jones should complete his report by
adding that information. This in no way suggests that my intuition about
our understanding and evaluation of Jones's use of (5) is defective. Any
information Jones adds to fill in his report will be consistent with his
attributing to Smith a belief that has as its object a proposition that
182
is true if and only if the singular
is true. 1*
proposition that Hesperus is visible
It is by no means dear that my view's rivai can he developed in a
way that preserves this intuition. M y view preserves it directly. This
is another reason why I prefer my view.
It is far from clear that my view's rival can he developed in a way
that avoids every version of the Attitude-Context Objection.5 flny number
of qualitative beliefs might give rise to a person's linguistic behavior.
The view Lewis favors must be developed so that a person who attributes a
belief somehow selects £nd expresses (one of) the correct qualitative
propositions) among the many that might have given rise to the behavior
which is the attribution's basis. Pertaes a bit of semantic machinery
can be devised to make the truth-conditions of a belief ascription made
m a carefully described situation dependent on (one of) the correct
qualitative proposition s). But, if the view Lewis favors were correct,
people who report on the beliefs of others would somehow manage to select
and express (one of) the correct qualitative propositions. A semantic
device which succeeded in identifying (one of) the correct qualitative
proposition(s) would not thereby explain how we do it. Yet, if the view
Lewis favors is correct, we do it often and with little effort. I favor
my view over its rival in part because (unlike its rival) my view clearly
avoids the Attitude-Context Objection, and also in part, because (unlike
my view) its rival requires that we frequently exercise skills I think we
lack
.
The final reason I favor my view over its rival is that unlike its
rival, my view admits solutions to Kripke’s puzzle and related problems
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» 1 cull CO •
which preserve the Hll
l
lan theory of proper
theory is false—and we have reasons to think It Is—then,
theory cotes along, the Millian theory is the only theory
description
until a new
we have.
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Notes
1 -The naive view is discussed
5).
in some detail in Stalnaker ( 1 97 9, p. i_
‘In this regard, Russell wrote:
.
. . the thought in the mind of a person usimr a ^name correctly can generallv nniv P
” lnS a proper
replace the proper name by a [definite]"^ W6
3See Kripke (1980a, p. 251, 253-259, and 267).
“An opponent might counter that Jones could very well follow his use
of (5) with a use of
(6) But Smith does not believe that Phosphorus is visible.
My intuition is so strong that I would conclude either that Jones has
inferred too much from Smith’s withheld assent to (4) or that Jones's
should be interpreted non- literally. I would ask him what he meant, and
hope that he would not say, ' I meant just what I said.’
5 See Chapter I, page 1 1.
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